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"THE FIRST RED CLAUSEWITZ": FRIEDRICH ENGELS AND EARLY
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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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
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ABSTRACT

THE FIRST RED CLAUSEWITZ: FRIEDRICH ENGELS AND EARLY SOCIALIST MILITARY THEORY, by MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA, 150 pages.

Between the European revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Friedrich Engels functioned as a writer, analyst, and critic concerning military affairs. His most essential commentaries were published, disseminated, and internalized by supporters of the proletarian revolution. This project concentrates on the tactical, operational, and technical aspects of Engels' military thought and the development of his concepts from his earliest writings until the Franco-Prussian War. Historians and commentators routinely ignore these aspects of military theory in examinations of Engels' work. This project will demonstrate that Engels possessed a remarkable level of military knowledge and a degree of insight at the operational and tactical levels of warfare and that that he should be considered not only as an important social and economic thinker, but also among the most significant contributors to the field of nineteenth- and twentieth-century military history and theory. Engels' most significant contributions exist in the manner by which he, as a key member of the socialist leadership in the nineteenth century, integrated the concept of armed insurgency into the conduct of a proletarian revolution. By drawing on the experiences of the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon, and then the impact of mass industrialization, Engels was the first person to specifically incorporate a force dynamic into the trajectory of a socialist revolution. Despite the fact that he was a civilian with no formal military training beyond service as a Prussian artilleryman in 1842, his contributions to the field of revolutionary military theory earn him distinction as one of the most important socialist writers of the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Revolutions of 1848 introduced a new paradigm of conflict through Europe. Masses of people rose up against authoritarian monarchies across the continent. By the summer of 1849 most of these uprisings had been put down. The uprisings demonstrated, however, new political awareness among the participants. They also entailed the use of new methods of organized violence. The fighting of 1848 and 1849 first proclaimed a new style of warfare simultaneously involving royal armies, democratic “national” armies, militia units, and groups of ordinary citizens. In this new style of warfare, the standard set piece Napoleonic battle was less dominant than unstructured conflict: guerrilla operations, disorganized urban fighting, or the mobilization and use of untrained citizen forces. It was amid these upheavals that the young socialist writer Friedrich Engels first began to comment on the military developments and actions of Europe. His writings on military topics would span nearly fifty years before his death, in 1895, and would prove to be an important developmental foundation for Marxist and socialist movements for over one hundred years, even into the twenty-first century. It was, however, during the first two decades of his writing, from the midcentury revolutions until the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, that the most critical of his commentaries were published, disseminated, and internalized by supporters of the proletarian revolution. From 1848 through 1871 Friedrich Engels functioned as a writer, analyst, and critic concerning military affairs, and certainly earned the sobriquet of “The Red Clausewitz.”

General Investigation, Background, and Context of the Problem

It is not difficult to find works that focus on Engels. He has been the subject of many authors who demonstrate his importance to central issues of nineteenth-century ideologies and social and economic movements. Within these works, his career as a military critic and correspondent is usually mentioned. Most authors, however, severely limit themselves when

addressing Engels' accomplishments and usually fail to present a balanced view of Engels' military writings. Studies of Engels' work almost always address his contribution to the strategic level, on occasion evaluate his observations on the operational level, but very rarely so much as mention the tactical element. In addition, the focus of most of these studies remains locked into a nineteenth-century framework. Few studies address the subsequent impact that Engels and his theories made upon twentieth-century Marxist revolutionaries and movements. Fewer still appreciate the manner in which he made use of historical examples from the eighteenth century, primarily examples from the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon's campaigns, to ground his commentaries.

This project concentrates on the tactical, operational, and technical aspects of Engels' military thought and the development of his thought from his earliest writings until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Historians and commentators routinely ignore these aspects of military theory in examinations of Engels' work. Only when analyzing the breadth of his commentaries and ideas on doctrine at all levels of organization and execution can one gain a full and complete picture of his theory of war. Beyond that, after realizing such understanding, the true and lasting impact of Engels' writings becomes apparent. This project does not focus on the strategic aspects of Engels' socialist theory of war. That has been evaluated in depth by a number of authors, most ably Martin Berger, Wolfram Wette, and W. B. Gallie.¹ Instead, this project will demonstrate that Engels possessed a remarkable level of military knowledge and a degree of insight at the operational and tactical levels and that he should be considered not only as an important social and economic thinker, but also among the most significant contributors to the field of nineteenth- and twentieth-century military history and theory. The critical contributions exist in the manner by which Engels, as a key member of the socialist leadership in the nineteenth century, integrated the concept of armed insurgency into the dynamics of a proletarian revolution. By drawing on the experiences of the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon, and then the

impact of mass industrialization, Engels was the first person to specifically incorporate a force dynamic into the trajectory of a socialist revolution. Despite the fact that he was a civilian with no formal military training beyond service as a Prussian artilleryman in 1842, his contributions to the field of revolutionary military theory earn him distinction as one of the most important socialist writers of the nineteenth century.

In military matters, Marx preferred to develop his expositions within the realm of political economy and social class warfare. David McLellan, in his biography of Marx, rarely mentions his subjects' opinion regarding military topics unless they related to either the "arming of the people" or the outbreak of a vast, European war.² Marx's knowledge of military affairs and technical developments was well short of the mark set by his friend Engels. As Berger writes, "In military studies it was Marx who deferred to his colleague; in the vital matter of tactics Engels was the originator, and not simply a vulgarizer of Marx's ideas."³ On the rare occasions when Marx wrote about specific military campaigns and operations, he seldom was able to grasp specific tactical, operational, or strategic concepts and actions. He focused his efforts on the strategy of revolution and on how it related to the inevitable ascendancy of the proletariat.

Engels, on the other hand, displayed far more competence as a military correspondent. While never deviating from the political and economic ideological positions of Marx, he demonstrated a remarkable degree of knowledge and understanding about military matters. He demonstrated more ability to understand and interpret the military actions of the midcentury revolutions than did Marx, who emphasized general ideology at the expense of specific doctrine and willingly deferred to and borrowed from his friend when discussing military matters.⁴ Engels' evaluations and analyses of battles and campaigns utilized his comprehension of many different facets of armed conflict, such as terrain and force capabilities. His methods of evaluation involved standards of examination that are often used in modern battle analyses.

It was in understanding tactical doctrine that Marx and Engels were at their greatest distance from each other. Marx did not spend a great deal of time discussing precise aspects of battlefield behavior. When he did, he regressed into a polemical argument not based on rational military considerations. For instance, when he discussed the Prussian behavior at the Battle of Wreschen, a victory against the Poles, he condemned the Prussians for cowardice in their actions: "They fled to a distance at which they could fire grapeshot, grenades containing 150 bullets, and shrapnel against pikes and scythes which, as is well known cannot be effective at a distance." The act of using weapons to their full advantage was nothing new in the field of warfare, but Marx branded it "Prussian treachery" against the helpless Poles. While hardly condoning Prussian oppression, Engels never adopted so absurd a position as criticizing a commander for employing his forces in the most effective manner.⁵

Engels filled a gap in the development of military studies that tied in the idea of revolution and war at different levels into the military and intellectual landscape of embryonic Marxist movements in the nineteenth century. He presented new concepts of warfare, from light operations and partisan warfare to guerrilla fighting and military operations on urban terrain, which were not explored in detail by other contemporary military theorists. Finally, Engels combined the first two points into the idea of a socialist revolution, therefore inserting a force dynamic into the socialist movement.

The Life of Friedrich Engels and the European Nineteenth Century

Friedrich Engels was born in 1820 in the German town of Barmen, in the Rhineland. His family was middle class and financial well off; his father had accumulated a respectable living trading cotton. He anticipated a similar lifestyle from his son and was horrified in the 1840s when young Friedrich, following a tour of duty as a bombardier in Prussian military service, began to associate with radical friends who followed the strictures of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Among these "Young Hegelians," whom Engels met while stationed

in Berlin in 1841 and 1842, were D. F. Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and later, Karl Marx. It was during these years that Engels first began to study the world and the history of human progression from a perspective of economic productivity and to perceive certain injustices in the modern, industrial world.⁶

Anxious to steer his son to more “bourgeois” tendencies, Engels’ father sent him to Manchester, England, to oversee the family’s business holdings in England in 1842. Engels did not see this exile as punishment; on the contrary, he wished to go there to witness personally the plight of the workingman in an industrial city. The destitution and deplorable conditions he saw during the next two years influenced him to write the work for which he earned the most notoriety, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. In this study, Engels examined the plight of the modern proletariat in the new, rapidly expanding, industrial society. He proposed that the predicament of the working class necessitated a new world order that would be created by a social revolution, entailing communal possession of assets and the means of productivity.⁷ Engels began to formulate many concepts within this examination that in later years figured prominently in his study of military subjects, such as the function of factories serving as an agent to instill class discipline, a necessary ingredient of any insurrectionary movement.

Engels served as a revolutionary activist for the next five years of his life. In two specific cases, his impact was noteworthy and of lasting importance. First, during the events of 1848 and 1849, he wrote as a correspondent for radical newspapers, most prominently the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* out of Cologne. In this capacity, Engels took a very active interest in the events in Hungary during the last few months of 1848 and the first few months of 1849 and received high praise from many sources for his discerning coverage of events. Second, he served as an active partaker in an armed revolution. This endeavor occurred in the summer of 1849, when Engels participated in the abortive Palatinate uprising. While unsuccessful, Engels gained a reputation as a brave and competent (compared to his untrained peers), though not brilliant, military leader.⁸

Following the failure of the midcentury revolutions across Europe, the deflated Engels began living something of a “dual” lifestyle, serving as a middle-class factory owner and manager by day and as a revolutionary activist by night.⁹

For the next twenty years, until 1869, Engels continued to write for revolutionary causes and while not physically active across Europe, continued to look eagerly for the conditions that would initiate the coming--and inevitable--proletarian revolution. At the same time, he continued to oversee his family's holdings in England, despite his father's death in 1860 and frequent legal grievances with his business partner. In spite of these distractions, Engels proved to be an astute and wise businessman and retired from the business in 1869 with substantial financial holdings. The fact that his retirement coincided with the onset of the Franco-Prussian War, the latest parameters of this study, provides an intriguing element to the period of Engels' writing career.

Engels remained active in socialist and Marxist circles after his retirement, although his energies increasingly focused on supporting his good friend Karl Marx, both monetarily and emotionally. It was Engels who encouraged Marx to continue his writings, and it was Engels who finished editing and ensured publication of the last volume of *Capital* after Marx's death. Adding to the benefits of wise investments, Engels retained excellent health, with a brief exception in the late 1850s, until the final years of his life. He never married, although he had many female companions throughout his life. Engels passed away in 1895 at his residence in London, leaving a substantial inheritance to, among others, the surviving daughters of Karl Marx.¹⁰

Engels was fortunate to live in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century. During the years of writings examined in this study, Engels witnessed numerous conflicts across Europe and the world. He spent his early years living in a world that freshly remembered the wars of Napoleon, where numerous innovations initiated by the French Emperor and his opponents were being introduced across Europe, such as the concept of a nation-at-arms and the

advent of professional military schooling. Engels began his professional writing career with frequent observations of the midcentury revolutions, which raged in many different venues from France to southeastern Europe. In the 1850s, he continued to comment on the revolutions, as well as the contemporary conflicts in the Crimean Peninsula (1853-1856), India (1857-1858), Italy (1859), and throughout the colonial world. The amount of available material to examine did not slacken in the 1860s, with the occurrence of the American Civil War and the Wars of German Unification.¹¹

The revolutions of the midcentury were triggered by events in France in 1848, when social unrest caused the abdication of the last French monarch, Louis Philippe, and the creation of a republic. The new republic was shattered by reactionary suppression in June (the "June Days") and by the end of the year, France was under the rule of Louis Napoleon, the great Emperor's nephew.¹² For the rest of Europe, however, the actions in France called socialist movements to action throughout the continent. In the first four months of 1848, barricade fighting occurred in Berlin, Krakow, Budapest, Vienna, Milan, Naples, and Venice, as well as Paris. Even though many of these uprisings achieved initial success, by the end of the following year reactionary forces had suppressed all insurrections of any significance. For a brief period, though, embryonic socialist factions saw the potential for a revolution that would sweep away the old order.

Engels held to the promise of the coming revolution just as firmly as most of his contemporaries and focused his analytical efforts on events in the Habsburg Empire. Within the Imperial sphere, two particular regions held great importance for the insurgency: northern Italy and Hungary. In northern Italy, Italian nationalistic armies under the leadership of Charles Albert of Sardinia united to drive Austrian forces across the Alps. In one and one-half years of campaigning, however, the Austrian forces of Marshal Josef Radetzky soundly defeated Charles Albert's armies. Following the July 1848, Battle of Custoza and the March 1849, Battle of Novara, Austria regained control of its Italian holdings. While Engels commented on these

actions and frequently praised the elderly Radetzky throughout the ensuing decades, his primary effort during this period concerned the events in Hungary.

Events in Hungary ebbed and flowed between the initial Hungarian declaration of independence in April 1848, and the final defeat of the insurgent Magyars in August 1849. Initially, Croatian forces invaded Hungary in support of the Habsburgs, soon followed by a Hungarian advance toward Vienna. In early 1849, however, Habsburg troops under Marshal Count Alfred zu Windischgrätz defeated the Hungarians of Arthur von Görgey and captured Budapest. The momentum shifted again in the following months, and a renewed offensive by Görgey drove Austrian forces from Hungarian territory by May 1849, and threatened Vienna. To this point, Engels faithfully recorded the events in Hungary and vociferously pushed the Magyar cause. Following Görgey's spring success, Engels put down his pen and began his participation in the German insurrections in Baden and the Palatinate of the summer, which were swiftly defeated by Prussian forces within a few months. Thus, he never commented directly on the final Hungarian defeats, which occurred following the Russian intervention in Hungary (which Engels foresaw) in June.¹³

In the 1850s, the military event on which Engels wrote most frequently was the Crimean War of 1853-1856. In 1853, Russian Tsar Nicholas I attempted to wrest control of the Turkish Straits from the Ottoman Empire. After preliminary operations in the Balkans, where Russia gained the upper hand, Britain and France entered the fray in March 1854, in order to prevent Russian control of the Straits and hence control of the eastern Mediterranean. The key to preventing these Russian actions, in the allies' eyes, was the destruction of Russian power in the Black Sea, which meant destruction of the port of Sevastopol. Campaigning toward the port from the peninsula, the allies' finally began the siege in October 1854. Eleven months later, the war concluded for all practical purposes with the fall of Sevastopol. The most significant aspect of

this war, as Engels repeatedly noted in his writings, was the abysmal performance of military leadership on both sides.¹⁴

Engels also began to devote much attention to the imperial conflicts that occurred in the 1850s, of which the British experience in India during the Great Mutiny of 1857-1858 was the most significant. The Mutiny, which lasted from May of 1857 until the following June, saw barbarous acts committed by both sides to a degree not common to the contemporary European mentality, such as the Cawnpore Massacre, where Indian troops massacred prisoners, and the British recapture of Lucknow, where Imperial troops engaged in random acts of violence against noncombatants in the subjugation of the city.¹⁵ British Imperial forces also met resistance in Asia, most notably in China during the Second Opium War, while French forces clashed with native insurrections both in China and Indochina.

The final conventional war in the 1850s on which Engels commented was the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 in Northern Italy. This short conflict, lasting only from the months of March to July, saw ferocious fighting between the Austrians and the French and Piedmontese fighting for Italian independence. Following the June battles of Magenta and Solferino, both moderate French and Piedmontese tactical victories, the combatants concluded the Conference of Villafranca that ended the war roughly on the status quo ante; no one was really satisfied by the peace. As a result, future revolutionary movements frequently blossomed in Italy, most notably those led during the next few years by Giuseppe Garibaldi.¹⁶

Engels wrote relatively little on the American Civil War, which was the next major conflagration involving modern armies. Most of his journalistic activities during the first half of the 1860s dealt with the reformation of European armies and the increased technology that made such transformation mandatory. As the decade progressed, the most significant development in Europe was, by far, the German drive towards unification. Following the rapid defeat of Denmark in 1864, Prussia, under the leadership of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, defeated

Austria in a matter of weeks in the summer of 1866, culminating with the decisive battle of Königgrätz. Five years later, Prussia completed the unification process following an overwhelming victory in the Franco-Prussian War. While Engels wrote relatively sparingly on the first two wars, he devoted considerable time to the study of operations in France.¹⁷ By the time this conflict arose, however, Engels had made significant contributions to the manner in which nineteenth-century socialists developed military concepts. As Europe entered a period of nearly one half of a century of continental peace and Engels entered the relative serenity of retirement, he stood as the foremost socialist military thinker of the period.

Engels' Vision: The Modern Portrayals

Commentaries on Engels' military studies fall into one of two broad groups. In the first group, the accounts simply detail the course of his military writings and refer to his nickname of "the General" without distinguishing why he received this title. These accounts take for granted that he was an expert in military matters and then move on to other topics that, to the authors, are more relevant and important than Engels' writings on nineteenth-century warfare. An additional handicap of this approach is that Engels' writers usually associate Engels with Marx, and no distinction is made between the thought process and analytical skills of the two. Oscar J. Hammen addresses the 1848 revolutions in his book, but fails to discuss in any detail the military analysis Engels provided on the Revolutions, particularly on the Hungarian uprising in late 1848 and early 1849. Hammen's focus remains on the possibilities of political and economic revolution in the German states provided by these events. He pushes aside military issues, and Engels' account of the events in Hungary is briefly described as "an oft repeated tale, impressive through its length alone."¹⁸ This offhanded dismissal fails to take into consideration the complex and insightful observations Engels made on the tactical situation in Hungary. Hammen goes even further by calling into question Engels' ability to formulate strategic doctrine when he portrays

Engels as without confidence when making judgments on revolutionary situations in the absence of Marx.¹⁹

Gustav Mayer, in his earlier biography of Engels, also does not fully appreciate the importance of Engels' military writings. Mayer never questions Engels' knowledge of military science, but does not see it as anything beyond a hobby, something that Engels' enjoyed commenting upon when not pressed with the greater weight of revolutionary projects.²⁰ The author mentions the military events of Engels' time briefly in passing. He even admits, in a few short, nonanalytical segments, to Engels' ability to provide some useful contributions to the field of military theory. For example, Mayer wrote, "With the help of a military handbook and the material which Marx collected for him in the British Museum, Engels began to write many articles on battles, armies, generals, fortification, army organization, and so on."²¹ In this account, the significant value of Engels' military writings stopped after the Austro-Prussian war, when Engels began to "stick to pure theory."²²

Two final works that fall into this first category are J. D. Hunley's *The Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels: A Reinterpretation* and D. Riazanov's *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*. Neither of these books completely brings the issue of Engels' military thought into their arguments. Hunley aims to dispel the notion that Marx and Engels had fundamentally different philosophical outlooks on politics, the economy, and society. Within the framework of his argument, military considerations figure very briefly.²³ Riazanov maintains a very pro-Marx attitude throughout his book. Engels correspondingly played a limited role, despite the book's title. For example, when commenting on the Revolutions of 1848, the author concentrates on the efforts of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in the political realm and concludes that the lessons learned from any military situation relating to these uprisings concerned the need to solve the economic inequity that existed.²⁴

Most studies of Engels fall into the second category. Here, the military validity of Engels' work is not questioned, but his contribution is only evaluated from a strategic perspective. Most authors feel that, as Berger states, "A critical study from a technical military viewpoint might indeed be interesting, but the revolutionary significance of Engels' military thinking is much more important."²⁵ These works give excellent accounts of Engels' theory of war in its formation, its development, and its future influence, but fail to consider the impact of his comprehension of the tactical elements in the scheme of military science. Though one cannot doubt the significance of the strategic and revolutionary level of Engels' commentaries, these elements should not stand alone.

Klaus Schreiner in *Die Badisch-Pfälzische Revolutionsarmee 1849* concentrates on the importance of the German Revolutions in shaping the revolutionary strategic thought of Engels, even above Marx. He asserts that they both drew many important conclusions from their participation in the military events of 1848 and 1849, but that they were of greatest value when placed in the context of a European Revolution. The author, writing for the East German Defense Ministry, regularly inserts Communist doctrine into his book, emphasizing that Marx's and Engels' values were later fully developed by later Soviet leaders, such as Lenin.²⁶ Schreiner does make reference to Engels' service as the adjutant to August Willich, and his service in the June 1849 campaign of the Willischen Freikorps. The author applauds Engels' service while fighting in the best of the revolutionary forces. Unfortunately, Schreiner does not develop this argument to demonstrate what tactical military lessons Engels learned from this experience.²⁷ This seems to be a common omission among twentieth-century Marxist interpretations of Engels' military writings.

Most authors tend to paint a portrait of Engels as a strategic thinker, with little regard to other contributions to the field. W. O. Henderson's huge two-volume biography of Engels addressed the military aspect in only one, forty-page chapter in this 800-plus page work. In this

plodding and quite colorless portrayal of Engels, Henderson offers various reasons for Engels' interest in military affairs, such as his desire to combat the opponents of the Communist League who had military experience and his search for the instigation of the revolution that would bring the proletariat to social and economic parity.²⁸ While these are some compelling reasons for Engels' interest, Henderson disappoints the reader by not pursuing promising leads regarding technical aspects of war. For instance, Henderson comments on Engels' suggestion to create standard organized battalions in state militia units, supported by regular army soldiers. This is a very forward-looking concept, complete with implications on the formation of future armies and mobilizations of societies, but Henderson does not explore its possibilities.²⁹ Henderson, with W. H. Chaloner, does attempt to address the issue of Engels' military thought by editing a collection of Engels' military writings, *Engels as Military Critic*. The introduction and commentary, however, are vague and lacking in analysis. The work also was published a number of years before Henderson's biography, indicating a possible change in perspective concerning the importance that Henderson placed on Engels' military writings.³⁰

Gallie addresses the issue of the Marxist theory of war in his book *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy*. This collection of essays treats Marx and Engels together, as similar entities, and does not give Engels the proper individual respect that he deserves. Gallie does a good job of summarizing the pattern of socialist thought on war and peace and of demonstrating the transition from war as a desired forerunner to European revolution to war as destructive anathema in the thought of (particularly) Engels. The focus of Gallie's study, however, is the philosophy of war and peace; tactical considerations have no part.³¹

The same can be said of Bernard Semmel's collection of primary source documents, *Marxism and the Science of War*. Like Gallie, the focus of his work is on the philosophy and ideology of Marxism and war. But he attempts to narrow it further by evaluating how Marxist

ideology both has been shaped by and helped to shape the science of war.³² The greatest value of Semmel's work lies in the excellent organization of his book and in the way in which he ties in the sequential theories of warfare from early Marxists to late-Soviet strategists and the influences that the former had upon the latter. Also to Semmel's credit is his focus on Engels as the primary and preeminent early Marxist military theoretician.³³ In terms of the conduct of war and the tactical, technical aspects, however, Semmel offers nothing that Gallie does not, nor does he attempt to.

The two works that possess the greatest significance for the issue of Engels' military significance are Martin Berger's *Engels, Armies, and Revolution: The Revolutionary Tactics of Classical Marxism* and Wolfram Wetze's *Kriegstheorien Deutscher Sozialisten: Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg: Ein Beitrag Zur Friedensforschung*. These two works best expostulate the character and development of Engels' theory of warfare. Berger demonstrates Engels' main contribution to Marxist revolutionary thought as the integration of the army into it. To Berger, this was not something on the periphery of Marxist doctrine, but "central" to the development of the ideology.³⁴ Berger carries his evaluation through different phases of Engels' life, from his early beliefs (that he shared with Marx) that warfare would contribute to the escalation of revolution and that revolution would allow the proletariat to triumph in their search for economic parity.³⁵ The failure of the revolutions of 1848-1849 caused Engels and Marx to rethink their system. The solution to this failure postulated that the revolutions failed because they were not on a large enough scale. Only a large war would entail the social cataclysms that would be necessary to produce revolution. Limited war, in this environment, would be practically useless; the Crimean War is the best example of the practical application of this thought. A corollary to this belief was that if only a large war would cause revolution, and since there were no catastrophic wars in the second half of the nineteenth century, then a peaceful road should be taken to achieve the objectives of the revolution.³⁶ As Hunley

stated, "Engels said the ballot box was slower and more tedious than the call to revolution but ten times surer."³⁷ The Franco-Prussian War furnished the incentive that brought Marxist thought from belief in the necessity of war for the sake of revolution to the necessity of avoiding war--also for the sake of revolution. With a German victory in the war and the success of a country supported by its workers, any further conflict between states would, Engels believed, become an impediment to the cause of the revolution and must be prevented. In the final two decades of his life, Friedrich Engels developed his strategic theory on war from an increasingly pacifist perspective. Berger concludes his commentary with a discussion of Engels' Theory of the Vanishing Army, where through the socialization of the military through universal conscription and mass armies, a nation's military would eventually melt away.³⁸

All of Berger's analysis is of great value when seeking to understand the place of the army and military force in the conduct of a socialist revolution. But Berger focuses his questions on the strategic level of thinking and the formulation of doctrine. Strategic planning and vision cannot occur in an intellectual vacuum without the benefit of military observations. For instance, what did Engels see in the wars of the mid-nineteenth century, to include the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars, that caused him to reverse his position completely on the role of warfare in the development of Marxist doctrine?

Wette's work *Kriegstheorien Deutscher Sozialisten* further develops the ideas of Engels' philosophy of warfare with a similar focus. Wette, however, approaches the issues somewhat differently. The subtitle of his work is *A Contribution to the Study of peace*. Wette studies not only the causes of war from a Marxist perspective, but also the conditions in which a just war may be fought. Wette does not simply focus on the socialist doctrine of war, but also on the causes of such a war and the reasons that socialists may go to war. Only through understanding the reasons for war, he states, can one achieve peace.³⁹ For instance, Wette defines war in a political realm, as a conflict between groups of men for goals associated with political

agendas.⁴⁰ Wette also treats the figures of Marx and Engels as equal partners in the pursuit of a theory of war. While this is not a problem if one is evaluating socialist theories, when one wants to evaluate contributions to the military field, rather than the general subject of ideological development, one must more closely look at individual achievement. With such considerations, Wette concentrates on the socialist theory of economy as the primary factor in the application of force and on Marx's statement that "war is the engine of history" inevitably leading to the revolution.⁴¹ It is a focus on these broad, polemical angles that puts Wette in the same category as Berger: offering an excellent evaluation of the strategic conception of *socialist Kriegstheorie*, but a somewhat flawed one nonetheless because of its lack of attention to lower levels of military doctrine.

One work that does allude to the importance of Engels' tactical thought, indeed the only work that gives Engels credit for having thought of tactics, is "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," an essay written by Sigmund Neumann and then updated by Mark von Hagen for Peter Paret's *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Of interest upon first examination of this essay is the order in which the subjects are listed in the title. Beyond this, Neumann and von Hagen give a good synopsis of the Marxist theory of war and even give the two men credit for considering tactical problems in their military writings.⁴² At least in the first decades of his military writings, Neumann and von Hagen posit, "Engels foresaw important future trends, not only in peacetime, but in war as well, and in this way contributed, if only indirectly, to concepts and techniques of military strategy in decades to come."⁴³ After a few pages, however, the bulk of the essay shifts back to the conception of Marx's and Engels' military theory as it related to the philosophic system of socialism, "based upon the materialistic interpretation of history, and its emphasis on the prevailing economic conditions as a key to an understanding of socio-political dynamics."⁴⁴

¹See Martin Berger, *Engels, Armies, and Revolution: The Revolutionary Tactics of Classical Marxism* (Hamden, CT: Archon Press, 1977); Wolfram Wette, *Kriegstheorien Deutscher Sozialisten: Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg: Ein Beitrag Zur Friedensforschung* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971); and W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels, and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

²David McLellan, *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 377, 390-1.

³Berger, 12.

⁴McLellan, 390.

⁵Karl Marx, "A New-Year Greeting," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #190, 9 January 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:224-5.

⁶Robert B. Pippin, "Hegel," in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 311-317.

⁷Kai Nielsen, "Engels," in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 227.

⁸See Klaus Schreiner, *Die Badisch-Pfälzische Revolutionsarmee 1849* (Berlin: Verlag Der Ministeriums für Nationale Verteidigung, 1956), for a full discussion of the events of 1849 in the Palatinate and Baden.

⁹W. O. Henderson, *The Life of Friedrich Engels*, vol. 1 (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 195.

¹⁰The best biography of Engels is Henderson, *The Life of Friedrich Engels*, 2 vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1976), although Gustav Mayer, *Friedrich Engels, A Biography*, trans. G. Highet and H. Highet (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) is also adequate. J. D. Hunley, *The Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels. A Reinterpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991) provides a more curtailed overview of Engels' life, but is much more useful in summarizing intellectual developments in his life. G. D. H. Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought*, 5 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co., LTD, 1955), Cole's first two volumes are useful to place Engels within the context of nineteenth-century socialist movements of all varieties.

¹¹The best single volume overview of warfare in the nineteenth century is William McElwee, *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974). For brief synopses of the Military events of the period, see R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), 1986.

¹²An excellent, brief, overview of this period, as well as the entire Second Republic in France, is William H. C. Smith, *Second Empire and Commune: France 1848-1871*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1996).

¹³See Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). This is an outstanding one-volume coverage of the events of the revolutions.

¹⁴See Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853-1856* (London: Arnold, 1999).

¹⁵Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1983*, 2d ed. (London: Longman, 1984), 28-36. For coverage of the Great Mutiny, see Christopher Hibbert, *The Great Mutiny, India 1857* (London: Allen Lane, 1978); and for an Indian perspective, see Sashi Bhusan Chaudhur, *Civil Rebellion in the India Mutinies (1857-1859)* (Calcutta: The World Press Private, Ltd., 1957).

¹⁶Even though the 1859 campaign involved two major battles in terms of forces engaged and casualties suffered, Magenta and Solferino, and a handful of smaller engagements, the vast majority of scholarship on the subject concerns great power politics. There are, unfortunately, very few sources that deal primarily with the Military aspects of the conflict. This shortcoming makes Engels' contributions all the more valuable in studying this campaign. See Arnold Blumberg, *A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 1859* (Selingrove, NJ: Susquehanna University Press, 1990); and Frank J. Coppa, *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence* (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1992).

¹⁷The best account of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, which significantly includes operations in Italy, is Geoffrey Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For coverage of the Franco-Prussian War, see Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871* (London: Methuen, 1981).

¹⁸Oscar J. Hammen, *The Red '48ers: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 398.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 391.

²⁰Mayer, 158, 168-9.

²¹*Ibid.*, 158.

²²*Ibid.*, 194.

²³Hunley, 20-2.

²⁴D. Riazanov, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (New York: International Publishers, 1927), 94, 101.

²⁵Berger, 15.

²⁶Schreiner, 79-80.

²⁷Ibid., 76, 40.

²⁸Henderson, vol. 2, 419, 422.

²⁹Ibid., 433.

³⁰W. H. Chaloner and W. O. Henderson, *Engels as Military Critic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), xvii-xviii.

³¹Gallie, 1, 75.

³²Bernard Semmel, *Marxism and the Science of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), vii-viii.

³³Ibid., 1.

³⁴Berger, 63.

³⁵Ibid., 74.

³⁶Ibid., 101-2.

³⁷Hunley, 111.

³⁸Berger, 154-170.

³⁹Wette, 9-10.

⁴⁰Ibid., 15.

⁴¹Ibid., 49, 34.

⁴²Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 262.

⁴³Ibid., 264.

⁴⁴Ibid., 267.

CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGELS' MILITARY THOUGHT

The Impact of the French Revolution

The modern warfare is the necessary product of the French Revolution. Its precondition is the social and political emancipation of the bourgeoisie and small peasants.¹

Friedrich Engels, "Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852"

No other event in history shaped the mind of Friedrich Engels as forcefully as the French Revolution. During these years of upheaval, the social changes that occurred had more impact on the later events of the nineteenth century than any other incident. These changes, although initiated in the social sphere, did not remain there and had a tremendous impact on the manner in which wars were fought. When combining the social nature of the revolution with the importance of mass armies and the concept of a nation-at-arms, one can easily discern why Engels found such tremendous motivation through the events of the last decade of the eighteenth century for socialist thought. Engels saw the military importance of such revolutionary spirit in two particular developments: the size and composition of mass armies and the tactical innovations that were a necessary by-product of this development. These elements that resulted from the French Revolution became critically important to the armies, and those armies' relationships to states and societies throughout Europe, during the course of the nineteenth century.² In the half century following the French Revolution, insurrectionary movements, such as those of Gracchus Babeuf and Louis Auguste Blanqui, looked upon the events of the revolution as the foundations for their movements.³

Engels saw the mass armies of the midcentury revolutions as another embodiment of the events sixty years earlier. True, the armies that fought in Hungary consisted of far fewer cumulative troops than fought in the wars at the century's turn. The similarity, however, rested in the nature of the armies. The system of revolutionary France made other modifications and

reforms possible in all European armies. These alterations allowed nations to maintain far larger armies than at any previous time. Engels used Germany after the reforms of Prussian Generals Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst and August Wilhelm A. N. von Gneisenau to embody this trend towards larger armies.⁴ More important than the sheer numbers that this revolutionary system produced was the type of soldiery it created--the citizen soldier. Engels rightly recognized the importance of a holistic national mobilization in times of crisis and how that was only possible after the activities of the French Revolution. Just as the coming of the French system of 1789 to the German states shattered the remnants of German feudalism, the possibilities for a continuation of that trend into Russia could prove critical for future proletarian success.⁵ When fighting came to Hungary, Lajos Kossuth, the Hungarian leader, mimicked the actions of French revolutionaries Georges Danton and Lazare Carnot in the development of Hungary for war against the Habsburg Empire. As Engels stated, the "main features of the glorious year 1793 are found again in the Hungary which Kossuth has armed, organized and inspired with enthusiasm."⁶ Conversely, while recognizing the importance of such national mobilization for an insurgent nation, Engels also recognized the fear with which the established bourgeoisie governments of the time viewed arming an entire populace. This, he saw, was also a direct result of the actions of the French Revolution.⁷

The new system provided the nations of Europe with a difficult dilemma. The wars of the French Revolution had changed radically and permanently the manner in which wars were conducted; a nation needed to adapt to the new paradigm in order to survive. But the manner of change was so contrary to the nature of monarchical rule that such actions posed the very real risk of potentially disastrous internal strife. Engels viewed such a paradox as an opportunity for the "emancipation" of all classes of society and a harbinger of the successful conclusion of the proletariat revolution.⁸ The trends and innovations introduced by the French revolutionary wars, however, could not be reversed or taken back, and a shift occurred between the erstwhile system

and the modern. Any future proletariat revolution, or any attempt to subvert such a revolution for that matter, would be fought as a “modern” war, with the new system fully in place.⁹ In his contribution “Army” for *The New American Cyclopaedia*, Engels defined the new system: “The principal features of this new system are: the restoration of the old principle that every citizen is liable, in case of need, to be called out for the defense of the country, and the consequent formation of the army, by compulsory levies, of greater or less extent, from the whole of the inhabitants.”¹⁰

With the advent of these mass armies, tactical innovations also appeared. Although Semmel may have overstated the importance of such advancements when he wrote that Engels “placed not merely his emphasis, but the entire burden of his argument [of the Marxist view of militarism]” on them, there can be no doubt that Engels certainly drew conclusions from these improvements that carried through Napoleon into the course of the nineteenth century.¹¹ It was not, however, until a decade following the failed revolutions of the midcentury before Engels recognized the importance of pre-1789 tactical innovations that the French Revolution incorporated into the specter of mass warfare. But he did, in some later writings, recognize certain tactical innovations that went along with the broader scheme of military realignment. First, he noted the increased use of columns and skirmishers by the new armies, as mobility became the key element in armies. In this regard, the “line tactics” used by the successful generals (Engels specified John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Frederick II “the Great” of Prussia) of the previous century quite suddenly became obsolete.¹² Second, the concept of combining the arms on the battlefield, first attempted by King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War, grew more refined as the contemporary mixtures of infantry, cavalry, and artillery expanded in echelon down through armies to corps and divisions.¹³ And third, technological innovations changed the weapons these new armies used to carry out modern warfare. While the medieval pike was long outdated by the French Revolution,

more recent improvements in musketry weight and windage as well as the enhancement of artillery by Frenchman Jean Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval significantly modernized the way soldiers fought.

In his reflections on the events of the midcentury, Engels devoted nearly the entirety of his April 1851, pamphlet "Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852" to the tactical innovations made possible by the French Revolution. Much of this pamphlet concerned a recounting and rough evaluation of the military campaigns of French General Charles Francois du Perier Dumouriez and the resulting battles of Valmy and Neerwinden. Engels provided some astute observations, but used this interlude more as a forum to preface his following discussion on the elements that made these campaigns relevant to the recently completed European insurgencies. Once Engels grounded the campaigns in a narrative form, he began his elucidation of operations, beginning with a discussion of the mass amounts of soldiery that fought, far more than had been previous in any earlier campaigns of France. This new army of 1792, comprising between 500,000 and 750,000 primarily new recruits, was organized and trained quickly by the revolutionary officer corps, who made them fit to fight the large armies of the Coalition.¹⁴

Engels' definition of fitness, however, did not entail the ability to defeat the armies of the Coalition alone. There is another dichotomy that these new revolutionary armies considered before taking the field, and the French armies operating in 1792 to 1795 best demonstrated such a discrepancy. Modern armies of such huge magnitude could not be organized and disciplined overnight, and although Engels credited the French leadership for putting together and organizing a substantial force, the level of military knowledge and discipline that could be instilled was far short of what was required to guarantee victory. Therefore, new tactics needed to be developed to take advantage of large numbers of soldiers with questionable disciplinary standards. In this case, the French adopted the concepts of massed tactics to utilize the numerical advantage they

possessed. Such tactics, though, could only be incorporated if the leadership, both civilian and military, properly deployed the forces at its disposal. Engels faulted the French leadership, particularly Carnot, for failure to do this effectively. The only reason, according to Engels, that the Revolutionary Convention survived was through the even more debilitating mistakes of the Coalition commanders during the campaigns of the war.¹⁵

The French system also provided another added benefit that the Coalition armies did not possess, what Engels called “mass character.”¹⁶ It was this conception of a mass spirit within the armed forces of a revolutionary army that served as the critical element for Engels’ model of armed conflict later in the century, one that was just as important for ultimate success as the tactical advent of mobility and maneuver.¹⁷ The problems that affected revolutionary movements later in the century partially resulted from the fact that such character of the masses was possible only in nations with a “higher stage of civilization.” To imbue the necessary “character” within the masses that would fight this modern warfare required a degree of education that allowed understanding and comprehension of many different levels of war. In the case of Engels’ revolutionary style, the soldiers needed to possess the education to understand not only the generic reasons for the conflict, but also the reasons for strict discipline and obeying of orders and, more importantly, possess the “*coup d’oeil* for small-scale warfare.”¹⁸

Engels’ view of this revolutionary transition in military operations was not only particularly insightful, but also critically important for his future development as a military commentator. But it did not, however, directly transfer to the battlefields of insurrectionary warfare and limited combat occurring in the nineteenth century. There were still considerable gaps between the organization and administration of nation and army, the incorporation of a nation at arms and a national will into a military equation, and the application of all these facets towards the refinement and completion of the French Revolution. A further complication came in the first one-half of the nineteenth century as Europe suddenly and awkwardly industrialized,

additionally complicating the social landscape and providing Engels with a final element of his theoretical foundation. These gaps began to be filled for Engels in the final few years of the eighteenth century by the French General, soon Emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte. In Napoleon's 1796 campaign in Northern Italy, the young Corsican provided the first steps in this direction. His campaign in Piedmont and "the actual annihilation *en detail* of a superior force showed people the goal towards which they were moving without having previously had any clear idea of it."¹⁹ Napoleon incorporated this fusion of the social, the political, and the military throughout his actions of the next two decades.

Napoleonic Interlude

As far as the modern art of war is concerned, it has been completely developed by Napoleon . . . there remains no other course than to imitate Napoleon as far as conditions allow.²⁰

Friedrich Engels, "Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852."

The French Emperor fascinated Engels for the duration of his life. In some of his first commentaries on historical subjects, before Engels became enamored with the concept of social revolution, he reflected upon Napoleon and his battles in his letters and writings.²¹ As Engels matured, he grew to appreciate certain qualities in the manner in which Napoleon conducted warfare. While Engels always possessed a comfortable satisfaction when analyzing Napoleonic battles, he eventually turned his absorption with the Corsican into an expanded examination of postrevolutionary France and Europe. It was Napoleon, in Engels' view, who firmly grasped the concepts that first appeared during the French Revolution and cemented the concepts that would from the last years of the eighteenth-century forward define modern war.

Tactically, Napoleon grounded his modern system of war on two principles that arose out of the wars of the French Revolution: mass tactics and mobility.²² While Engels discussed the many positive attributes of Napoleon and his methodology of warfare, his evaluation seldom covered the early wars of Napoleon's career. While Engels wrote some small commentaries on

specific actions of that period, for the most part his writings focused on the activities of the years following 1812 and the disastrous Russian campaign. For the fifteen years prior to 1812, his primary focus remained more on limited actions and specific types of warfare. Most of these examples reflected lessons learned from the midcentury revolutions and other colonial operations of Engels' lifetime. For example, Engels devoted time to Alpine mountain warfare, Napoleon's initial use of the mass combined arms tactics in Italy, and Spanish guerrilla insurgency on the Iberian Peninsula, all of which related in one form or another to the wars of the later nineteenth century.²³

Although Engels never came forward and specifically stated the reason for the unbalanced concentration, it appears through his writings that he viewed these early years as less useful in developing a theory of socialistic mass conflict. Between Napoleon's Italian campaigns and the Russian invasion, for the most part no other European army fully emulated Napoleon's system of combat. Therefore, Europe did not see a completely revolutionary-style war during this period. It was only after the vast majority of European armies completed the transition to a Napoleonic style of organization and combat that the modernization of Europe's fighting forces reached fruition; this transformation was complete for the most part by 1812. At that point, and only then, were conditions mature enough that Engels could devote time to study the direct impact of modern European conflict on the course of socialist revolution.

In these campaigns, the principles of Napoleonic warfare were still evident and practiced by all sides. Engels demonstrated this point through his discussions of Napoleon's defense in front of Paris in 1814 and of the 1813 summer campaigns prior to the battles of Lützen and Bautzen.²⁴ But in addition to the conventional aspect of these campaigns, there were additional, unconventional, elements that played a role in the final outcome. Wars no longer, after 1812, transpired solely between armies, but now included *all* sections of society within the nations of Europe. Previously, only the French had mobilized the entire population to conduct warfare, and

only with the advent of the mass character of combat through all the combatant forces could a nation now achieve total victory.²⁵ One indication of the expansion of this dimension in warfare occurred during Napoleon's 1812 campaign into Russia, where the armies of the Czar forced Napoleon to conduct a war of occupation, necessitating the reduction of individual villages and plots of land, "in short, the entire periphery," in order to achieve his objectives.²⁶ Of course, he never was able to attain such a massive goal as the subjugation of Russia.

These were the guiding principles by which Engels conducted his analyses of European conflict later in the century. These latter developments of the national mass character of war as honed by Napoleon dovetailed directly into his concept of class mobilization for a revolutionary conflict. For the most part, he was disgusted by the conduct of European generals in the few cases of regular warfare that occurred. The nadir of European generalship in these circumstances was the Crimean War. He began his commentaries on the war by looking forward to a conflict that would eventually draw in all of the armies of Europe and would be fought on based on Napoleonic principles and have profound agency for a European class war.²⁷ The danger of such a war had increased greatly through the actions of Napoleon's namesake, French Emperor Louis Napoleon III, whose understanding of military affairs was negligible in Engels' opinion.²⁸ Engels gradually grew disillusioned with this view as the conduct of the war did not match the standards of the conflict one-half of a century previously. Even the French, for whom Engels had more respect than other participants in conflict, took a step backward and conducted warfare in direct opposition to the manner in which Napoleon conducted his campaigns.²⁹ In its entirety, Engels believed that "The whole of this war has been, in appearance, a war of fortifications and sieges, and has in the eyes of superficial observers completely annihilated the progress made by Napoleon's rapid maneuver, thus carrying back the art of warfare to the days of the Seven Years' War."³⁰

In evaluating the progress of modern war from the time of Napoleon, Engels firmly believed that the nature of the conflict had not changed, and that the principles that had their fruition in the Wars of the French Revolution and had been finalized by Napoleon remained completely valid. This judgment provided the practitioners of revolutionary warfare with a sound framework for not only revolutionary war, but also for the irregular warfare which of necessity accompanied class-based revolutionary movements. Only two things had changed between the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 and the events of Engels' lifetime that impacted military operations--the importance of fortifications and the advent of steam.³¹ Engels made the first of these observations based on his evaluation of the Crimean War, particularly the siege of Sevastopol. The use of fortresses was not new, but the composition and utilization of these systems had changed dramatically. Engels saw that the laws of modern warfare made the Vauban system of fortification outdated and of little value in a mass war. Events later in the century would prove his point.³² Engels' second observation, noting the importance of steam, fit in with the advent of industrial warfare during the course of the nineteenth-century. While Engels did not grasp the full significance of this type of factory-based conflict until near the end of his life, his recognition of technological innovations to the conduct of military operations was forward thinking for his day.³³

As a final element, with the final defeat of Napoleon, a new era dawned in the trajectory of European history. With the advent of peace, industrial growth began in Europe, bringing with it social and economic problems that were particular to development. This industrial expansion, on the foundation of the new order in Europe, was the key element into the definition of class warfare within European society, and the root of social conflict for the coming decades.³⁴ In this manner, too, the events of the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon possessed the critical elements of structuring the relationships between war and the revolution, and between armies and the revolutions, two interactions that continued to hold a central position throughout Engels'

lifetime.³⁵ These relationships ensured that with this redefinition of warfare, society itself became more closely intertwined with military conflict, and the violence that war entailed.

To Barbarism and Social War

Present day society, which breeds hostility between the individual man and everyone else, thus produces a social war of all against all which inevitably in individual cases, notably among uneducated people, assumed a brutal, barbarously violent form--that of crime.³⁶

Friedrich Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld," February 1845

One of the lesser but insightful contributions of Engels dealt with the nature and intensity of revolutionary war. Almost from his first writings as a budding journalist, Engels carefully and repeatedly distinguished between the character of a revolutionary war of the people (along Marxist lines) and the character of a conventional war fought within the parameters of a Napoleonic paradigm. Warfare during the midcentury revolutions took a more barbaric turn that had been present in European warfare dating many centuries into the past. Warfare at midcentury, particularly in the case of nationalistic uprisings and movements, contained far more atrocities and acts of barbarity than Europe had witnessed in many lifetimes. This, of course, according to Engels, was to be expected as part and parcel of a revolutionary movement. The bourgeois style of war to which Europe was accustomed was, he inferred, a kinder, gentler type of warfare that seldom saw acts of cruelty directed at the general populace, or conducted by the populace, on a regular basis. As warfare now involved not only the fixed armed forces of a state but also the entire populace, any sort of revolutionary conflict now needed to focus, at least at some level, on the morale of an enemy.³⁷ War now became a "social force having an inherent dynamic of its own."³⁸ As Gallie writes, such Marxist sociology, although crude, was "the first sociology of war ever devised."³⁹ With this conduct of class war, and the fate of all classes' total way of life at stake, warfare devolved into barbarism. Two closely related events clearly defined this transition in the nature of warfare in the early nineteenth-century: the Wars of the French Revolution and the rise of the Napoleonic system of warfare.

Engels focused on two specific areas when discussing the attributes and examples of inhumanity in contemporary war. The first of these instances occurred during the midcentury revolutions, where Engels saw a considerable amount of cruelty performed within the sphere of influence of almost all combatants. The only antagonist that appeared more humane than its opponents were the forces of Hungary, and in this regard, one detects a fair amount of bias in Engels' writing. The second example took Engels outside the continental framework when he discussed European colonial warfare in Asia and Africa. It is particularly interesting to note how Engels made a clear effort to separate continental, "civilized" warfare from the brute violence of the unenlightened world. Engels did not, however, exonerate European forces from similar conduct. He frequently condemned western armies, most prominently those of England, for unwarranted actions against local peoples. The key point is that Engels drew moralistic barriers between warfare inside and outside of Europe.

Engels saw the first examples of such brutality in warfare during the Paris June Days of 1848. The actions of the National Guard and the forces of General Louis Eugène Cavaignac sent to put down the insurgency were dictated not by a logical law of warfare, but rather by a degree of class hate that infected the bourgeoisie-influenced forces in power. In response to this, the workers of Paris had no recourse but to match this hatred with similar hatred, and to undertake acts of terrorism to combat these actions.⁴⁰ The degree of such hatred, Engels saw, was not equaled in any other European country of the day--Engels interestingly singled out Germany as being incapable of such actions--nor had such been the case in Europe for two hundred years, since the Thirty Years' War ended in 1648.⁴¹ Even after the events in Paris played out, Engels saw in them, and in the ensuing events across Europe, the initiation of a much more inhumane type of conflict than had been the case in Europe in many centuries. This revolution consisted of, by the beginning of September 1848, "the massacres and barbarities in Posen, the murderous incendiarism of Radetzky, the ferocious cruelties committed in Paris by the victors of June, and

butcheries in Krakow and Prague, the rule of brutal soldiery everywhere--in short, all the outrages which constitute the 'actuality' of this revolution today."⁴²

This brutality transferred easily to other theaters throughout Europe during the course of the revolutions. Nowhere did the actions take on more caustic form than in the Habsburg lands, and in particular Hungary. The primary reason for this was that in Hungary there was no single war of rebellion, but many different insurrectionary movements, all holding similar aims and desires and fed by the same senses of nationalistic hatred at various levels. Over a period of two years, Engels introduced his readers to the various forms of brutality practiced by all sides in the Hungarian theater. Between January 1849,⁴³ and late summer 1850,⁴⁴ he referred to nine specific atrocities committed by members of various armed units, both regular and irregular. Serb general Kusman Todorovich, serving with the Habsburgs, executed over 400 civilians in February 1849.⁴⁵ Croatian-born Austrian General Josef Jellačić burned women and children alive in their own villages three weeks later.⁴⁶ The Russians and the Hungarians of General Józef Bem traded prisoner executions during operations in Transylvania in April.⁴⁷ At the conclusion of the revolutions when he wrote his famous pamphlet "The Peasant War in Germany," Engels' predilection toward the discussion of barbarous actions during times of strife can be seen in the way in which he cited similar activities that occurred three hundred years in the past.⁴⁸

The Crimean conflict provided Engels with a relatively "civilized," though poorly fought and therefore boring, military interlude with which Engels occupied himself considerably. Soon upon its conclusion, however, he began to write a series of articles concerning European struggles to subdue "uncivilized" nations on the fringes of the known world. During these conflicts, ten years after the midcentury revolutions and a few years following the Crimean War, Engels demonstrated the manner in which the character of warfare shifted back to the nationalistic, brutal, forms that it took ten years previously. In these circumstances--in India, China, Persia and Algeria--European forces were forced into a military situation that was unlike any their previous

experience prepared them to encounter. In such situations they faced enemies who, in Engels' accounts, adhered to strange and horrifying customs, such as drowning their own families before battle.⁴⁹ Challenged by these new and morally foreign mores, European armies could not but retaliate in kind. Engels returned to this point frequently, commenting on the English actions in Asia that "Since the British treat them as barbarians, they cannot deny to them the full benefit of their barbarism."⁵⁰

In these passages Engels was caught between conflicting attitudes of class warfare based on economic foundations and his personal haughty Eurocentric and condescending attitude toward non-Europeans. Therefore, he praised the "Asiatic mob" for utilizing the method of warfare they were familiar with and that proved successful against a more narrowly focused enemy, while he simultaneously demeaned the uneducated and simple-minded mentality that led to such tactics.⁵¹ Similarly in India, even though Engels acknowledged the skill of the British fighting the insurgent Sepoys, he scathingly chided the mutineers for their incompetence in basic military skills, a shortcoming he related to their uneducated status.⁵² But there was there was the added dimension, certainly from the Indian perspective, that the British were conducting a social war aimed at the total destruction of Indian (either Hindu or Moslem) cultural mores, which only added to the ferocity of the fighting. Even if some reports coming from India were exaggerated, there can be no doubt that brutality continued to excess. In one account,

Indians were shot and hanged out of hand, burned alive, and blown from guns by the British. In their turn the rebels massacred British women and children. As if this was not enough, the stories were embellished by both sides to appeal to their own particular national forms of moral outrage: on the British side by reports that their women were 'dishonoured' before they were murdered; on the rebel side by reports that Muslims were defiled by sewing them into pig-skins before execution.⁵³

Here again, though, Engels noted that instead of making efforts aimed at curtailing the barbarous excesses that occurred in such an environment, he noted the British tendency to mimic their enemies in the conduct of brutal warfare. Both the revolutionary and the guerrilla nature of this conflict led to more slaughter of civilians "than in all the wars of the English in European and

America put together.”⁵⁴ The scope of warfare spread rapidly during the early nineteenth century. Clausewitz drew a conclusion, that goes hand in hand with Engels’ observations on the subject, that these new popular uprisings should be “considered as an outgrowth of the way in which the conventional barriers have been swept away in our lifetime by the elemental violence of war.”⁵⁵

¹Friedrich Engels, “Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852,” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:550.

²Henderson, vol. 2, 422.

³G. D. H. Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought*, vol. 1, *The Forerunners, 1789-1850* (London: Macmillan & Co., LTD, 1955), 6, 159-164.

⁴Friedrich Engels, “The Agreement Debates,” *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #45, 15 July 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:228.

⁵McLellan, 202-3. McLellan is referring primarily to Marx in this context, but such a position is completely in line with Engels’ reasoning.

⁶Friedrich Engels, “The Magyar Struggle,” *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #194, 13 January 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:227-8.

⁷Friedrich Engels, “The Defeat of the Piedmontese,” *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #261 (2nd edition), 1 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:173.

⁸Engels, “Conditions and Prospects,” 10:552-3.

⁹*Ibid.*, 10:556.

¹⁰Friedrich Engels, “Army,” *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 2, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:114.

¹¹Semmel, 9-10.

¹²Friedrich Engels, “Mountain Warfare in the Past and Present,” *New York Daily Tribune* #4921, 27 January 1857, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:167-8.

¹³Engels, “Army,” 18:114.

¹⁴Engels, “Conditions and Prospects,” 10:542, 543-5.

¹⁵Ibid., 10:545-6.

¹⁶Of note are the similarities of Engels' conception of "mass character" and Clausewitz's definition of "national character." See Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 480.

¹⁷Engels, "Conditions and Prospects of a War," 10:552.

¹⁸Ibid., 10:551-3.

¹⁹Ibid., 10:545.

²⁰Ibid., 10:547.

²¹Engels to Friedrich Graeber, Bremen, 1 February 1840, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 2:491; Engels to Marie Engels, Bremen, 6 December 1840, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 2:517; Friedrich Engels, "The True Socialists," in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 5:553-4.

²²Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:550.

²³Ibid., 10:545; Friedrich Engels, "The Battle of Inkerman," *New York Daily Tribune* #4261, 14 December 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:532; Engels, "Mountain Warfare," 15:171; Friedrich Engels, "Po and Rhine," in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:221-2, 232.

²⁴Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:556; Friedrich Engels, "The Battle of the Alma," *New York Daily Tribune* #4219, 26 October 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:496.

²⁵Friedrich Engels, "Blücher," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 3, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:187.

²⁶Friedrich Engels, "The American Civil War," *Die Presse* #85, 27 March 1862, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 19:193-4.

²⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Military Power of Russia," *New York Daily Tribune* #4223, 31 October 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:504; Friedrich Engels, "The European War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4316, 17 February 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:613.

²⁸Mayer, 145.

²⁹Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, "Criticism of the French Conduct of the War," *Neue Oder Zeitung* #133, 20 March 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:91.

³⁰Friedrich Engels, "Crimean Prospects," *New York Daily Tribune* #4508, 1 October 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:528.

³¹Friedrich Engels, "The Campaign in Italy," *Das Volk* #4, 28 May 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:346-7.

³²Engels, "Po and Rhine," 16:247-8.

³³Engels, "Campaign in Italy," 16:347.

³⁴Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class* (New York: Random House, 1974), 14.

³⁵Berger, 63.

³⁶Friedrich Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld," 8 February 1845, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 4:248.

³⁷Gallie, 83.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 93.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 136.

⁴⁰Friedrich Engels, "The 24th of June," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #28, 28 June 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:138.

⁴¹Friedrich Engels, "German Foreign Policy and the Latest Events in Prague," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #42, 12 July 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:212.

⁴²Friedrich Engels, "The Frankfurt Assembly Debates the Polish Question," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #93, 3 September 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:376.

⁴³Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:227.

⁴⁴Friedrich Engels, "The Peasant War in Germany," in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:466.

⁴⁵Friedrich Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #219 (2nd edition), 11 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:352.

⁴⁶Friedrich Engels, "Speech from the Throne," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #235, 2 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:447.

⁴⁷Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #263, 4 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:188-90.

⁴⁸Engels, "The Peasant War," 10:440, 446.

⁴⁹Friedrich Engels, "A New English Expedition to China," *New York Daily Tribune* #4990, 17 April 1857, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:245.

⁵⁰Friedrich Engels, "Persia--China," *New York Daily Tribune* #5032, 5 June, 1857, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:281.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 15:280-2.

⁵²See Chapter 3, Section III.

⁵³Porter, 30.

⁵⁴Friedrich Engels, "Details of the Attack on Lucknow," *New York Daily Tribune* #5333, 25 May 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:529.

⁵⁵Clausewitz, 479.

CHAPTER 3

ENGELS' THEORY OF WAR

Until 1870, the majority of Engels' work consisted of newspaper and journal articles, with some small, but rather important, pamphlets interspersed. Of his work, most dealt to some degree with the military questions of his day. While not a completely innovative thinker in these years, Engels did begin to formulate many of the ideas and conceptions that framed his thought process as he began to think of military questions and how they would relate to revolutionary movements in the future. While many of the following elements did not relate directly to insurgent movements and guerrilla fighting, they all were interspersed regularly with ideas that would frame Engels' structure of such warfare. In all of the areas discussed below Engels drew important lessons and formulated critical thoughts which played important roles in determining his conception of guerrilla operations.

Speed

In war, and particularly in revolutionary warfare, rapidity of action until some decided advantage is gained is the first rule.¹

Friedrich Engels, "The Storming of Vienna. The Betrayal of Vienna"

Of all the ideas and tenets that Engels set forth in his observations, one key element works its way through all of his commentaries. The concept of speed and rapidity in whatever mission the armies undertook is of paramount importance. While Engels continually emphasized boldness and aggressiveness in the face of an active enemy, the idea of speed unified these different traits and made them part of a coherent tactical and operational whole. This conception of the necessity of speed during the conduct of operations reappeared throughout Engels' writing, and was brought on particularly by the exploits of Napoleon and the wars he fought. One of Engels' favorite targets in the realm of slowness of movement was the Austrians, and he looked back to the Napoleonic battles at Eggmühl and Abensberg as instances where the Austrian adage of "always slowly forward" held more critical in deciding the fate of the operation than any other

considerations.² Again in May 1859, during the Solferino Campaign, Engels wryly commented, “The campaign continues to maintain its preeminence in the annals of modern warfare for slowness. We almost seem to be transplanted back to those antediluvian times of pompous and do-nothing warfare, to which Napoleon put such a sudden and decisive end.”³

In his writings on the Hungarian revolt of the midcentury, most of Engels’ remarks dealt with the necessity for tactical speed and rapidity. As the Hungarians remained severely outnumbered and outgunned during the entire campaign, Engels saw the energy and “speedy organization” of the Hungarian leadership, particularly that of Kossuth, as vital to achieve any success in the movement.⁴ Similarly, in the Palatinate campaign, Engels was singularly disgusted with the Prussian leadership for the lack of enterprise they demonstrated in suppressing the insurgents. Engels was puzzled and amazed by the slowness exhibited by the Prussians, against an armed force far smaller and less trained than their professional army, as they attempted to put down the revolt.⁵

The Russo-Turkish front in the Crimean War provided excellent examples where such fortunes ebbed and flowed in Engels’ opinion. From the outset, Engels saw no other way for the Turks to succeed in their campaign against the Russians except for bold, aggressive, and swift movement. Repeatedly, he emphasized this point by commenting on either the disposition of Russian forces in the face of the Turkish armies, both along the Danube and in the Caucasus, or by the Turkish forces themselves. The best example of Turkish success in this matter consisted of the activities of Turkish General Ismail Pasha, the commander of the Kalafat fortress, who succeeded in quickly concentrating a substantial force to hold out the operationally important outpost.⁶ Along with the successes, however, Engels recognized failures on both sides to seize any advantage by rapidity of movement. Plodding action by Russian commanders, particularly Field Marshall Prince Mikhail S. Vorontsov and General Alexander M. Gorchakov, led to

potential Russian disasters, but were countered each time by equally abysmal Turkish performances.⁷

As the Crimean War dragged on, Engels grew more frustrated with the apparently never-ending failures by the opposing armies to gain some advantage. Following the fall of Sevastopol, in September of 1855, he wrote for the *New York Daily Tribune* that "The whole of this war has been, in appearance, a war of fortifications and sieges, and has in the eyes of superficial observers completely annihilated the progress made by Napoleon's rapid maneuver, thus carrying back the art of warfare to the days of the Seven Years' War."⁸ The war had been, in his eyes, a poor mixture of units and leaders being "over-cautious" and of others being too rash and hasty in their decisions, best exemplified by Raglan's famous charge. Among the many siege operations that the war had consisted of, the only opportunity for rapidity and speed occurred when there were breaches in the walls or fortifications.

During the colonial wars in the years following the Crimean War, Engels found some examples of leaders who were willing and able to execute an operation quickly and successfully. Most significant among these occurred in the theater that Engels found the most impressive, the British operations against the Indians. Particularly in the relief of Lucknow, in January 1858, Engels found the British commander, General Colin Campbell, an excellent leader and tactician, primarily because he retained the ability to advance quickly when needed.⁹ Engels contrasted this with the speed and energy of the Indian mutineers, whom likewise earned Engels' respect. In regard to their operations against Campbell in the summer of 1858, Engels noted that the insurgents ran circles around the British. He notes, "They were everywhere but where he [Campbell] happened to look for them, and when he expected to find them in front, they had long since again gained his rear."¹⁰ The British, therefore, to protect their rear area and maintain their own lines of communication, were obliged to chase these irregular forces. Regardless of the problems that afflicted the insurgent forces, these operations best exemplified the manner by

which a revolutionary, insurgent army could be most affective against a regular force of trained professionals.¹¹ The other shortcomings the Indians possessed, however, negated what positive achievements the Indians attained.

As mentioned above, the 1859 campaign represented another frustrating episode in the slow conduct of warfare. While both the French and the Austrians came under censure from Engels regarding their slow pace of operations, the French at least had a few small successes that impacted at least a small bit on the campaign. On the eve of the battle of Solferino in July 1859, the French Fifth Corps was able to engage a small portion of its strength in the battle after two forced marches, an achievement not lost on Engels.¹² The Austrians, however, had no such good fortune or activity. General Franz Gyulai, whom Engels regarded before the campaign as one of the best contemporary generals in the field, let numerous opportunities slip by because of a lackadaisical purpose and slowness of movement. It was as if, according to Engels, the campaign was a race to see which army could concentrate its armies and strike first. It was not so much that the fastest won (the French), but that the slowest lost (the Austrians).¹³

As this period closed, Engels located two instances of military operations where speed was present and demonstrably led to successful operations. First, it was in Sicily amid the Italian revolutions that Engels finally found a general in Italy who demonstrated tactical success through rapid movements, Giuseppe Garibaldi. In order to conduct revolutionary activities, “a bold offensive was the only system of tactics permitted.”¹⁴ In his campaigns of the early 1860s, Garibaldi demonstrated to Engels that he had the ability not only to command small, partisan units, but also to command larger conventional forces as well. The main criterion for this judgment was the ability of Garibaldi’s “sudden flank-march and reappearance before Palermo, on the side where he was least expected, and his energetic attack” that marked him as a tactician of the first degree.¹⁵

The second example occurred one-half dozen years later, in the 1866 Prussian campaign against Austria. Despite all the shortcomings that Engels saw with Prussian deployments and initial dispositions, he acknowledged that the Prussians overcame what he viewed as critical shortcomings in their plans. Although his backtracking remained conditional, he admitted in a few articles after the cessation of hostilities that the (perceived) superiority of the Austrians foundered not only through the existence and application of the Dreyse needle-guns, but also through the “terrible tactical energy,” “unexpected dash,” and “punctuality” with which the Prussians conducted the campaign.¹⁶

Technology

The revolution will have to fight with modern means of war and the modern art of war against modern means of war and the modern art of war.¹⁷

Friedrich Engels, “Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852”

Introduction

Following the abortive revolution in the Rhenish Palatinate in 1849, Engels wrote a series of articles for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-öconomische Revue* entitled “The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution” in late 1849 and early 1850. In April of the next year he also wrote an untitled manuscript concerning the “Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852.” In these articles, he dedicated a considerable amount of time to the discussion of the importance of technological advancement and its role in the future not only for warfare but also for the revolutionary movement. One of the reasons continually stressed by Engels for the insurgents’ loss of the 1849 campaign was the degree to which the revolutionary army remained outnumbered and outgunned by the Prussian governmental forces. In the future, revolutionary movements would almost universally find themselves in similar situations, and would have to rely on other means to reduce the correlation of forces against them and influence the conflict in their favor. It would be imperative for revolutionary forces therefore

to make the most beneficial use of new technological possible to offset other disadvantages challenging them. Drawing from historical sources, Engels emphasized that role that innovative use of new technical instruments served in past wars. Specifically, Engels cites both French Marshall Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne de Turenne and Prussian monarch Frederick the Great for revolutionizing infantry through "the suppression of the pike and matchlock by the bayonet and flintlock."¹⁸ Engels particularly credits Frederick for his "epoch-making achievement in the science of war" when "in general, within the limits of the warfare of that time, he transformed and developed the old tactics in conformity with the new instruments [of war]."¹⁹ It was this same sort of innovation and thinking that Engels saw as imperative for nascent revolutionary movements to succeed, and to concentrate on, when he wrote about technology's impact on war.

In the arena of technology, Engels was able to detect many different trends before they actually impacted the battlefield, although his primary interest lay in the realm of immediate impacts on firepower. Most likely due to his previous experience as an artilleryman in Prussian service, he dwelt a great deal on the improvements in that arm of service between the time of Napoleon and the Paris Commune. In the realm of the infantry, his primary remarks dealt with the impact of breech-loading rifles and the advantages that soldiers bearing these weapons carried into combat. Other, more strategic, forms of technological advances appear also in Engels' writings, foremost among them the impact of steam and railroads, particularly in the way each of these impact the logistical aspects of a campaign.

Artillery

Fundamental in Engels' mind regarding the increasing impact of technology on the battlefield were the roles and functions of artillery and the improvements that occurred over the past few centuries. His first commentaries occurred, as in most areas, during his writing for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* concerning the midcentury conflicts in Hungary. His observations at this stage, in the late 1840s and early 1850s, do not reflect fully the considerable attention to

detail that he developed later in his life. For the most part, his reflections dealt with the simplistic elements of the Hungarians being out-matched technologically by the opposing Austrian forces. In early 1849, before the great Hungarian offensive, he pressed this point frequently, bemoaning the lack of a developed Hungarian industrial base that could produce the necessary quantities of field-pieces with the necessary quality.²⁰

Although his early writings on the condition of the artillery, particularly in the Hungarian campaign, remain quite simplistic and lacking in the level of analysis that appears in subsequent years, Engels on occasion demonstrated much of the attention to detail and the notice of the specifics that granted his writings a degree of individuality and legitimacy in the future. Most of these more advanced observations tied into other elements of a battlefield framework. Many of these comments discussed the Austrian problems transporting their large artillery pieces in the specific weather conditions of central Hungary. During the February 1849, maneuvers, when the Hungarians began pushing the Austrians to the west, Engels devotes considerable time to a discussion of the problems that Prince Windischgrätz, commander of the Austrian forces, found transporting his heavy twelve-pound batteries. Not only did Engels note the problems involved in such transport, but he also recognized a primary reason for the problem, that being the design and dimensions of the wheel rims on Austrian artillery. Engels saw this dilemma as an important point in the equalization of combat power in the campaign.²¹

The Hungarians used advantages like these in their successful operations against the Austrians for a number of reasons. In one particular way, the impact of Austria's technological problems fed into Hungarian success. In this observation lies one of the key elements of Engels' military tactics--the use of swift maneuvers to inflict maximum damage on a superior force. The Magyars used "the most daring and swift execution" of their missions in order to compensate for their technological and numerical inferiority to the Austrians.²² This trend continued in Engels' next combat experience, the rebellion in the Palatinate. This experience, Engels' first and only in

which he was in combat personally, enhanced many of the rudimentary ideas in Engels' mind concerning the conduct of warfare. The impact of artillery in this action remained negligible, at least from the perspective of the insurgents. Engels himself limited his comments to the mere notice that the "motley" collection of weapons the insurgents owned contained "for their whole artillery two or three small mortars."²³ There was the possibility of capturing and using some outdated, but serviceable, munitions from the Fruchthalle at Kaiserslautern, and Engels was critical of the manner in which his compatriots squandered such an opportunity.²⁴ In later writings for the *New York Daily Tribune* in March 1852, Engels attempted to use such an argument as an excuse for the poor performance of the insurgents, asking what use a "few old, outworn, ill-mounted and ill-served pieces of ordnance had the insurgents to oppose to that numerous and perfectly appointed artillery."²⁵ With these exceptions, Engels' commentaries on the advantages of artillery did not go beyond the notice that the insurgents had little, while the Prussians had a lot.²⁶ While certainly a far cry from what he would later achieve, in these simplistic commentaries Engels laid out the root of his future analytical base.

Engels more astute observations began as he wrote on the Crimean War for the *New York Daily Tribune*. The focus in these articles went beyond the simple arguments of more versus less and the vague pronouncements concerning quality and began to focus on the tactical impact of sound artillery practices and procedures in the fighting. Engels found that the British, far from his most popular subject, had the most successful artillery in the conflict, citing them as the most effective in breaking down fortifications and other defensive works. The British were able, Engels wrote, to produce the proper balance of shell weight and charge to create the maximum possible result when fired at the target.²⁷ The French, noted Engels, were not as successful in reducing fortifications because of their lack of heavy mortars and howitzers, even though some of their techniques, such as their method of firing their pieces horizontally at defending embrasures and firing ports, were worthy of credit.²⁸ In fact, Engels perceived the French as international

leaders in the development of artillery practices and improvements, dating to a great degree from the impact of Napoleon, but continuing through the century.²⁹ The only exception to this observation occurred in Engels' commentaries on the advent of rifled cannon, noting that the French models did not measure up to the standards of other nations, primarily because of problems in workmanship.³⁰

To this point in his career, Engels limited himself chiefly to observations illustrating the progression of development to date, and synopsis and analysis of the current state of affairs. Following the Crimean conflict, he went further than this, and began to make comments on elements in warfare that would affect the future of combat. Although his writings remained somewhat limited in the late 1850s and early 1860s, Engels began to see trends and technological advances that would impact future operations, and, with a remarkable degree of insight, initiated an elaboration on exactly what these contributions would or might be. Frequently throughout his life until the mid-1860s, Engels commented on the impact of rifled cannon and breechloading weapons. In 1859, with the publication of his pamphlet "Po and Rhine," he remarked on specific improvements and developments, such as the Armstrong breech-loading rifled cannon. Not only was this weapon significant because of the technological impact it had, but also because of the way in which it revolutionized artillery tactics by making light artillery more maneuverable and responsive on the modern battlefield.³¹

In 1860, Engels wrote a series of articles for the *New York Daily Tribune* that dealt with the impact of rifled cannon on war. Much of his exposition dealt with the impact not only of pure artillery on the battlefield, but also the way in which artillery would affect, and be affected by, new developments in infantry weaponry. The greatest advantage of the new types of artillery systems, according to Engels' analysis, was the way in which rounds fired by a rifled cannon had a greater impact per the weight of the round, based on the ability of force projection from the barrel. In this way, the same effects could be produced through the use of lighter field guns,

leading to a more mobile and flexible arm of service.³² There were some inadequacies of the rifled pieces, which Engels laid out. Most of these critiques, such as the problems of using time-fuses and shrapnel with a rifled cannon, were remedied by further technological advances and by practice in the wars of the 1860s.³³ Engels also noted the problem of educating and training gun crews for duty with the new rifled canon. Although they certainly were more accurate, the degree of training necessary for aiming and adjusting the fire was beyond that of the present conditions of armies in Europe.³⁴ In the final analysis, however, Engels concluded that “still the advantages given by rifled bores . . . are so great that it is imperative upon every army which may never be called upon to fight with civilized foes, to do away with all smooth-bored barrels, both in small arms and artillery.”³⁵

Engels continued this analytical trend when he contributed seventy-one entries for *The New American Cyclopaedia*. The vast majority of these entries dealt with military items, and within in this population group, fully twenty-nine concerned artillery terms and usage to some degree.³⁶ Historically, Engels saw the impact of Gribeauval and his improvements on the branch as critical and one of the most important innovations that took place in the pre-Revolutionary French Army.³⁷ A second trend that appeared in these entries by Engels is the importance of the new advances in artillery to the navies of the world. The primary reason for this was the new advent of steel-plated ships. New, powerful, rifled cannon now assumed a vitally important role for the penetration of these new armadas.³⁸

This point led to what possibly could be one of Engels’ most astute observations of the 1860s--the importance of turreted ships for naval operations. In the late spring of 1862, Engels commented on the battle between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor* in the American Civil War. While recognizing the importance of the iron warship, Engels looked at this battle from the opposite perspective, evaluating how best to fight against one of these ships. In this regard, he saw the most crucial feature of future naval combat as arming warships with the heaviest guns

possible. Accordingly, guns of such size and weight could not be mounted on the sides of the ships as was currently the practice, but must be mounted in the middle of the ships to maintain proper balance and seaworthiness. The ship must, however, still be able to maintain a full 360-degree defensive pattern around the ship, and with the limited number of heavy guns that new battleships retained the ability to mount, the most effective method of utilizing these guns would be on turrets. In Engels' reasoning, "turret ships will, from now on, constitute the decisive strength of any navy."³⁹ When mounted with the heaviest guns possible at the time (ten- to fifteen-inch) turret ships are "incomparably the strongest ships both for defense proper and for offensive operations on neighboring coasts."⁴⁰

There are some problems with the new deployment of turret ships that Engels did recognize. Engels noted the problem of long-distance naval actions, and recognized the need for iron plated, traditional warships, as long as they met two conditions. First, the logistical tail for such open-seas operations must be sufficient to maintain the force. And second, the traditional broadside mounted forces must not be sent into an arena where they would come up against any turret ships. As England presented, in Engels' mind, the most prominent threat to the German states in the early 1860s, and was at that time far ahead of Prussia in the production of ironclad warships, Engels also called for a rapid and strong response in the building of coastal defenses to counter any British threat. Prussia "must act, and straight away. Any delay may cost us a campaign."⁴¹ Guns of the necessary strength, caliber, and number to render German coasts undefeatable would be available from the factories of Krupp if swift action were taken.⁴²

Infantry

Engels' primary commentaries on the technological advance of infantry weaponry dealt with the impact of breech-loading weapons. His first commentaries on the importance of this new weapon system occurred in his writings concerning the Palatinate insurgency, as he compared the opposing forces. Not only were the insurgents outnumbered and outgunned, but the

Prussians had an entire battalion of forces with the “needle-guns” engaged in the operation.⁴³ Not were are the insurgents out-matched technologically by the needle-guns of the Prussians, but were armed with only muskets against the Prussian rifles. Again, at this stage one can note Engels’ unfamiliarity with technical terms and specifics of the systems, as he merely referred to the “elongated bullet rifles” of the Prussian soldiers. He was cognizant enough, however, to note the effect, in terms of bullets downrange and total firepower felt, of this technologically advanced enemy.⁴⁴ Perhaps this experience somewhat shaped his opinions toward his further writings. Four years later, he wrote disparagingly of the English small-arms development, having nothing “remotely comparable” to the Prussian needle-gun or even the French rifle, the Chassepot.⁴⁵

Again, beginning with the Crimean War, Engels began to develop a more analytical mind concerning the use of technological terms and tendencies. He now called the new “elongated-bullet rifles” more properly Minié rifles, and Engels noted their impact on the battlefields around the Black Sea, particularly in the areas of marksmanship and skirmishing. Even the Turkish Army seemed to have advanced capabilities through the incorporation of these weapons.⁴⁶ These observations began to be backed up with fact, as when Engels studies the battle of Inkerman in November 1854 and marked the differences between the Russian army musket's power and the Minié bullets of the French and English. Although the specifics of comparison remain somewhat vague (and Engels probably was not above such exaggerations as citing a single Minié bullet penetrating and “often killing four or five [men]”), the basis for comparison was not rooted in a measurable quantity--the degree of penetration or force of weapon.⁴⁷ The Russians, under these circumstances, had “no chance with western troops in an even fight, nor even with such odds as she had at Inkerman.”⁴⁸ Engels emphasized this point again when he contributed the article “Alma” to *The New American Cyclopaedia*, commenting on the impact of the Minié rifles, destroying entire Russian files during the Crimean War.⁴⁹

Many of these trends and comments were soon borne out by events, as Engels noted the transition of the other armies of Europe away from muskets to the rifled guns. The British arms their entire army with the Minié rifles (Pritchett) and the Prussians added to the number of forces using the needle-gun, while transforming muskets into good rifles capable of firing the Minié bullet, even developing plans to transform their reserves into such outfitted units.⁵⁰ Similarly, five years later, Engels criticized the Prussians for not following through with this plan, censuring them for maintaining an "almost incalculable variety of calibers for small-arms."⁵¹ The Prussian initial plan, "which offered such a splendid occasion for equalizing the calibers all over Germany, has not only been shamefully neglected, but has made matters worse."⁵² Comparing the two, Engels postulated about the possibility of Prussia partially outfitted (one battalion of every regiment) with the expanded range of the needle-guns fighting the British, armed across the board with Enfield rifles, firing longer distances than any other muskets currently in use.⁵³ Engels implied, although he did not come forth and say it outright, that he favored the British in such an exchange, at least for the first few months of the fighting.

In his articles for *The New American Cyclopaedia*, Engels continued this commentary on the impact of rifles and the transition away from muskets in many of his articles. For instance, in "Infantry," he wrote of this new technology completely changing warfare based on "a very simple mathematical reason."⁵⁴ In a comment that would be validated many times in the American Civil War, Engels cited this new change as giving the defense "an immense advantage, at from 1000 to 300 yards, over the attacking force."⁵⁵ Along with this added defensive capability given to armies by the increased use and incorporation of rifles, Engels gave the French, specifically the French chasseurs, credit for creating a method of instruction and scientific approach to the use and disposition of such forces.⁵⁶

The culmination of Engels' pre-1870s writing on the impact of the new small-arms technology was his commentaries on the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. His comments were

particularly insightful given the vast divergence of his prediction with the actual outcome of events. Before the conflict started, in late June, 1866, Engels wrote that “in spite of the needle-gun, the odds are against the Prussian.”⁵⁷ Even during the course of the campaign, Engels was skeptical of the Prussian chances for ultimate success, mostly stemming from the perceived Austrian superiority in the areas of leadership, organization, tactics, and morale. Even after the battle of Jičín, a Prussian victory, Engels remained skeptical, although he cited the needle-gun as one of the key aspects contributing to the Austrian loss in the battle.⁵⁸ He attributed so much of the Prussian success during the course of the campaign to the Dreyse gun that he even downplayed other elements of the ongoing campaign to its credit, writing that, “at the same time we must ascribe the greater portion of whatever success they [the Prussians] have had to their breech-loaders; and if they never get to of the difficulties into which their generals so wantonly placed them, they will have to thank the needle-gun for it.”⁵⁹ What is most remarkable about the 1866 campaign--and Engels’ reminiscences about it--is that fact that when events proved Engels’ ruminations incorrect, he rather gracefully admits his misjudgment. When he commented on the reasons for the Prussian successes, however, he did not grant the needle-gun the same degree of responsibility that his earlier commentaries seem to indicate.⁶⁰

Transportation Network, Railroads, and Steam

Early on Engels recognized the impact that new technological developments impacting transportation would have on future operations. In one of his earliest writings on military operations, in January 1848, when he was still relatively unskilled and illiterate in the scientific and studious approach to military analysis, he addressed the importance of England’s building the first railways in 1831.⁶¹ Soon after this, in June of the same year, as he comments on the Westphalian uprisings, he calculated the Prussian strength in the region based on the ability to reinforce the existing force with two regiments (the 13th and 15th) within a few hours based on the availability of rail transport.⁶²

Engels remained relatively quiet on the impact and potential impacts of a rail transportation network during his discussion on the Hungarian insurrection, possibly due to his emphasis on the lack of technological advances that the Hungarians possessed compared to the Austrians. He did, however, spend a considerable amount of time discussing operations in Italy between the French and the Austrians. Of critical importance to Engels was the ability for the armies to deploy rapidly to the theater and reinforce operations based on the relatively new movement capabilities present in the 1850s. Not only rail transport, which allowed swift and timely response and reinforcement from Paris for the French with their excellent railway networks, but also the new, paved roads over the Alps that allowed expanded maneuvers, beyond what was possible during the wars of Napoleon.⁶³ Steam powered transport, which helped enable the French to conduct such maneuvers, was one of the “two new elements” that Engels cited as having “changed warfare significantly” since the time of Napoleon.⁶⁴ Somewhat surprisingly, Engels did not give much thought to the impact of transportation to the rapid Prussian advance into Prussia, leading to the swift victory in 1866.

Rear Operations

In his writings, Engels devoted time to the concept of service support. For him, the idea of conducting operations with an extended support lifeline not only was dangerous, but also traitorous. Much of Engels’ commentaries consider the linkage of these lines of communications and the corresponding support of armies in the field with the prosecution of some form of guerrilla or irregular warfare. For the most part, revolutionary movements remained on the initiating end of the spectrum for such operations and were intended to hit these lines when and where they were most vulnerable, with the most appropriate forces. For the regular armies that had to protect their own lines of communication, it was of vital importance that they did not allow such irregular attempts to affect maneuver elements in the field.

There is a problem of definition that clouds examination of these concepts throughout Engels' writings. He uses the terms "lines of communication" and "bases of operation" almost interchangeably, and it depends on the context with which either is used to determine to what extent the role of logistics is or is not in play. For the most part, however, the important elements of communications and logistics occur evenly in his notes, regardless of the terms used. In his early writings, particularly covering the Paris uprisings of June 1848, Engels remains concerned primarily with insurgent coordination and wrote critically of the Parisian workers for failing to consider all the districts of Paris when setting up their operations. The bases that the rebels maintained, however, were well protected and quite strong, a fact that Engels noted.⁶⁵

The first instances of Engels commenting on rear operations occurred in his articles for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on the Hungarian uprising of 1848 and 1849. Throughout his writings during this period, he devoted considerable attention to the importance of the peasant uprisings and guerrilla efforts in the rear of the Austrian positions. Other aspects of the campaign that tie directly into such examination concern the existing road and weather conditions in Hungary. Hungarian leadership, particularly Generals Bem and Görgey, deserve great credit, according to Engels, for their use of the available resources and circumstances to make life as miserable as possible for the attacking Austrians. As the Hungarians under Bem defended the Debrecen Heath, the Magyars did two things simultaneously. First, they concentrated their armies without the fear of becoming susceptible in their own rear. In modern terms, Bem held defensible interior lines. Second, by forcing the campaign to be conducted on ground of their own choosing, the Hungarians dictated where and how frequently Austrian resupply would and could occur. Although the Austrians did advance fairly deep into Hungarian territory, they remained at risk of two very significant threats during the campaign.

First, the tactical position called for resupply over some of the most treacherous ground in Hungary, particularly in rainy conditions, to vastly dispersed forces, as was the case for much

of the campaign. In March 1849, before some of the great Hungarian victories, Engels notes the problems that these factors cause the Austrian command.⁶⁶ Even the resupply of forces from Vienna to Pest, where Windischgrätz was basing his operations, proved exceptionally difficult for the Austrians. Although a rail line runs part of the way, as Engels noted, "when it is a matter of transporting 30,000 men along with their artillery, cavalry, baggage train, etc., railways do not speed things up very much."⁶⁷ While the full appreciation of this commentary never came under actual question, Engels did at least recognize the difficulties of resupplying an army in poor terrain across such a wide distance.⁶⁸ Second, the Austrian commanders in the field had to commit much of their forces to maintain security in the Austrian rear area against not only peasant insurgents, but also actual Hungarian field forces. These distances are not insignificant, and Engels remarks on a number of occasions on the size and significance of the forces needed in the rear area to prevent major logistical disruptions.⁶⁹ Not only were these forces very real and threatening to the Austrians, but countries across Europe noticed the impact, and Engels cited British newspapers carrying word of the effectiveness of these Hungarian actions and the concern that they caused the Austrians.⁷⁰

Insurgency movements, on the other hand, needed far less detail in their handling of operations. Although they certainly needed a base of operations, and needed to ground their operations from a common communications and logistics hub, they also needed to be prepared to take any action necessary to maintain their forces. While fighting in the Palatinate in the spring and summer of 1849, Engels lamented the logistical problems of the revolutionary forces. The only way the revolutionary army could be maintained, in many instances, was through the smuggling of supplies across the border between Baden, the Palatinate, and other German states, including Switzerland.⁷¹ One always needed to be prepared for the unexpected. As Engels wrote, "The stores are adequate if they suffice only for unforeseen contingencies; they are continually depleted and replenished."⁷²

Such concerns did not apply to insurgent armies alone. Foreshadowing some of the actions of the American Civil War, Engels emphasized the importance of provisioning an army from the countryside. Commenting on the Russian army at the outset of the Crimean War in January 1855, Engels noted, "An army which can detach strong cavalry parties to hunt up provisions, and the numerous carts and wagons of the country, can easily provide itself with everything necessary in the shape of food; and it is not likely that Moscow will burn down a second time."⁷³ Engels also warned, however, that for all the gathering of food, and its importance, an army needed bullets and weapons to fight, and a proper balance must be struck to precipitate success.⁷⁴

Engels displayed less comfort when examining the logistical problems of the allies against Russian in the Crimean War. While the extreme distances between England and France and the Crimean Peninsula certainly served as a critical element in this campaign, Engels refused to dwell greatly on this aspect of the fighting. Instead, he focused on the Russian combat and logistical operations against the Turks and other groups on the Russian frontier. Befitting the tendency Engels had to denigrate the Russians at every opportunity, most of the situations he focused on concerned the problems that the Russians had putting down any Turkish resistance, either regular or irregular. The most significant challenge in this regard concerned the Balkans, where there existed very few passable routes through which a Russian army could maneuver to engage the Turks. While Engels saw the possibility of an army based on a very specific mix of light artillery, light cavalry and infantry breaking through and conducting operations, he saw no possibility of such a force retaining the ability to receive support or to maintain communications with its rear along a hostile route.⁷⁵ In 1858, the Russians would face similar problems as they conducted the campaign against the tribes in central Asia. In this campaign, the Russians paid particular attention to the potential problems of maintaining security along their lines of communications and support. As part of the approximately 10,000 combatants, the commander

of the expedition General Vasily A. Perovsky, included a number of irregular Cossack, Bashkir, and Kirghiz cavalry to support the infantry. In addition, according to Engels, 15,000 camels were present to maintain the supplies to the army.⁷⁶

In the campaign against the British and French, Engels noted that Russia's best hope for success was in the fact that the British and French were dispersed and far away from any central point, or base of operations. If the allies could have maintained a significant base of operations closer to Sevastopol, then, Engels predicted, the situation would have deteriorated immediately for the Russians. After a distance of 120 miles, however, Engels wondered how effective the Allies would be in operations against the Russians.⁷⁷ Unfortunately, Engels did not develop this analysis to a further degree during his writing on the Crimean war. When the Russians were finally bottled up in Sevastopol, Engels simplistically cited the reason for Allied success as low Russian morale and lack of supplies in the besieged city. While these elements certainly played a role, Engels grouped them broadly as an all-encompassing solution.⁷⁸ Ten years later, in 1866, Engels succinctly addressed the Prussian supply system by citing it as "decidedly better" than the Austrians, while refusing to elaborate on the specifics of its operation.⁷⁹ It is interesting because, just seven years earlier, in his pamphlet "Po and Rhine," earlier Engels remarked on the significance of the railways running in such large numbers between the Seine and the Rhine, intimating to the Prussians' significant forethought in this realm.⁸⁰

Combined Arms

I deal with the modern system of war as fully developed by Napoleon. Its two pivots are: the mass character of means of attack in men, horses, and guns, and the mobility of these means of attack.⁸¹

Friedrich Engels, "Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852"

One of the most significant ways in which Friedrich Engels maintained his significance as a military theorist of the first degree was his ability to emphasize not only the need but also the proper roles for combined arms operations throughout the nineteenth century. Beginning with

simple descriptions of the manner in which the three branches of infantry, cavalry, and artillery were organized together, by the end of the 1860s, he developed his thought far enough so that he was regularly analyzing the combat mix of all major European armies and submitting theories on how the utilization of all arms might be best integrated to provide for maximum effect on the battlefield.

The very first commentary recorded by Engels on combined arms operations occurred in June 1844, when he wrote about the weavers' riot in Silesia, noting that government forces used a mix of infantry, rifles, cavalry and artillery to quell the rioters. Of particular note is Engels' distinction between regular infantry and the special forces using rifles.⁸² Engels' first attempt at recognizing and commenting on the utilization of combined arms on a larger scale arises during the uprisings in 1848. Most of his remarks and observations remain rather mundane, concerning chiefly the numbers and types of units and weapons involved. He devoted a number of articles to discussing the numbers and designations of German units sent to suppress revolts in Westphalia.⁸³

During his remarks on the fighting in Paris during the June Days, however, Engels demonstrated some very telling aspects of his analytical mind that figured prominently in the years to come, and marked him as an astute military observer in his own right. Through his description of barricade fighting, particularly the manner in which artillery was used in the reduction of insurgent strongpoint, he indicated an appreciation for its abilities, if not respect for the forces utilizing it. In response to the insurgent practice of turning buildings and houses into "genuine fortresses," the leader of the French governmental forces, Cavaignac, brought a great deal of artillery into use. Engels went further and distinguished between the types of cannon and munitions being used: grape-shot, cannon-balls, shells, and Congreve rockets in particular.⁸⁴

Additionally, Engels did not limit himself to the governmental actions, but also discussed the manner in which the insurgents attempted to develop the fight. In an article written immediately following the June Days of 1848, Engels went into detail about the insurgent

development of different columns, moving concentrically through worker-dominated districts, stemming from bases of operations that had been well developed. Between the columns were other elements conducting reconnaissance missions and maintaining communications between the forces. Engels picked up on the relatively minor activities of this lesser-trained group of insurgents.⁸⁵ Disappointingly, Engels did not develop these concepts to their fullest possible extent. While he recognized the different aspects of using different functions of the force for different purposes, he never delved into specifics as to how they actually would be employed as part of a large group. Aside from later singular comments on the fighting of 1848,⁸⁶ for the most part when Engels offered some final comments on the failure of the insurgency and the ultimate success of Cavaignac's forces, he regressed back to the simplistic reasoning of numbers and brutal means utilized being responsible, without any detailed analysis.⁸⁷

Two elements, however, do stem from this early analysis. First, Engels demonstrated an appreciation for the brutality and intricacies of city fighting when few recognized this aspect earlier, not only through his discussion of the manning of city walls, but in the turning of civilian establishments, such as houses and businesses, into military fortifications. This theme cropped into his examinations at various times in the future. Second, Engels possessed a keen eye for the minute incidences that indicated greater events. In 1848, most of these observations resulted primarily from his specific previous experience as an artilleryman in Prussian service, when he remarked on the significance of artillerymen receiving issued rifles with bayonets in his article on the Westphalian uprising. The fact that Prussian artillerymen received no training with such weapons was an indicator of the degree of force and type of fighting that was to be used in putting down the insurrection.⁸⁸

Engels analytical ability increased as he wrote his articles for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on the Hungarian uprising of 1848-1850. It is in these articles where one first sees a glimpse of more advanced examination of military thought and practice. In the fighting for the

Debrecen Heath, Engels drew comparisons with the cavalry fight between the Hungarian light cavalry and the Austrian cuirassiers and the fighting between the French cavalry and Arab light horsemen in Algeria. The Austrian commander, Prince Windischgrätz, personally commented on the problems that the Austrians had with the Hungarian light cavalry.⁸⁹ In his closing comments on the Hungarian uprising, Engels devoted time not only to the general mix of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, but also used information from official Austrian dispatches and other, pro-Austrian newspapers to examine specific force ratios and mixture to determine exactly what activities and events transpired.⁹⁰

By the spring of 1849 Engels had gained a reputation for being, if not a military commander, at least someone who, within the socialist school of thought, understood military matters. Hence, when the town of Elberfeld in Westphalia began its insurgency against the Prussian government, town leaders called Engels to act as a counselor in their preparations. Although his activities lasted only a few days before elements within the town demanded his removal, the degree to which he received authority highlights his reputation. Not only did the town give him authority to inspect the barricades, but also the authority to finish preparing the fortifications within the city and to install artillery. In order to accomplish this, Engels used “sappers” to a great degree.⁹¹

In the activities in the Palatinate in 1849, Engels repeatedly mourned the problems of the insurgents’ lack of firepower, predominantly in artillery and cavalry. He was not frustrated, but somewhat honored by the fact that such a large, disparate group of the Prussian military has been sent to reduce their expedition. In his pamphlet “The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution,” he wrote, “I still remember with delight the astonishment it gave rise to when I discovered . . . the news of the concentration of 27 Prussian battalions, 9 batteries and 9 regiments of cavalry, together with their exact location between Saarbrücken and Kreuznach.”⁹² Part of his latter thought, leading to some of his first formulations of personal theory, came from this

campaign, particularly in the fact that the Prussians had such a hard time in finishing off the insurrection. Engels remained somewhat critical of the Prussian forces for their unprofessional conduct of the operation, writing that “one regiment of cavalry with some horse-artillery would have sufficed to blow the whole merry company to the four winds and totally disperse the ‘liberation army’ of the Rhenish Palatinate.”⁹³ It was from experiences like this that Engels began to formulate his ideas on military practice, such as the one cited at the beginning of this section. Although few of these missals were entirely original at this point, he at least began to demonstrate his affinity for such thinking.

In his commentaries on the Crimean conflict, Engels reverted to some extent, focusing predominantly on specific numbers and types of units involved in the fighting. The only truly forward-leaning thoughts he had at this time concerned the reduction of fortifications, primarily stemming from the siege of Sevastopol. In this regard, Engels emphasized the necessities of bringing forward as much as possible all necessary artillery pieces into the necessary position to demolish the work and demoralize the defenders, hardly an inspired or particularly original thought.⁹⁴

In the 1860s, Engels began to utilize more innovative structure and discussion on his ideas concerning combined arms warfare. It was during this time that he began to formulate the application of such forces in the conduct of revolutionary warfare. From the end of the Crimean War until the Franco-Prussian War, the focus of such discussions resided in the colonial conflicts conducted by the main European Armies. The British received particular adulation from Engels for their handling of operations in India. Engels cited General Campbell for his adept use of both artillery and infantry in the relief of Lucknow in January 1858.⁹⁵ Engels even alluded to early efforts at what modern practitioners would call “joint” operations. In the Spanish war with the Moors in 1859 and 1860, Spanish forces conducted operations against the Algerian coast. To accomplish tasks here, the fight was “carried on principally by the infantry in skirmishing order,

and a battery or two of mountain artillery, supported here and there by the effect--more moral than physical--of the fire of a few gunboats and steamers.”⁹⁶

Engels elaborated on the historical impact of combined arms operations in some of his articles for *The New American Cyclopaedia*. The Roman army, he posited, was the first to develop such a concept with a degree of success. In his article “Army,” he wrote, “The Roman army presents us with the most perfect system of infantry tactics invented during the time when the use of gunpowder was unknown. It maintains the predominance of heavy infantry and compact bodies, but adds to it mobility of the separate smaller bodies, the possibility of fighting in broken ground, the disposition of several lines one behind the other, partly as supports and relief, partly as a powerful reserve, and finally a system of training the single soldier which was even more to the purpose than that of Sparta.”⁹⁷ The concept of training was one that, in the 1850s, existed in its infant stages for Engels, but which figured prominently in the future. Engels wrote of the importance of modern training in combined arms in his reviews of English training methods for *The Volunteer Journal* in 1860, citing the importance of constructing training venues offering members of all branches the opportunity to train together.⁹⁸

On a few occasions, certainly, Engels got somewhat pompous in his pronouncements and came to conclusions that were quite far fetched. For instance, when commenting on Russian operations in Turkey during the Crimean War, he wrote that “the passage of a large river, even in presence of a hostile army, is a military feat so often performed during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, that every lieutenant now-a-days can tell how it is to be done. A few feigned movements, a well-appointed pontoon train, some batteries to cover the bridges, good measures for securing the retreat, and a brave vanguard, are about all the conditions required.”⁹⁹ While this may sound simple, Engels himself on many occasions recognized the difficulties of getting all these elements to work together. He noticeably refrained from commenting on the length of time that transpired since any substantial force executed such an operation. Indeed, through 1870,

Engels did not once comment on any actual operation of the type he described here. The only close approximation to this involved the Turkish crossing of the Danube River in 1853, and Engels attributes this mostly to the fact that the Russians allowed them to do so, unopposed, to allow a better chance at attacking them when the Turkish dispositions were less focused.¹⁰⁰

¹Friedrich Engels, "The Storming of Vienna. The Betrayal of Vienna," *New York Daily Tribune* #3425, 9 April 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:61.

²Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:548.

³Friedrich Engels, "The War--No Progress," *New York Daily Tribune* #5647, 27 May 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:327.

⁴Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:237.

⁵Friedrich Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" *The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution*, August 1849-February 1850, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:208.

⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Progress of the Turkish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3934, 25 November 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:455-6; Friedrich Engels, "Retreat of the Russians from Kalafat," *New York Daily Tribune* #4040, 30 March 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:66-7.

⁷Engels, "Retreat of the Russians," 13:68.

⁸Engels, "Crimean Prospects," 14:528.

⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," *New York Daily Tribune* #5236, 1 February 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:437.

¹⁰Friedrich Engels, "The Indian Army," *New York Daily Tribune* #5381, 21 July 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:581.

¹¹See Chapter 5, Section III.

¹²Friedrich Engels, "The Italian War [Retrospect]," *Das Volk* #12, 23 July 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:425.

¹³Engels, "The War--No Progress," 16:329; Friedrich Engels, "A Chapter of History," *New York Daily Tribune* #5678, 2 July 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:378.

¹⁴Friedrich Engels, "Garibaldi in Sicily," *New York Daily Tribune* #5979, 22 June 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 17:388.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 17:389.

¹⁶Friedrich Engels, "Notes on the War in Germany," *The Manchester Guardian* #6204, 6 July 1866, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 20:179, 182.

¹⁷Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:556.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:237.

²¹Friedrich Engels, "Bulletin No. 23--From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #230, 24 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:425-6.

²²Friedrich Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #265, 6 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:232.

²³Friedrich Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," *The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution*, August 1849-February 1850, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:154.

²⁴Friedrich Engels, "The Palatinate," *The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution*, August 1849-February 1850, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:194.

²⁵Engels, "The Storming of Vienna," 11:59.

²⁶Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:154.

²⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Capture of Bomarsund (Article II)," *New York Daily Tribune* #4182, 13 September 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:385.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 13:387.

²⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #32, August 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:415.

³⁰Friedrich Engels, "On Rifled Cannon," *New York Daily Tribune* #5926, 21 April 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 17:361.

³¹Engels, "Po and Rhine," 16:220.

³²Friedrich Engels, "On Rifled Cannon," *New York Daily Tribune* #5950, 19 May 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 17:365.

³³*Ibid.*, 17:366.

³⁴Friedrich Engels, "Lessons of the American War," *Volunteer Journal* #66, 6 December 1861, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:527.

³⁵Engels, "On Rifled Cannon," *New York Daily Tribune* #5950, 19 May 1860, 17:366.

³⁶For example, the following are some of the entries: Bastion, Ammunition, Battery, Blindage, Bosquet, Bomb, Bomb Ketch, Bomb-Proof, Bomb Vessel, Bombardier, Bombardment, Artillery, Cannonade, Carronade, Case Shot, Catapult, Fortification, Navy.

³⁷Engels, "Army," 18:115.

³⁸Friedrich Engels, "Navy," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 12, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:372.

³⁹Friedrich Engels, "Artillery News From America," in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 19:291.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 19:295.

⁴²Friedrich Engels, "England's Fighting Forces as Against Germany," *Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung* #27, 6 July 1864, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 19:324.

⁴³Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:154.

⁴⁴Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:228.

⁴⁵Friedrich Engels, "England," 23 January 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:199.

⁴⁶Friedrich Engels, "Progress of the Turkish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3944, 7 December 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:476.

⁴⁷Engels, "The Battle of Inkerman," 13:532.

⁴⁸Ibid., 13:534. Russian strength at the beginning of the battle was 60,000, significantly less than their opponents. The Russians lost approximately 12,000 men at Inkerman while the allies lost slightly more than 3,000 soldiers.

⁴⁹Friedrich Engels, "Alma," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:18.

⁵⁰Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #32, August 1855, 14:420; Friedrich Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #33, September 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:435-6.

⁵¹Friedrich Engels, "Military Reform in Germany," *New York Daily Tribune* #5873, 20 February 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 17:348.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Friedrich Engels, "German Resources for War," *New York Daily Tribune* #5582, 12 March 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:180.

⁵⁴Friedrich Engels, "Infantry," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 9, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:363.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Friedrich Engels, "The French Light Infantry," *The Volunteer Journal* #7, 20 October 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:428.

⁵⁷Friedrich Engels, "Notes on the War in Germany," *The Manchester Guardian* #6190, 20 June 1866, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 20:168.

⁵⁸Friedrich Engels, "Notes on the War in Germany," *The Manchester Guardian* #6201, 3 July 1866, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 20:178.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Engels, "Notes on the War in Germany," *The Manchester Guardian* #6204, 6 July 1866, 20:181.

⁶¹Friedrich Engels, "The Beginning of the End in Austria," *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* #8, 27 January 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:533.

⁶²Friedrich Engels, "Cologne in Danger," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #11, 11 June 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:69.

⁶³Engels, "Po and Rhine," 16:223.

⁶⁴Engels, "The Campaign in Italy," 16:346. The other element was improved defense by fortress groups and entrenched camps.

⁶⁵Friedrich Engels, "The June Revolution [The Course of the Paris Uprising]," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #31, 1 July 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:158.

⁶⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Military Reports of the *Kölnische Zeitung*," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #240, 8 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:15.

⁶⁷Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #273, 15 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:280.

⁶⁸Friedrich Engels, "The Struggle in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #212, 3 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:291.

⁶⁹Engels, "From the Theater of War [Italy]," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #259, 30 March 1849, 9:166; Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War--Windischgrätz's Comments on the Imposed Constitution," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #271, 13 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:261.

⁷⁰Friedrich Engels, "The Frankfurt Assembly Debates the Polish Question," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #81, 20 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:351.

⁷¹Engels, "The Palatinate," 10:189.

⁷²Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:550.

⁷³Friedrich Engels, "Progress of the War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4276, 1 January 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:549.

⁷⁴Friedrich Engels, "Critical Observations on the Siege of Sevastopol," *Neue Oder Zeitung* #37, 23 January 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:594.

⁷⁵Friedrich Engels, "The Russians in Turkey," *New York Daily Tribune* #3900, 17 October 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:337.

⁷⁶Friedrich Engels, "Russian Progress in Central Asia," *New York Daily Tribune* #5471, 3 November 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:61.

⁷⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Situation in the Crimea," *Neue Oder Zeitung* #155, 2 April 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:138; Friedrich Engels, "Napoleon's Apology," *New York Daily Tribune* #4377, 30 April 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:148.

⁷⁸Engels, "Crimean Prospects," 14:526.

⁷⁹Engels, "Notes on the War in Germany," *The Manchester Guardian* #6190, 20 June 1866, 20:167.

⁸⁰Engels, "Po and Rhine," 16:245.

⁸¹Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:550.

⁸²Friedrich Engels, "Further Particulars of the Silesian Riots," *The Northern Star* #346, 29 June 1844, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3:533.

⁸³Engels, "Cologne in Danger," 7:69. "In addition there is the major part of the 7th and 8th artillery brigades of which at least half are already mobilized (i.e. each battery of foot-artillery has now 121 horses instead of 19, or 8 instead of 2 horse-drawn cannon)."

⁸⁴Friedrich Engels, "The 23rd of June," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #28, 28 June 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:132; Engels, "The 24th of June," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #28, 28 June 1848, 7:134.

⁸⁵Engels, "The June Revolution," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #31, 1 July 1848, 7:157-8.

⁸⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Russians in Transylvania," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #232, 27 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:433.

⁸⁷Friedrich Engels, "The June Revolution [The Course of the Paris Uprising]," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #32, 2 July 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:161.

⁸⁸Engels, "Cologne in Danger," 7:70.

⁸⁹Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #258 (supplement), 29 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:155; Friedrich Engels, "An Austrian Defeat," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #272, 14 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:274.

⁹⁰Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #279 (supplement), 22 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:316; Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*

#279 (2nd edition), 22 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:319; Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #284, 28 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:350.

⁹¹Friedrich Engels, "Elberfeld," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #300 (2nd edition), 17 May 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:447-8.

⁹²Engels, "The Palatinate," 10:193.

⁹³Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:209-10.

⁹⁴Friedrich Engels, "The War on the Danube," *New York Daily Tribune* #3952, 16 December 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:519-20.

⁹⁵Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:437.

⁹⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Moorish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #5863, 8 February 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:553.

⁹⁷Engels, "Army," 18:96.

⁹⁸Friedrich Engels, "Volunteer Engineers: Their Value and Sphere of Action," *The Volunteer Journal* #12, 24 November 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:462.

⁹⁹Engels, "The Russians in Turkey," 12:337.

¹⁰⁰Engels, "Progress of the Turkish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3944, 7 December 1853, 12:472.

CHAPTER 4

THE LEADER AND THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Military Science

The new science of war must be just as much a necessary product of the new social relations as the science of war created by the revolution and Napoleon was the necessary result of the new relations brought about by the revolution.¹

Friedrich Engels, "Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852"

It should be remembered that throughout his lifetime Engels, as well as Marx, believed that the proletariat movement was a belligerent power and needed to be prepared, mentally and physically, for conflict.² Although not a trained military expert, Engels paid particular attention to the contemporary state of the profession of arms in terms of techniques and procedures. His military service inculcated a desire to further contribute to the development of Marxist military thought to prepare for the coming proletariat revolution.³ Military science was a critical element, to Engels, of the progression of any revolutionary mission, and he did not consider his efforts in developing a Marxist military theory to be wasted: "The most important purpose of all Engels' studies in military science was to provide a basis for revolutionary strategy and tactics."⁴ While he certainly acknowledged the role of the commander and of the abstract in the pursuit and practice of military art, Engels also saw many features that directly related to the scientific approach to warfare. Successes and failures on the battlefield, as well as faults and shortcomings in training procedures before conflict, could be traced directly to an army's adherence to a scientific approach to fighting. Nowhere in his writings did Engels devote a consistent body of work to the subject. He did, however, frequently include such discussion into his writings on warfare of the period, with particular attention to the role and application of military science to the midcentury revolutions and the colonial wars. In these latter conflicts, Engels saw that laws of military science within the context of a social revolutionary war did not remain constant, but

rather existed in a continual state of flux. It was in these situations that the regular armies of Europe discovered many problems in the pursuit and conduct of war.

Engels remained fairly consistent throughout his life in defining the parameters in which he commented on military science. One of the foremost elements he considered when approaching battle was historical precedent; and in the professional study of military history, Engels perceived many shortcomings. The recognition of such shortcomings was one of the primary motivators that urged him to write his commentaries "The Armies of Europe" in the summer of 1855.⁵ In this essay, he stated that "Military history, as a science in which a correct appreciation of facts is the only paramount consideration, is but of very recent date, and boasts as yet of a very limited literature."⁶ Bearing out this observation, Engels commented frequently on events of his day by recounting events of the past. As part of his commentary, one of the key eras in the development of military science occurred in the century preceding the French Revolution, when great captains such as Turenne and Frederick the Great, revolutionized the conduct of warfare through their fusion of new weapons and new tactics across Europe.⁷

In addition to recognizing the utility of military history toward contemporary military science, Engels also proved insightful in another arena of scientific warfare that would figure prominently in the twentieth-century. As early as his writings on the midcentury revolutions in evaluating the ability of France and Britain to conduct war, Engels reached certain conclusions using a numerical formula incorporating national population, economic viability, and productive output to determine the size and capabilities not only of opposing armies, but also of mobilization tables. Engels remained skeptical concerning the size of mass armies that would be able to take the field. To create an army incorporating more than 12 percent of a nation's population entailed an increase in the economic program and technological/industrial base of a country to a degree that mechanical output would outpace human labor by a tremendous factor. In 1851, this capability did not exist.⁸ In an economically Malthusian manner, this juxtaposed the growth of a

state along economic, industrial, agricultural, and population statistics. Such discussions certainly were not common in the middle of the nineteenth-century. Fifty years later, however, theorists like Jean de Bloch elaborated on similar thinking in their analyses of European militaries in the years prior to the First World War.⁹ By the time World War One commenced, comparable considerations figured prominently in the thinking of all combatants and significantly impacted national ability to wage war by the conclusion of hostilities in 1918. Particularly in Germany's situation manpower problems, combined with the industrial condition, caused problems not ending with Versailles, but carrying forward into the next decades.

Engels also saw the importance of maintaining clear objectives in time of war. While this seems almost second nature for a military professional, for Engels and his commentaries on guerilla movements and irregular warfare, such considerations were not a given. In India during the Sepoy rebellion, the Indian mutineers gained limited advantages over British forces and conducted operations that had at least the potential for significant victory. Unfortunately, the insurgents "entirely lacked the scientific element without which an army is now-a-days helpless."¹⁰ In the multifaceted fields of conflict during his lifetime, Engels seldom drew distinctions between irregular and regular warfare regarding scientific approaches to war. The application and utilization of scientific principles of war did not cease with the initiation of unconventional war, but continued to be of paramount importance to the progression of operations.¹¹

A final medium through which Engels entailed his views on scientific war was *The New American Cyclopaedia*. During the three-plus years of his submissions, from July 1857 to November 1860, Engels contributed many different articles that incorporated discussion, either directly or indirectly, on the relationships of scientific considerations to the conduct of war. In articles entitled "Attack," "Army," and "Artillery," Engels incorporated the impact of scientific knowledge not only on actual operations, but also on the general concepts and principles that

guided the organization and doctrinal development of national armed forces. In this regard, military history figured prominently as the basis for such development.¹² Additionally, Engels took care to cite specific examples for military commanders who properly, or in some cases improperly, applied scientific practices in their campaigns. Engels cited such leaders as Bem in Hungary and Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher during the Napoleonic wars as examples of officers who achieved success in such manner.¹³ Other persons, such as Baron Menno van Coehorn and Viscount William Carr Beresford contributed significantly to the development of the military profession through their theoretical works.¹⁴ Immediately upon the heels of these essays was Engels' series for *The Volunteer Journal* in England where he addressed the same issues. Citing French General Thomas Robert de la Piconnerie Bugeaud, Engels portrayed what he perceived as useful and sage principles of war. He founded his justification for this conclusion on the manner in which Bugeaud grounded his principles in "scientific tactics" rather than on abstract emotional appeal to his subordinates.¹⁵ As can be seen, understanding of the concepts of military science depended a great deal of the education and ability of individuals. Therefore, Engels spent a considerable amount of time addressing the manner and method by which military science was learned and applied in war.

Leadership

Engels spent a considerable amount of time evaluating and addressing different leadership traits and different leaders' abilities in the pursuit of military objectives. In this discussion, certain concepts appear frequently, suggesting key elements that Engels viewed as decisive and critically important for successful leadership in combat. Although most of his specific examples concerned generals or senior leaders, all of these observations could be applied equally to the actions of younger, junior officers. Indeed, many of the shortcomings that Engels saw among the senior leaders of his day were problems that had foundations in unresolved problems of those particular officers' youth and education. Personally, Engels had mixed results

when he was thrust into positions of responsibility. Although he was certainly proud of his service in the town of Elberfeld in May 1849, the fact remains that he was “somewhat unceremoniously ejected” from his position after a few days. He recovered, however, to serve with distinction during the uprising of the Palatinate later that year.¹⁶ Hammen, in his evaluation of Engels during the midcentury revolutions, says that he was “a leader among men, with a zest for action and a genius for witty speech and ridicule.”¹⁷ This section will concern Engels’ analysis of leadership traits, both good and bad, emphasizing those things critical for good leadership.

Morale and Motivation

During the revolutions of the midcentury, Engels remarked frequently on the importance and critical nature of morale and of a leader’s ability to inspire his subordinates in battle. One of the key elements Engels saw as important for an effective leader to accomplish was conveying to his troops an ideal of *élan* and spirit. A good leader insured that troops under his command had superior morale and used this motivation to achieve success on the battlefield, even when against a technologically superior and well-supplied foe.¹⁸ One of the first individuals that Engels identified as possessing this unique ability to inspire troops and to imbue in them enthusiasm for a cause is the Hungarian leader Kossuth. In this regard, Engels saw Kossuth as a reincarnation of the great French revolutionaries Carnot and Danton in his ability to create the conditions in a beleaguered army that facilitate victory.¹⁹ Throughout the course of the campaign in Hungary, Engels cited the love of the people of Hungary for Kossuth, and their willingness to rally around his calls for action.²⁰ Kossuth, however, was not the only Hungarian leader that Engels praised for ability in this regard. Engels also cited Hungarian General Mór Perczel as one commander who was able to perform motivational feats, with his actions in the Slovak region.²¹

Engels contrasted this with the complete failure of the Austrian commanders opposing them to perform similar deeds. Even such Austrian generals as Radetzky, whom Engels found

quite worthy of praise for some of his operations in Italy, failed, in Engels' mind, to inspire any sort of motivational upsurge among his own soldiers, let alone the local populace. Similarly, Engels chastised Prince Windischgrätz for his inability to put down the Hungarian rebellion, as well as for his whining missives concerning Hungarian strength and ability.²² Indeed, Engels almost appeared dumbfounded when he compared the fighting procedures of the Hungarians and the Austrians. While recognizing the Austrians' superiority in number, organization and arming, he was amazed by the degree to which the Hungarians were able to achieve success against them. In Engels' mind, there had to be some other factor at work, and the clear implication was that it was the spirit of the army that gave the Magyar forces the ultimate advantage.²³

Hungary was not the only region in which Engels found examples of spirited leadership being critical for success during the midcentury revolutions. Engels himself participated in the abortive Palatinate campaign of 1849 against the Prussian forces, and in general was very critical of all aspects of the insurgents' performance. There were, however, a few bright spots in this revolutionary debacle. One of these bright spots was an insurgent commander out of Baden, the Pole Ludwik Mieroslawski. Even though Mieroslawski was unable to reverse the elements that caused the insurgent army to be "disorganized, beaten, dispirited [and] badly provided for," he was at least, in Engels' mind, able to revive the army enough to fight a few final battles at Waghäusel and Ubstadt and to withdraw in some semblance of order through mountainous terrain and across the Murg River toward the Swiss border in the Summer of 1849.²⁴ Although unsuccessful, Engels credited Mieroslawski with at least inspiring the insurgents with the ability to take some progressive action.

After the midcentury revolutions, Engels did not comment as often on the importance of a leader to maintain morale in this generic sense of the word. The one significant instance of Engels commenting on such an occurrence was during the Crimean War, when the Allied troops on the peninsula were having a slow time defeating the Russian forces opposing them. Engels,

certainly no easy critic of the Allies during this time, did find one French general whom he cited as excelling in his abilities--Jean Jacques Pélissier. Given the decrepit state (in Engels' opinion) of the Allied army and fortifications during the campaign, Pélissier's actions upon assuming command were designed appropriately "not with the intention of really undertaking to storm the place at present, but to keep up the *morale* of the men."²⁵ This activity on Pélissier's part was particularly notable given his predecessor's, General François Canrobert, lack of regard for his subordinates' morale and his inability to inspire them.²⁶

Discipline and Organization

Following the revolutions, Engels' analyses of leadership attributes developed from the more simplistic conceptions of mere "morale-building" into the incorporation of more specialized qualities that leaders needed in order to be successful. Two of the most important elements in this conception were the ideas of instilling discipline within the troops and of organizing them in the most effective manner for combat. Although Engels did see such considerations present in generals' actions early in his writing, he never did develop these themes as separate entities in their own right, as he did in later years. Certainly, such leaders as Kossuth and Bem proved quite adept at utilizing the necessary resources available to them in order to fight the Austrians successfully on many occasions.²⁷ But reflections on the actions of these leaders remained relatively rare and nowhere exhibited any depth of analytical traits. As a witness and evaluator of numerous insurgency movements throughout his life, however, Engels had little patience for any sort of disarray in a revolutionary force.²⁸

Once Engels began writing on the activities of the Crimean War, however, such conceptions as discipline and organization played an increasingly large role in his examination of leadership in combat. Although his commentaries on discipline during the Crimean War were few in number (he saw many other problems with the armies than simple discipline), one can begin to gain an insight into the ideas that would shape his future writings. Foremost among

these conceptions was the idea that discipline was decisive and an absolute requirement for any successful military operation. One of the reasons for the length of the Crimean campaign, in Engels' opinion, was the discipline of the troops involved in the fighting, regardless of the overall skill of the commanders involved. Disciplined troops could withstand many more hardships than undisciplined troops.²⁹ In the Crimean War, this observation reflected in both directions, roughly equalizing out between the Russians and the Allies.

In the later years of the decade, however, Engels commented on fighting where discipline was not so evenly balanced between the combating parties, and where it played a definitive role in determining the outcome of the fight. During the relief efforts of General Campbell to relieve the besieged garrison at Lucknow, Engels credited strong discipline as one of the primary reasons for the success of the operation. Campbell's operation demonstrated that "an attack by well-disciplined, well-officered European troops, insured to war and of average courage, upon an Asiatic rabble, possessing neither discipline nor officers, nor the habits of war," will inevitably lead to the success of the Europeans.³⁰ Once an army lost this discipline, as was common during the nineteenth century when European armies digressed into plunder and pillaging after battles, it proved difficult, if not impossible, to ever regain under such situations.³¹ These characteristics, and the failure of the English troops to diverge into such a state of indiscipline as Engels cited, led to the success of Campbell's mission, regardless of the future progression of the campaign. The insurgents, who failed on numerous occasions to retain the necessary order to combat the English, suffered the inevitable defeat.³²

Similarly, Engels' saves high praise for the ability of Garibaldi, the Italian revolutionary, to achieve success against apparently enormous odds. Engels noted Garibaldi's ability to maintain order and discipline within the ranks as early as May 1859, when he called the Italian "a strict disciplinarian [who] had most of his men under his hands for four months."³³ Such ability

and skill were necessary in order to meet the more regular forces that he would face in his campaigns of the next few years.³⁴

When Engels used the forum of *The New American Cyclopaedia* to impart some of his views in the 1850s, in addition to emphasizing the social element in military organizations, he wrote on a number of different military figures.³⁵ Of these, he focused a great deal of his writing on each one of the aspects of the ability to impart discipline or to effectively organize a combat force. For example, Barclay de Tolly, the Russian Napoleonic general, was a “stern disciplinarian,” who kept his troops firmly under control.³⁶ The Hungarian Bem “showed himself a master in the art of suddenly creating and disciplining an army.”³⁷ Finally, General Beresford was worthy of inclusion into the *Cyclopaedia* in light of his “successful reorganization” and disciplining of Portuguese troops during the 1810s and 1820s.³⁸ Certainly these characteristics of successful leadership grew more important to Engels, as he increasingly dedicated limited time and space to commenting on these attributes among military figures.

Technical and Tactical Competence

Of course, one of the most important attributes that any military leader must possess was the knowledge of his profession. Engels certainly did not shortchange this quality, but his appreciation for it certainly did develop and expand through his years of writing.

Engels found his first opportunities for writing about simple soldierly competence during the Italian campaign of 1848. During this campaign, Engels wrote scathingly of Charles Albert, the King of Sardinia, who committed many significant failures as a leader. Even so, Engels did write before the completion of the campaign that “Despite all the bad qualities of this ‘sword of Italy,’ the possibility still existed that at least one of his [Charles Albert’s] generals, favoured by such uncommonly advantageous positions, might have possessed the military skill to claim the victory for the Italian colours.”³⁹ Unfortunately for the Sardinians, Charles Albert himself conducted many unforgivable faults, in Engels’ view, leading to the ultimate failure of the

campaign. Some of these faults included the wide dispersion of forces in the face of the enemy, the neglect to form a reserve, the lack of or unsuitability of logistical items for his army, such as food and correct ammunition for the issued weapons.⁴⁰

On the Austrian side, Engels found the actions of Radetzky quite laudable, regardless of the apparent dislike Engels maintained at this point in his life for the general. Engels calls Radetzky's operations in Italy "masterful," citing the Austrian's ability to use the defensive positions within the Italian Quadrilateral in an extremely effective manner, and to take advantage of the multiple failures (mentioned in the above paragraph) of the Italian leadership.⁴¹

During the midcentury revolutions, Engels' most damning commentaries fell on the heads of those insurgents with whom he fought during the Palatinate uprising of 1849. Even Mieroslawski, whom Engels found to be a better leader than most, suffered from a failure of ability in certain instances, most notably following the battle of Waghäusel, where his unclear orders (coupled with the incompetence of his subordinates) allowed the Prussians to cross the Rhine and gain a tactical advantage, forcing the insurgents south, without any opposition.⁴² Engels noted that Mieroslawski took command from Herr Joseph M. Reichardt, a lawyer who possessed little cleverness in professional military matters, and had for his second-in-command the Polish officer Franz Sznayde, whom Engels described as possessing "total incompetence."⁴³ In addition, before Mieroslawski's tenure, the exploits of professionally trained Badenese General-in-Chief Franz Sigel led to disastrous results for the insurgency. During Sigel's command, "everything was got into confusion, every good opportunity was lost, every precious moment was loitered away with planning colossal but impracticable projects."⁴⁴ Although Engels personally disliked Sigel, and although his critique was quite general and lacked specifics, Engels was not far wrong in his assessment of the desperate situation of the army under these less-than-stellar commanders. Sigel's performance a dozen years later in the American Civil War would not do anything to prove Engels wrong, either.

During the Crimean War, Engels found very little to be applauded in any army, whether British, French, Turkish or Russian. Even on those occasions when a leader made an insightful action, such as Prince Alexander Menchikov's selection and siting of his positions at the Battle of Alma, Engels noted the inability of the acting officer to fully utilize all the available resources and necessary functions at his disposal.⁴⁵ In general, the armies operating in the Crimean received very little applause from Engels for their actions at the highest levels. The Allied generalship, in Engels' words, "has been worse than indifferent."⁴⁶ The Russians caught little better treatment, primarily because Engels believed that "Russian Generals are not formidable."⁴⁷ In a bit of humor, in which Engels engaged from time to time in his writings, he later commented that "no Russian General ever had an original thought, not even [Field Marshal Prince Alexander, 1729-1800] Suvorov, whose only originality was that of direct advance."⁴⁸

Most of the praise that Engels dictated in this situation belonged to those officers of junior rank who achieved something noteworthy. This is particularly significant as it demonstrated a further development in Engels' thought process where he began to notice the lower level decision-makers and decisions that were critical to an operation, as well as the importance of junior officers. Three examples in particular stand out. First, The English Engineer, Colonel Sir Harry David Jones, who oversaw the English fortifications in the Baltic and Crimean theaters, was adept at realizing and understanding the capabilities and limitations of the English forces available to him.⁴⁹ Similarly, one of the chief Russian engineers, Colonel Count Eduard I. Todtleben, a "comparably obscure man in the Russian service," proved himself adept at developing fortifications inside Sevastopol.⁵⁰ Finally, Engels took enough notice of the astute observations of a young Prussian Major in 1836 when that officer wrote about the particulars and details of defending Silistria. That Engels took such an early notice of the remarks of Major Helmuth von Moltke reflects quite positively on his observational skills.⁵¹

In the battles that occurred during the dozen years following the Crimean campaign, Engels witnessed and examined a number of different generals and their actions. The English General Campbell received quite high marks from Engels for his tactical ability in front of Lucknow, in an extremely uncomfortable position, as Engels admitted. Engels praised Campbell for his judgment and use of combined arms to defeat a numerically superior enemy in a hostile environment, and gave him “the highest praise for tactical skill.”⁵² Conversely, few generals of this period suffer more lambasting from Engels than General Gyulai, the Austrian commander in Italy in 1859 and an officer whom Engels once admired, who committed a number of tactical errors that led to his ultimate defeat on more than one occasion. In his article, “A Chapter of History,” published in June 1859, Engels cited several key reasons for Gyulai’s defeat, such as his slowness of movement, laziness, and wide dispersion of troops.⁵³

In southern Italy, Garibaldi demonstrated a number of qualities that made him appear highly favorable in Engels’ opinion. In particular, he possessed the ability to move swiftly against an enemy force from a flanking position. Speed and flank attacks were quite important to the military conception of Engels.⁵⁴ These same qualities appeared under Bennigsen’s entry in Engels’ account for *The New American Cyclopaedia*. Bennigsen’s use of “fire, audacity, and quickness” was key elements to the success of his 1793-1794 Polish campaign in.⁵⁵ The Union general George B. McClellan reflected the opposite view. McClellan maintained the dubious distinction of being one of the very few American Civil War Generals concerning whom Engels remarked, and his comments were far from favorable. Engels rather flippantly dismissed McClellan in May 1862, as a “military incompetent,” who was unable to win battles through fear of losing them.⁵⁶

“The Great Men of the Exile”

In 1852, following the failures of the midcentury revolutionary movements, Engels wrote a brief manuscript with Karl Marx discussing the necessary traits of a partisan leader. This

article is particularly useful in that it was written early in Engels' career, while the experiences of his only direct involvement in combat were still fresh in his mind. Engels' record during the fighting of this time was fairly commendable. While not demonstrating remarkable military skill, Engels demonstrated a degree of competence noteworthy for his army, as well as for the time in general.⁵⁷

In the article, Engels focused on the relatively novel concept of a partisan leader. The leader in this situation was faced with a dilemma that was relatively new to the military profession. He was dependent on his men for his own support, even while the men in his command must owe their allegiance totally and completely to him, not to a nation or a state. With that in mind, the leader must take pains to develop something that would bind the entire group to him. Engels was pragmatic in his approach: "The normal military qualities are of little use here and boldness must be supplemented by other characteristics if the leader is to retain the respect of his subordinates. If he is not noble he must at least have a magnanimous consciousness, to be complemented as always by cunning, crafty intrigue, and covert practical baseness."⁵⁸ The solution to this dilemma could be found in the discovery of some lofty idea that would unite all of the men together and "exalts them far above the level of ordinary unreflecting courage" in order to accomplish the necessary deeds of the conflict.⁵⁹

How does this tie in with the prosecution of warfare? Engels remained somewhat fuzzy on the details of this aspect of the partisan leader's role. For, while calling attention to the importance of discipline, organization and adherence to the "normal rules of war," he correspondingly alluded to the problems of achieving success if following these dimensions. For instance, while the partisan leader must adhere to the same set of rules in war as in peace, he must constantly preserve the wartime arrangement of forces and focus on the recruitment of new forces, keeping them all in a high state of alert.⁶⁰ Also, while failure resulted from ignorance of the rules of war, the "communist barracks is no longer subject to the articles of war, but only to

the moral authority and the dictates of self-sacrifice.’⁶¹ And finally, Engels noted the predilection for the successful partisan leader to move from one party to the next as the situation dictates.⁶²

Even with all of these conflicting opinions, however, the important thing to note is that Engels begins to at least think of and address several new and important concepts that will play a role not only in his future writing, but also in his developing assessment and conceptualization of military units and formations. He recognizes that insurgent leaders will be forced to operate in different dimensions than other movements, especially the nationalistic movements that were the primary motivating force up until this writing. He also recognizes the problematic nature of the “communist barracks” at this early stage of development, before even such thought as a purely communistic revolution was ever a term that was en vogue. In Engels’ mind, the wheels were turning.

The Education of a Leader

As a man self-taught in military matters, it is perhaps not surprising that Engels spent a considerable amount of time emphasizing the necessity of a substantive and complete education for officers and future military leaders. Similarly to Clausewitz, Engels recognized the importance of such an education for leaders at all levels of the military hierarchy.⁶³ Leader education was a topic that he frequently returned to in his later writings, giving particular attention to it in a number of articles. In the 1850s, Engels scrutinized the educational system of most European armies in his series “The Armies of Europe” in *Putnam’s Monthly*. By the early 1860s, he devoted an entire series of articles for *The Volunteer Journal* to the problems of education among the English volunteer corps. The entire process of successfully preparing an army through the introduction of effective leaders was a challenge that figured prominently in his formulation of effective fighting bodies.

The subject of military education, however, was not a subject to which Engels devoted much attention until after the midcentury revolutions. Before that time, his primary

considerations and commentaries on the value and purpose of education primarily concerned vague generalities such as those he discussed in 1845's *Condition of the Working Class in England*, for instance the necessity of general education at state expense to all children or the function of strikes and union activities as the "military school" of the working class.⁶⁴ These examples reflect a genuine desire for and understanding of the benefits of knowledge, but do not indicate any particular militaristic need or predilection on his part.

This trend began to change after the midcentury revolutions. Not simply through the results of the failed revolutions, but also through the mirror of the condition of the fighting forces that lost, did Engels gain certain insights into the importance of a regular, well-led and -trained force. In January 1849, he criticized the Swiss Federal Council for appointing Herr Rudolf Lohbauer to lecture on military science while possessing none of the prerequisite skill or experience to do so.⁶⁵ Similar lack of experience and knowledge was a cause, although perhaps not the primary one, for the failed revolutions. The Magyar army, Engels noted frequently, was not trained or directed by those with any particular military schooling. He found it amazing at times that the Hungarians were as successful as they were given the lack of education that their leaders possessed.⁶⁶ Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of such experience occurred during the Palatinate revolt, in which Engels participated. Certainly his close personal attachment and participation in these actions, as well as his ability to comment on them after the fact, clouded his opinion but again a common theme was the poor quality of the movement's leaders. The first leader, Joseph M. Reichardt, particularly came under fire for lacking "professional knowledge."⁶⁷ Following these experiences, when Engels wrote his famous manuscript "The Peasant War in Germany" in 1850, he made a number of references to the lack of ability on the part of Thomas Münzer, a key leader of the insurgency. Münzer's possession of "not the slightest military knowledge" was a key element in the final defeat of these early insurgent forces.⁶⁸

It was following these experiences that Engels began to devote more attention to the importance of education. During the 1850s, he began to develop some of his conceptions not so much on the positive stories of education in military circumstances, but rather in the way in which education, or its corresponding lack, was of central importance in the success or failure of a military operation. Comparing the success of those militaries that opposed the forces of early socialism, the role of education held great significance. The importance of education in the hands of a motivated and vigorous leader proved important for the continuing success of those reactionary movements, not only in the civil service but also in other arenas such as the Church, as well.⁶⁹ During the Crimean War, where Engels saw very little to be admired in any of the regular armies in operation, he determined a lack of proper leader training a key reason for these shortcomings. The Russians were unsuccessful ultimately because the men in charge of their operations had no ability to conduct siege warfare. The lack of proper training for their artillery and engineer officers, skills where a higher education was paramount in the nineteenth century for successful undertakings, was a prominent cause of this deficiency.⁷⁰ Engels concluded that part of the reason for this lack of dexterity and knowledge among the communal European officer corps was the way by which all European armies promoted and selected officers based on social connections and wealth as opposed to ability. While certainly not the primary reason for the failures in Crimea, Engels saw a definite correlation between officer education and selection and the successes or failures during the war. So impressed by the defective leadership of this conflict, Engels drew upon these observations to develop a connection between modern war and revolutionary movements. As Berger writes, Engels saw in the Crimean War a situation where “a war might be carried on so incompetently as to annoy the people, leading them to shake off an unpopular regime.”⁷¹

These observations played a critical role in Engels 1855 commentaries on the armies of Europe, written for *Putnam's Monthly*. In this series of articles, Engels introduced these armies

to the reader. In all of his commentaries, the role of officer education figured prominently. For instance, Engels rated the military schools in France as “models of their kind.”⁷² He also recognized Piedmont and the Scandinavian countries for the high quality of officer education and character in their armies.⁷³ While in Austria, on the other hand, the “theoretical instruction of the officers is extremely defective.”⁷⁴ Russia, as well, suffered from Engels’ harsh criticism, being rated as one of the most corrupt militaries in Europe in terms of the use of connections to ensure attainment of commission and selections to higher ranks.⁷⁵

Of all of the militaries, however, Prussia rated the highest in terms of education according to Engels. Henderson notes that in Prussia, Engels saw two excellent institutions in the universality of both military service and compulsory education.⁷⁶ These elements worked to Germany’s favor in the development of military capabilities. In terms of evaluation, Engels proved particularly insightful to future trends, and many of his observations would be proven in the next decade when Germany launched its wars of unification. For instance, not all of the Prussian educational system was to be emulated, like the faulty scientific programs designed for the artillery service, which Engels called “old-fashioned and by no means up to the requirements of the present time.”⁷⁷ Given the Prussian difficulties with this arm of the service in its 1866 war against Austria, such observations are quite noteworthy. Engels also praised the Prussian activities of promoting the use of not only Clausewitz, but also French General Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, in its educational classes.⁷⁸

In Engels’ writings of the 1860s, two armies figure most prominently in the manner in which they are educated--those of France and of England. Engels portrayed the French in a particularly favorable light for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Engels cited the importance of actual experience in different combat situations as an important factor in their successful system of teaching subordinate officers. Even the lexicon that Engels used reflected this opinion. For instance, Engels frequently cited Algeria as a French “school of war,” where

“French officers who won laurels in the Crimean war received their military training and education.”⁷⁹ Later, in 1860 when writing for *The Volunteer Journal*, Engels called Algeria “a splendid school for their light infantry.”⁸⁰ French chausseurs even introduced the “modern school of musketry” into the science of warfare through their actions during the fighting of Engels’ lifetime.⁸¹ The fighting in Algeria, for the French, proved very instructional, and quite crucial for the development of French fighting capabilities at the individual and small-unit levels that figured prominently into guerrilla fighting and small-war fighting of the period.⁸²

Concerning the English, Engels focused a great deal more on the specifics of officer education, and what that meant for the future abilities of the English fighting force. In the first three years of the 1860s Engels contributed a series of articles for *The Volunteer Journal* and the *Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung* in which he critiqued the training progression of English officers and junior leaders. In this project, he consistently cited numerous problems within the English system that degraded the overall capacity of the English armies to fight successfully. In giving this censure, Engels defined one thing that he saw as definitively lacking in the English army--the role of a “Red Team,” or outside critiquing agency. The function of having such an outside observer fit well into Engels’ self-positioned role as a military commentator of the era, and one that he saw as critical to the sound evaluation of any force’s fighting ability. It was precisely this element that was missing the English army of the 1860s, as it had been for centuries.⁸³

Additionally, the manner in which English officers were trained appeared to Engels to be “amusing” and unsound.⁸⁴ Engels was particularly critical of the inability of English volunteer officers to conduct any sort of proper rifle drill, when those officers were never critically examined by any system to ensure competence.⁸⁵ Two problems appeared with this specific charge of insufficient training. First, the officers did not ever gain an understanding for the proper method of conducting drill in order to best train their subordinates. Second, and for Engels the most important, this fault proved indicative of the problems that resulted when an

army selected officers for positions and advancement based solely on social connections and wealth and not through any sort of subjective criteria. Engels commented negatively on this trend in his commentaries on the “Armies of Europe,” and in later years he specifically cited the English forces for shortcomings in this regard. Although the English did not ever gain the necessary degree of promotion by ability that Engels desired, by the time of the Austro-Prussian conflict they had at least, in his eyes, made some small gains. He wrote in 1864 that although “officers are recruited from all the educated classes of the nation...increasing efforts are being made to get young men from the military school at Sandhurst into the army, in particular by giving commissions as ensigns *without purchase* to those who come out top in the examinations.”⁸⁶

¹Engels, “Conditions and Prospects,” 10:553-4.

²Mayer, 332.

³Neumann and von Hagen, 265.

⁴Berger, 63, 153.

⁵Engels, “The Armies of Europe,” *Putnam’s Monthly* #32, August 1855, 14:403.

⁶*Ibid.*, 14:404.

⁷Engels, “Conditions and Prospects,” 10:556.

⁸*Ibid.*, 10:554.

⁹M. Jean de Bloch, *Selected Articles* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 2, 22.

¹⁰Friedrich Engels, “The Capture of Delhi,” *New York Daily Tribune* #5188, 5 December 1857, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:392.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 15:399.

¹²Friedrich Engels, “Attack,” *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 2, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:34-7; Engels, “Army,” 18:85-

125; Friedrich Engels, "Artillery," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 2, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:195, 207.

¹³Friedrich Engels, "Bem," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 3, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:132; Engels, "Blücher," 18:187.

¹⁴Friedrich Engels, "Coehorn," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 5, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:268; Friedrich Engels, "Beresford," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 3, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:290.

¹⁵Friedrich Engels, "On the Moral Element in Fighting. By Marshal Bugeaud," *The Volunteer Journal* #23, 9 February 1861, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:469.

¹⁶Henderson, vol. 1, 134. Engels maintained that the reason for his dismissal from Elberfeld was the town's fear of political repercussions. See Engels, "Elberfeld," 9:448-9.

¹⁷Hammen, 36-7.

¹⁸Semmel, 11.

¹⁹Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:227-8.

²⁰Friedrich Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #219 (2nd edition), 11 February 1849, 8:351.

²¹Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #259, 30 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:162.

²²Friedrich Engels, "Military Art of the Royal Imperial Army," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #226, 18 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:412-3; Engels, "The Russians in Transylvania," 8:432-3.

²³Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #265, 6 April 1849, 9:231-2; Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #289, 28 April 1849, 9:351.

²⁴Friedrich Engels, "Karlsruhe," *The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution*, August 1849-February 1850, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:184; Friedrich Engels, "Petty Traders," *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, *New York Daily Tribune* #3576, 2 October 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:91.

²⁵Friedrich Engels, "From the Crimea," *New York Daily Tribune* #4424, 23 June 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:250.

²⁶Friedrich Engels, "The New French Commander," *New York Daily Tribune* #4414, 12 June 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:215.

²⁷Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:227-8; Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #259, 30 March 1849, 9:159.

²⁸Berger, 55.

²⁹Friedrich Engels, "Movements of the Armies in Turkey," *New York Daily Tribune* #3919, 8 November 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:426; Engels, "Progress of the Turkish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3934, 25 November 1853, 12:452.

³⁰Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:436.

³¹Friedrich Engels, "The British Army in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5361, 26 June 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:557.

³²Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:435-6.

³³Friedrich Engels, "Strategy of the War," *New York Daily Tribune* #5663, 15 June 1859, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:352.

³⁴Engels, "Garibaldi in Sicily," 17:388.

³⁵Neumann and von Hagen, 277. The specific individuals were: Prince Barclay de Tolly, Count Levin A. T. Bennigsen, Jozef Bem, Field Marshal Gebhardt L. von Blücher, Baron Menno van Coehorn, and Viscount William Carr Beresford.

³⁶Friedrich Engels, "Barclay de Tolly," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 2, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:52.

³⁷Engels, "Bem," 18:132.

³⁸Engels, "Beresford," 18:290.

³⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Milan Bulletin," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #62, 2 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:306.

⁴⁰Friedrich Engels, "Charles Albert's Betrayal," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #77-78, 17 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:388-9.

⁴¹Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:547.

⁴²Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:218.

⁴³Engels, "The Palatinate," 10:195; Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:218.

⁴⁴Engels, "Petty Traders," 11:91.

⁴⁵Engels, "The Battle of the Alma," 13:495.

⁴⁶Friedrich Engels, "Aspects of the War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4543, 10 November 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:571.

⁴⁷Friedrich Engels, "The European War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3992, 8 January 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:557.

⁴⁸Engels, "The Battle of Inkerman," 13:533.

⁴⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Capture of Bomarsund (Article I)," *New York Daily Tribune* #4174, 4 September 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:382.

⁵⁰Friedrich Engels, "Progress of the War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4366, 17 April 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:135.

⁵¹Engels, "The Siege of Silistria," *New York Daily Tribune* #4115, 26 June 1854, 13:241.

⁵²Friedrich Engels, "The Siege and Storming of Lucknow," *New York Daily Tribune* #5235, 30 January 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:424; Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:435-6, 437.

⁵³Engels, "A Chapter of History," 16:378.

⁵⁴Engels, "Garibaldi in Sicily," 17:389.

⁵⁵Friedrich Engels, "Bennigsen," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 2, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:76-7.

⁵⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Situation in the American Theater of War," *Die Presse* #148, 30 May 1862, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 19:205.

⁵⁷See Schreiner.

⁵⁸Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, "The Great Men of the Exile," June 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:312.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 11:313.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 11:314.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²Ibid., 11:315.

⁶³Clausewitz, 111.

⁶⁴Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, ed. Victor Kiernan (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 232-3.

⁶⁵Friedrich Engels, "Herr Muller--Radetzky's Chicanery Towards Tessin--The Federal Council--Lohbauer," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #194, 13 January 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:240.

⁶⁶Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #261 (2nd edition), 1 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:182; Engels, "The War in Hungary," 5 April 1849, 9:232.

⁶⁷Engels, "The Palatinate," 10:195.

⁶⁸Engels, "The Peasant War," 10:472.

⁶⁹Friedrich Engels, "Austria," *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, September 1851, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:27-8.

⁷⁰Engels, "The Russians in Turkey," 12:338-9.

⁷¹Berger, 94.

⁷²Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #32, August 1855, 14:415.

⁷³Friedrich Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #36, December 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:459, 465.

⁷⁴Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #32, August 1855, 14:426.

⁷⁵Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #33, September 1855, 14:443-4.

⁷⁶Henderson, vol. 2, 607.

⁷⁷Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #33, September 1855, 14:435.

⁷⁸Ibid. See also Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, intro. By Charles Messenger (London: Greenhill Books, 1992).

⁷⁹Friedrich Engels, "Algeria," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 1, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:67.

⁸⁰Engels, "The French Light Infantry," 18:426.

⁸¹Ibid., 18:428.

⁸²Ibid., 18:426.

⁸³Friedrich Engels, "Volunteer Generals," *The Volunteer Journal* #28, 16 March 1861, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:479.

⁸⁴Friedrich Engels, "A Review of English Volunteer Riflemen," *The Volunteer Journal* #2, 14 September 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:411.

⁸⁵Ibid., 18:415-6.

⁸⁶Friedrich Engels, "The English Army," 1864, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 19:303.

CHAPTER 5

PROBLEMS BETWEEN WAR AND REVOLUTION

Economics

It is somewhat surprising that for all of the importance of economics in the theoretical observations and logic of Karl Marx's thought, and of communism in general, that subject figured so little in Engels' reflections concerning war and fighting. Surprisingly, when Engels first read one of the most well-known military missives of the nineteenth century, Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, the first thing that caught his attention was the way in which Clausewitz incorporated commerce into war. Engels specifically drew Marx to this correlation.¹ Certainly, there were frequent examples of how economics functioned in conflict, but for the most part, these observations occurred primarily in the early years of his writing, and seldom concerned any innovations at the tactical levels of warfare. Distinct themes surface throughout these writings, however, particularly the role of conflict in resolving the struggle between rich and poor, and the importance of financial viability in the execution of warfare as an increasingly expensive field. In this last regard, Engels made several very insightful observations, and almost foreshadows later writers, such as Jean de Bloch, who, at the turn of the twentieth century, pointed to the difficulty of waging and financing war on a mass scale.

In all of Engels' writings concerning war and the nature of conflict, the position of economics was one of the first that he discussed to a great extent. Early in the 1840s, when he first struggled with the questions of inequality between classes Engels commonly wrote about the struggle between those with wealth and those without. Most of these observations, however, were simplistic revelations of comparison, equating bigger with better, larger with stronger, and weaker with smaller. While not completely misguided, such comparisons led Engels to adjudicate the potential results of such struggles on a very singular formula--the side with the most numbers and resources will always win.²

He would, however, expand this view by the middle of the decade, when he wrote his famous *Condition of the Working Class in England*. While maintaining the same types of simplistic comparisons, Engels did develop more strongly his position of armed conflict as key to changing the situation and allowing the working class (i.e., the poor and weak combatants in the struggle) to gain the upper hand. Indeed, the only way for a change to occur was through armed conflict. In the industrial city of Manchester, Engels was appalled by the willingness of the factory owners and the property owning classes to resort to violence against their workers and those of the lower classes in order to ensure their own continued financial viability. This violence often turned to involve local military authorities, as well. In a situation like this, with the proletariat of Manchester living in the wretched conditions that Engels cited repeatedly through his work, the only solution, according to Engels, was a violent uprising of the people in order to change the status quo. Such an uprising was not necessary in itself, but only because of the "insanity" of the wealthy, who as a class were so "blinded by monetary profit" that they were willing to take these most extraordinary steps to maintain their place.³ And this conflict, when it erupted (which Engels viewed as inevitable), would not remain localized, but would become universal.⁴ This concept was formalized later, when Engels wrote "The Principles of Communism" and addressed the issue. Point 16 of this manuscript discussed the possibility of abolishing private property through peaceful means. While Engels certainly desired such an action, he saw its occurrence as highly improbable.⁵

This theme of improbability remained relatively constant throughout his writings of these years. Engels frequently used military jargon and bellicose words to discuss economic relations between the classes. When writing about the German constitutional question, he compared the fight between the "undisciplined and poorly armed swarms of petty bourgeoisie with the heavy artillery of its capital, with the closed columns of its joint-stock companies."⁶ This fight would culminate in a final "field of battle" between "two hostile armies."⁷ These observations prove

quite interesting, particularly considering the dismal picture Engels had at this point in his life for the ability of the urban workers to successfully conduct any sort of violent actions, on the scale necessary, against the wealthy classes.

Engels began to analyze the importance of war finances of the future of the revolutionary movement in the late 1840s, when he wrote specifically about the Austrian financial situation. Even though his conclusions were not entirely correct when he predicted that Austria would not engage in a war any time soon, his thought process reflected a great degree of skill and insight in predicting the importance of finances in war. In his article “Three New Constitutions” written in February 1848 for the *Deutsche-Brüsseler Zeitung* on the brink of revolution, the foremost reason for Austria’s hesitancy for risking war was the fact that its finances are “chaotic.”⁸ Later, in the Hungarian campaign, one of the key elements Engels observed in the progression of the war, and for Hungarian triumph, related to financial matters. Hungary’s success, Engels believed, could be traced to many of the progressive ideas that the leadership of the country enacted, most notably the elimination of feudal duties and financial obligations. In this particular instance, Engels cited the importance of Kossuth, in his capacity as Minister of Finance, in affecting all of these changes, a commentary that reflects Engels’ belief in the wide assortment of traits and abilities that effective leaders must possess.⁹ As the Austrians fought, however, even such a general as highly regarded in Engels’ mind as Radetzky came under fire for his waste of resources, even in victory.¹⁰

The midcentury revolutions also brought another theme into the writings of Engels. After the success of the Hungarians, Engels saw in greater detail the importance of arming the workers, bringing them, as a class, into the sphere of armed conflict. True, this theme had its roots earlier in his writing. For instance, in January 1848 Engels commented that the bottom line for the movement was that every man needed to have both a vote and a musket, but this theme was not something that appeared repeatedly in Engels’ reflections.¹¹ Later, this theme would appear

more frequently in Engels' works.¹² But for the most part, following these early commentaries, Engels did not write frequently on the importance of finances and economics in the waging of war until later in the century. Instead, he focused his energies on the importance of technological advances and colonialization as keys to increasing a nation's wealth. The degree to which this opinion would change as a result of the Paris Commune remains to be seen.

Nationalism

Apart from all this I am not a Doctor and cannot ever become one; I am only a merchant and a Royal Prussian Artillerist; so kindly spare me that title.¹³

Friedrich Engels, April 1839

A second problem Engels faced was the question of nationalism and its role in the struggle of the working class to obtain economic freedom. In many cases, this proved a difficult dilemma for workers who must choose between whether they belonged to a certain nation or whether they belonged to a certain class, in this case the proletariat. Engels himself was not immune from this dilemma, and frequently displayed an affection for things and positions inherently German, a common trait of Young Hegelians. Indeed, one of his comments from his earliest writings referred to a personal "spirit of freedom" when he glimpsed the Prussian coat of arms at the local post office.¹⁴ And despite his many criticisms of the Prussian military system, he did retain some elements of pride, as both a Prussian and a soldier, following his own year-long stint in the artillery.¹⁵ As Engels developed his military theories and his ideas about the roles of states, nations, and peoples in his writings, the theme of an individual's, as well as a nation's, predilection towards certain behavior and actions figured prominently.

His earliest commentaries where nationalities feature notably were confined mostly to rather chivalric definitions of bravery, honor and barbarism. Articles he wrote for the *Schweizerischer Republicaner* in the early 1840s provide an excellent example of such opinions. In these early writings, Engels perceived Irishmen as "wild, headstrong, fanatical Gaels," who bore an unrelenting hatred and smoldering anger against all things civilized. Some of this feeling

may have been shaped by the fact that Engels resided in England at this time, in close proximity to the starvation and poverty of Ireland in the 1840s. In this condition, the Irish had the ability to accomplish anything, including, in Engels' mind, the overthrow of the British monarchy with two hundred thousand men.¹⁶ In the same period, however, he demonstrated his still juvenile writing ability when he conversely maintained that because of Sir Robert Peel's abuse and impoverishment of the Irish, a few thousand British soldiers would be able to keep these "wild Gaels" under the British thumb.¹⁷

Prior to the midcentury revolutions, Engels commented frequently on the relationship between Prussia, Austria, the smaller Germanic states, and the future concept of a unified Germany as a whole. Through his opinions, which he maintained fairly consistently throughout the decades leading up to the Franco-Prussian War, Engels developed very particular opinions about each of these entities. By far, within Engels' framework for evaluation, Germany rated the highest and noblest in comparison. Of course, the fact that Engels considered himself "German," having spent his formative years in Barmen, Bremen, and Berlin, was a prominent reason for this; being German was a cultural identity.¹⁸ In addition, when Engels wrote in his early years, no state of Germany existed, although he strongly desires that event. In Engels' mind, the concept of a German nation fits into the category of a nation being oppressed by other countries. Germany's fractured status in the first half of the nineteenth century supported this case. The basic tenets of Marxism theorized that such nationalistic fervor would evaporate when economic conditions solidified the realities of class war, Engels struggled with rectifying nationalism with the revolutionary movements throughout his life.¹⁹ He recognized, as did many of his contemporaries, that the impact of nationalism could be used by proletariat movements to foster sentiment within a sphere of influence that could enhance the possibilities for a successful socialist revolution.²⁰

German unity, in Engels' opinion, carried with it a number of certainties that served either as a prerequisite for its occurrence or as a direct consequence of its happening. First and foremost, the establishment of a German nation could only be accomplished through the "victory of democracy."²¹ The outcome of such a victory entailed the dissolution of the repressive and reactionary monarchy of Prussia, a development that Engels saw as highly desirable, and one that would eventually lead to the establishment of a strong proletarian insurrection movement within Germany.²² The concept of "Germany" held lofty ideas of culture and freedom, which were being oppressed by the Great Powers of Europe for reasons either of power politics, as in the case of larger German states and Russia, or economics, as in the case of England.²³ Conceptions of culture, figured prominently in Engels' formulation that states in southeastern Europe that Germany had incorporated in its sphere of influence through conquest should remain "German."²⁴ For similar reasons, as well as for strategic and economic concerns, Prussia suppressed minor German states through a number of measures, such as the application of military force, the use of fear tactics, and the attempt to incite hatred between Germans and other cultures, most notably the Slavs.²⁵ The primary force behind the actions of the Prussian state was the bourgeoisie class, who desired, at all costs, to prevent the flame of freedom from igniting in the German states and to maintain their "feudal" hold on the poorer elements of Germany.²⁶

Engels, however, did not remain consistent with this position of national desires and capabilities. The standards that he applied to the German people did not apply equally to the Slavs who, in his mind, were quite unable to inspire future events, and would serve in future conflict only as supporters and tools of any revolutionary movement. He indicated this sentiment frequently throughout the midcentury revolutions. In January 1849, when he wrote "The Magyar Struggle," he dismissed the Slovaks and Croats, both of whom Engels ridiculed as Habsburg supporters, by belittling their last attempt to play a role in history nearly 400 years prior, in the Hussite War of 1419-1436.²⁷ Slovak peasants never directly initiated any insurgency, but rather

supported existing powers, exemplified by the outbreaks in Hungary in the 1840s.²⁸ By the 1860s, Engels remained firmly convinced that large states called the shots for any contemporary national state building movement, and a new revolution or military uprising would only develop through the advent of a new economic crisis. Even considering this eventuality, he saw very little possibility for any of the Slavic peoples to rise up successfully and establish their own state.²⁹

Russians, too, displayed few abilities in Engels' eyes that indicated they could perform military functions at a superior level. In November, 1854, Engels called the Russian infantryman "the clumsiest fellow alive for petty war operations; his forte is action in column by close order."³⁰ In other words, the simple Russian serf was too dull witted to understand any sort of advanced warfighting techniques, and must be limited strictly to brute force and mass, the conduct of which required little training or intelligence. By the conclusion of the Crimean War, Engels noted with a sense of disgust that the Russian nation had "in a military sense at least culminated long ago, and was even declining when the present war began."³¹

The exception to his general lack of respect for any Slavic nation was Poland. Partly this resulted from the fact that, of all the peoples of Europe, the Poles suffered the worst, in Engels' opinion, under the oppression of three of the great European powers: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. There were a number of reasons for Engels' positive impression and feelings toward the creation of an independent Poland, not least of which was the desire, and apparent "German" necessity, of establishing an alliance with a new country between the borders of the German states and Russia.³² The tremendous fighting ability of the Polish people could not be overlooked, either; from the English Chartist movement through the Paris Commune, Poles had always been active members of a revolutionary movement.³³ Not only had Polish insurgents risen up against foreign repression, but Polish insurgents had also left the borders of their country to fight for the cause of the oppressed across Europe. Engels highly praised the efforts of the Polish leaders in Hungary during 1849, such as Jozef Bem. In one of Engels' more memorable

commentaries from the conflict, "The War in Italy and Hungary," written in March, 1849, he described an incident in Piedmont when "the Duke of Coburg's regiment of Polish Uhlans went over to the side of the Magyars at the moment when [General Henryk] Dembiński, calmly waiting for the attack, ordered the tune of 'Poland is not yet lost' to be played."³⁴ Even as the Franco-Prussian War drew near, Engels continued to praise the work of Polish revolutionaries, in the aftermath of the Polish insurrection against Russian rule in 1863-1864. He wrote in March 1866, for *The Commonwealth*, that "the Poles were then a strong, and always a brave people, and not only knew how to fight for their own, but also how to retaliate; in the beginning of the seventeenth century they even held Moscow for a few years."³⁵ Engels certainly drew a great deal of comparison between the nationalistic sentiment of a nation and its ability to conduct military operations. The events of 1870 and 1871 would support Engels' assessment.

Engels did not demonstrate consistency in other areas, too. By the middle of the 1850s, Engels backed off his position concerning the importance of a "German" state. The reason for this was his belief, brought on and solidified by the events of the midcentury revolutions that the concept of pan-Germanism, or the foundations for a unified Germany, would not occur under the established concepts he had envisioned. In September 1851, a few years after hope for a successful European revolutionary movement had faded, Engels spent a considerable amount of time commenting and critiquing the revolutionary efforts of the period and examining the idea of "who betrayed whom."³⁶ He did not find any concrete solution to these questions regarding the failure of the revolution, and he was skeptical that any smoking gun found could give such an answer. He did, however, come to the conclusion that a significant reason for this failure was the refusal of any political powers in Prussia or Germany to uphold the prospect of a democratic free Republic. The reactionary elements of these government refused to support any such movement, which was hardly surprising. The disappointment for Engels grew from the fact that nowhere did any liberal or democratic people make a concerted or steadfast effort to counter the Prussian

monarchy.³⁷ In that sense, Engels discerned some betrayal. Along with the betrayal of the German people, these reactionary elements also betrayed other peoples of Europe, most notably the Poles and other Slavs, whom the Prussian government left out to hang in the ensuing upheavals across the Continent.³⁸

Many of the other comments that Engels made on specific nationalities remained rather simplistic and stereotypical. Although Engels did, on frequent occasions, directly correlate these attributes to proclivities and abilities in the military sphere, they were somewhat slanted and of dubious worth when adding them to the entirety of his military writings. For instance, the Bedouins were a “nation of robbers,” a characteristic which established them as more suited for irregular warfare.³⁹ Similarly, the Bashkirs, Pandours and Croats who fought in the midcentury revolutions were nothing but “rabble,” unfit for civilized warfare.⁴⁰ As a positive example the Piedmontese, who were from mostly mountainous territory, were excellent infantrymen, and possessed the natural ability to function as skirmishers and mountain troops.⁴¹ Engels’ contrast between French soldiers and English soldiers provided some amusement in this stereotyping of combat abilities. In his writings on the “Armies of Europe,” in 1855, he compared the two armies, writing that “the little Frenchman, under all his load, remains a capital light-infantry-man; skirmishes, trots, gallops, lies down, jumps up, all the while loading, firing, advancing, retiring, dispersing, rallying, reforming, and displays not only twice as much agility, but also twice as much intelligence as his bony competitor from the island of ‘rosbif’.”⁴² Such stereotyping, however, was hardly unique in his lifetime. Other military essayists of the time engaged in the same, problematic dialogue.⁴³

Two years later, Engels remained critical of the English rank and file when he wrote his entry “Alma” for *The New American Cyclopaedia*, noting the English “habitual clumsy way” of conducting military operations.⁴⁴ But perhaps his most insightful comment on the English soldier was not one of condemnation, but one of praise for the system under which the warrior fought.

Such a man was to be envied because, almost alone in the European armies of the nineteenth century, he was “by no means regarded by the law as a machine that has no will of its own and must obey without argument any order given it, but as a ‘free agent,’ a man possessing free will, who at all times must know what he is doing and who bears responsibility for all his actions.”⁴⁵ This attitude arises from Engels’ belief that the soldier/worker maintained an individual consciousness and was a subject capable of defining his own world and not an automaton. Such discussion, written in March 1849, in the midst of revolution for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* displays a remarkable grasp of futuristic military conceptions of responsibility and accountability.

Unfortunately, this represents one of the few times where Engels directly commented on this aspect of armies prior to 1870. The challenges that nationalism presented to the socialist movements of Engels’ lifetime did not die out in the nineteenth century. Even after 1900 and through the First World War, Communist Internationals, as well as socialist movements of all dispositions, remained torn by the questions of national identity.⁴⁶

Guerrilla Warfare--Role of the People

A nation that wants to conquer its independence cannot restrict itself to the ordinary methods of warfare.⁴⁷

Friedrich Engels, “The Defeat of the Piedmontese”

When the revolution came to a particular country, no matter where, there were certain conditions and circumstances that needed to be present for the revolution to have much chance of success. Specifically, the relationship between the people of all classes and the revolutionary movement itself needed to fall within certain parameters. Unlike many of the topics he chose to cover, the relationship between the people and the revolution was a subject that Engels dealt with consistently throughout his writing period. One of the first references he ever made to an insurgent movement in July 1839, in a letter to a friend when he was only 19 years old, discussed the significance of people rising up in their masses.⁴⁸ As the opening quote maintained, such risings and mass movements could not be accomplished in a regular, conventional manner, but

must be accomplished through the revolutionary use of the entire people. He looked back to the events on the Iberian peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars as examples of how a peoples' movement could succeed when "ordinary methods failed."⁴⁹ The tactics of how best to accomplish this task concerned Engels greatly, and were the source of much of his writing on this subject. As a testament to the longevity of his conclusions, twenty years after his death the Soviet Red Guards of 1917 personified many of the concepts that he put forward during his lifetime.⁵⁰

At its inception, however, this theoretical application had one central inconsistency that Engels needed to overcome in order to formulate any sort of doctrine for mass uprisings. The problematic nature of incorporating class conflict with nationalism proved troublesome for Engels. While neither Engels, nor the majority of his socialist contemporaries, rejected nationalistic warfare outright, all of them tied such fighting directly with significance for a proletariat revolution. The solution rested on the perceived endstate within the country and the position of the proletariat relative to other classes and to its previous position. This relationship between the revolution and nationalism became one of the central concepts and issues of Marxist theory.

Engels himself struggled with personal discrepancies in this regard, viewing himself (somewhat passionately) as a German. Now within this conception of conflict between classes, Engels had to determine the role and relationship of a military force to any "people's" government. The armed force of this new entity would of course be manned by the proletariat and would be a "labor army," able to maintain order and sustain the state within practical guidelines.⁵¹ Such a force would function as the rival to the bourgeois-led national guard, and could be used in revolutionary fighting. The significant challenge to this problem occurred with the question of how such a people's government could actually take charge, and what military force would, or could, be used to this end?

Aside from the debate between stages of revolution and whether the proletariat revolution was necessarily dependent on a first, bourgeoisie takeover, at some point the workers and their allies would have to possess an armed force. Given Engels' predisposition to think very poorly of the peasantry and lower classes, the problem of arming such a "barbarian in the midst of civilization," became acute.⁵² So the first question for Engels was: where were the material and concrete support for such a force to come from. Apparently, the answer was that it would come directly from the princes and the state. Unfortunately for Engels and his workers' army, the princes and the upper classes of the state, those who controlled the means to wage war, belonged to the bourgeoisie class and only in exceptionally few cases were willing to consider passing control of weapons to the lower classes. Engels recognized this problem as early as the revolution in Hungary, when he wrote about the expansion of the struggle into a sphere pitting the peasants against the nobility in an increasingly volatile conflict.⁵³ Concurrently, in the same struggle, he admitted to the problems of arming these new forces of the oppressed.⁵⁴ Even in Paris in the summer of 1848, Engels urged the workers to conduct a "social civil war" in spite of their shortcomings in numbers and material.⁵⁵ With the failures of the midcentury revolutions, however, Engels modified his approach to this problem. His solution simply was to ignore the problem, and instead of addressing the specific issues of arming the people, he instead issued calls for the rather generic "arming of the workers," as he did in May 1849, when voicing his support of socialist activist Ferdinand Lassalle⁵⁶ and in August 1852, when evaluating the failed German revolution.⁵⁷

But even though he chose to ignore the general problems that existed, he did not ignore specific traits of mass popular war and the challenges with which both regular and irregular forces fighting the war would have to contend. Even before the final convulsions of the early 1850s, Engels began to describe some of the specific concepts that made such popular wars different from previous conflicts. Foremost among these new trends was the degree of barbarism

that inherently was a part of such war. Engels' most insightful comments on such conflicts occurred in the spring of 1857, when he wrote about the situation involving the British in China and India and commented that "in a popular war the means used by the insurgent nation cannot be measured by the commonly recognized rules of regular warfare, nor by any other abstract standard, but by the degree of civilization only attained by that insurgent nation."⁵⁸ In this particular instance, this meant that the war was not being fought under the conventional, Euro-centric conception of honorable fighting, but instead fell increasingly under the rules that the "oppressed" Chinese people wished to emplace on the conflict. Such new measures of this fight therefore included actions like poisoning of foodstuffs, kidnapping, and random massacre of European travelers.⁵⁹ This was not the way that regular European forces were accustomed to fighting--it was a new type of warfare. Later, when writing for *The New American Cyclopaedia*, Engels commented on the same type of combat parameter redefinition occurring in Algeria, where the fighting on both sides took on a degree of barbarism that was not common in Europe. The significant point about these particular engagements was that many of the atrocities were committed by the more "civilized" French troops, who indiscriminately burned and destroyed Arab houses, supplies, and crops.⁶⁰ Even during the American Civil War, Engels saw a tremendous opportunity for poor Southern whites to rise up and engage in lawlessness, further splintering the United States into class distinctions.⁶¹

Aside from this, Engels made efforts to address more conventional methods that insurrectionary forces could apply in the conduct of warfare. First and foremost, the important element for Engels remained the critical importance of morale on the battlefield, and how such spiritual supremacy was invaluable to final success. Engels seemed very affected in this regard by the various tendencies that manifested themselves in Hungary during the revolution. Both the Magyars and, to a lesser degree, the Habsburg forces received a degree of support from poor peasants, who supported their respective causes with little more than "enthusiasm" for a cause.

As previously stated, though, Engels did not come to grips with the nature of these causes for which people fought. He wanted to see them as class-based, and subservient to the impending European revolution. In reality, however, most of the time those minor revolutionaries fought strictly on nationalistic ideals.⁶² The same sentiment was present during the failed German revolutions of the same period.⁶³ Engels appeared somewhat disgruntled that during the American Civil War such sentiment was not present to any significant degree.⁶⁴ Even when Engels discussed military tactics and procedures that both regular forces and irregular soldiers needed to learn, he structured these skills within the construct of maintaining military spirit and presence of mind on the battlefield:

The considerable extension of patrol and foraging expeditions, outpost duties, etc., the greater activity demanded of every soldier, the more frequent recurrence of cases in which the soldier has to act on his own and has to rely on his own intellectual resources, and, finally, the great importance of skirmish engagements in the fighting, the success of which depends on the intelligence, the *coup d'oeil* and the energy of each individual soldier--all this presupposes a greater degree of education of the non-commissioned officer and rank-and-file soldier. A barbaric or semi-barbaric nation, however, is unable to offer a degree of education of the masses such that 500,000-600,000 men recruited at random could, on the one hand, become disciplined and trained to act like machines, and at the same time acquire or retain this *coup d'oeil* for small-scale warfare.⁶⁵

Surprisingly, this is an aspect of Engels' writings that few historians and twentieth-century observers have given him credit for discussing.⁶⁶

¹Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 43-4.

²Friedrich Engels, "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy," *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* 1844, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3:418-443.

³Engels, *Condition*, 262.

⁴*Ibid.*, 292.

⁵Friedrich Engels, "Principles of Communism," October 1847, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:349.

⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Constitutional Question in Germany," April 1847, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:82.

⁷Friedrich Engels, "Protective Tariffs or Free Trade System," *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* #46, 10 June 1847, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:94.

⁸Friedrich Engels, "Three New Constitutions," *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* #15, 20 February 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:542.

⁹Friedrich Engels, "Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #301, 19 May 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:455-6.

¹⁰Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #263, 4 April 1849, 9:176.

¹¹Friedrich Engels, "The Chartist Movement," *La Réforme*, 19 January 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:475.

¹²Preface to *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 10 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), xviii.

¹³Engels to Arnold Ruge, 15 June 1842, Berlin, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 2:543; Marcus, 82.

¹⁴Engels to Friedrich Graeber, 8 April 1839, Bremen, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 2:422.

¹⁵Henderson, vol. 1, 13; Neumann and von Hagen, 265.

¹⁶Friedrich Engels, "Letters From London," *Schweizerischer Republikaner* #51, 27 June 1843, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3:389.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 3:391.

¹⁸Ian Cummins, *Marx, Engels, and National Movements* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 45.

¹⁹Hammen, 272.

²⁰Cummins, 5.

²¹Friedrich Engels, "The Danish-Prussian Armistice," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #99, 10 September 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:425.

²²Hammen, 272.

²³Engels, "The Danish-Prussian Armistice," 7:424-5; Friedrich Engels, "The Frankfurt Assembly Debates the Polish Question," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #70, 9 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:339.

²⁴Neumann and von Hagen, 272.

²⁵Friedrich Engels, "The *Zeitungs-Halle* on the Rhine Provinces," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #87, 27 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:400; see "Po and Rhine" for further elaboration of strategic and economic considerations, 16:213-255.

²⁶Friedrich Engels, "The Frankfurt Assembly Debates," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #81, 20 August 1848, 7:352.

²⁷Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:231.

²⁸Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #286, 28 April 1849, 9:351.

²⁹Preface to *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 14 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), xvii-xviii.

³⁰ Friedrich Engels, "The Campaign in the Crimea," *New York Daily Tribune* #4246, 27 November 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:511.

³¹Engels, "Aspects of the War," 14:570.

³²Engels, "The Danish-Prussian Armistice," 7:425.

³³Cole, vol. 3, part. 1, 486-8. This author says, surprisingly and problematically, that they did not play a role in 1848.

³⁴Friedrich Engels, "The War in Italy and Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #257, 28 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:149.

³⁵Friedrich Engels, "What Have the Working Classes to do with Poland? The Doctrine of Nationality Applied to Poland," *The Commonwealth* #165, 5 May 1866, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 20:159.

³⁶Friedrich Engels, "Germany at the Outbreak of the Revolution," *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, September 1851, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:6.

³⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Berlin Insurrection," *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, October 1851, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:38.

³⁸Friedrich Engels, "Poles, Tschechs and Germans," *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, February 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:45.

³⁹Friedrich Engels, "Extraordinary Revelations--Abd El Kader--Guizot's Foreign Policy," *The Northern Star* #535, 22 January 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 6:471.

⁴⁰Friedrich Engels, "The Revolutionary Uprising in the Palatinate and Baden," *Der Bote für Stadt und Land* #110, 2 June 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:475.

⁴¹Friedrich Engels, "The Struggle in the Crimea," *New York Daily Tribune* #4323, 26 February 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:4-5.

⁴²Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #32, August 1855, 14:414.

⁴³Bloch, 58. Bloch said in 1901 "It is quite true that many of the Volunteer Yeomanry lately sent out from England were complete failures. But this was not because they were Volunteers, but because they were men of bad physique, taken from the wrong class, and primarily bad material."

⁴⁴Engels, "Alma," 18:18.

⁴⁵Friedrich Engels, "The English Soldier's Oath of Allegiance," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #241, 9 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:23.

⁴⁶Gunther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution. History and Methods* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), v.

⁴⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #261 (2nd edition), 1 April 1849, 9:171.

⁴⁸Engels to Friedrich Graeber, after 27 July 1839, Bremen, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 2:464. References are a part of Engels' poem "German July Days 1839."

⁴⁹Hammen, 381.

⁵⁰Mark von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-1930* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 20.

⁵¹Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, "Demands of the Communist Party in Germany," March 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:3.

⁵²Henderson, vol. 1, 152; Friedrich Engels, "From Paris to Berne," November 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:519.

⁵³Friedrich Engels, "From the Theatre of War--Peasant War in the Bukovina," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #275, 18 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:289.

⁵⁴Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:237.

⁵⁵Friedrich Engels, "The *Kölnische Zeitung* on the State of Affairs in England," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #62, 1 August 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:297.

⁵⁶Friedrich Engels, "Lassalle," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #288, 3 May 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:387.

⁵⁷Friedrich Engels, "Insurrection," *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, August 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:85-7.

⁵⁸Engels, "Persia--China," 15:282.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 15:281.

⁶⁰Engels, "Algeria," 18:67.

⁶¹Engels, "The Situation in the American Theater of War," 19:207.

⁶²For example, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #284, 28 April 1849, 9:351; Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #292, 7 May 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:409.

⁶³Engels, "Karlsruhe," 10:172; Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:226; "Insurrection," 11:85-7.

⁶⁴Engels, "The Situation in the American Theater of War," 19:207.

⁶⁵Engels, "Conditions and Prospects," 10:551.

⁶⁶P. H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 102.

CHAPTER 6

GUERRILLA AND PARTISAN WARFARE

Guerrilla Tactics

Mass uprising, revolutionary war, guerilla detachments everywhere--that is the only means by which a small nation can overcome a large one, by which a less strong army can be put in a position to resist a stronger and better organized one.¹

Friedrich Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese"

Now, insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other, and subject to certain rules of proceeding, which, when neglected, will produce the ruin of the party neglecting them.²

Friedrich Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese"

As discussed above, Friedrich Engels was one of the first early socialist writers to devote energy to the actual operations of armies in the field. And although he might not have been a dramatic innovator his observations and concepts nevertheless contributed greatly to the way in which socialist movements since his time developed and engaged in military operations. And his impact has been felt in no arena more than in the area of guerrilla warfare. Engels, almost alone of his contemporaries, discussed to considerable length the ideas behind guerrilla movements. What is more impressive, he did so not solely on a generic and random basis, but took pains to cover numerous aspects of this fighting, paying particular attention when interaction with regular forces was significant to the progression of operations. Engels believed that guerrilla warfare was "a species of warfare," and needed to be considered as a component of any regular campaigning, even though a guerrilla force did not maintain the capabilities of a regular force.³ With this in mind, he discussed special cases, including the areas of mountain warfare, rear operations, and the application of military principles toward the successful completion of an insurgent movement.

Engels did not spend a particularly large amount of time on guerrilla operations and insurgency movements until the revolutions of 1848 occurred holding tremendous impact for the political and social scene of the century. These revolutions included a wide range of

revolutionary struggles with decidedly different protagonists and outcomes. As part of this, Marx and Engels published their "Communist Manifesto," placing the specter of communism on the political agenda. At the conclusion of the revolutions, however, communism was not successful; the advocates of revolutionary change, of which Engels was a leader, had to find out why.

Within these revolutions, the actions in Paris provided the earliest examples of oppressed workers raising barricades and fighting against the governmental regular military forces. Engels devoted his first excursions into the concepts of insurgency warfare amid this landscape. Writing in these circumstances, he laid the foundation for later writings on the general models of guerrilla warfare and the role of armed insurgency and action within a proletariat (Marxist) revolution. Engels focused his writings during these years on the principles of conducting operations aimed at "confounding and disorganizing" the enemy in order to achieve the ultimate goal--the victory of the socialist insurgency.⁴

In the summer of 1848, Engels watched the developments in Paris with great attention. It was a situation where the workers were competing militarily against a regular force that both outnumbered them and contained far more lethal weaponry than they possessed. While the ultimate outcome was not in doubt for long, and the bulk of the fighting ended within a week, Engels drew some conclusions concerning the nature of insurgency warfare, especially when conducted in an urban environment. First, Engels emphasized the Parisian revolutionaries' success and necessity of turning individual buildings into strongpoint defenses.⁵ Through the use of barricades along critical streets and passageways, each individual building was transformed into a defensible strongpoint, suitable for sustained action against a foe. While these strongpoints were being constructed and manned, the insurgents properly used smaller elements to maintain lines of communications, using barricades and lesser streets to keep contact between individual strongpoints. All of this was done only in sections of the city where the workers were relatively sure of local support, and not in more affluent districts of the city. In addition to this, the rebel

leader Joachim R. T. G. de Kersausie (a former military officer) concentrated his available manpower on a single objective, the Hotel de Ville, while lesser sections of the movement protected the insurgency's bases of operations. These bases, Engels observed, had been "skillfully transformed into formidable fortresses."⁶

These actions, skillful as they were, ended ultimately in failure for the insurgents. The reasons were simple for Engels. While the Parisian workers maintained the necessary spirit and the necessary will of the populace, two decisive advantages lay with the French military. First, they outnumbered the insurgents over two to one.⁷ Second, they had at their disposal the use of superior weaponry, such as mobile artillery, which could, when given enough time, batter down even the most formidable barricade. The bitterness of such defeat was difficult for Engels to accept; he condemned the French commander, General Cavaignac, for barbarous behavior by turning his artillery against the revolutionaries.⁸ Soon afterwards, in September 1848, when a similar uprising broke out in the German city of Frankfurt, Engels praised the spirit and drive of the insurgents, but expressed little hope for the ultimate success of the operation. In addition to the disadvantages of numbers and equipment, the additional drawback of an unsympathetic population that considered revolutionary action as detrimental to possible German unification significantly altered the odds against the insurrectionaries.⁹

In Hungary, a year later, the revolutionary Magyar forces utilized similar tactics with a great deal of success against the Habsburg armies. In this case, while popular support was, at least in the first periods of the fighting, strongly behind the Hungarians, the Hungarians also possessed a comparable force of arms that allowed them to fight on more equal footing than earlier movements. The Hungarians themselves faced insurrection within their own lands from Slovak and Croatian minorities, rising up against them based on the same nationalistic considerations that drove the Magyars. The tactics the Magyars used reflected those of the French in 1848, except that due to the larger expanse of territory available, the Hungarian rebels

were not limited to the towns and urban areas. They certainly held the towns as long as possible, but when that failed, as Engels noted, they withdrew into the countryside, where they maintained considerable support from properties Magyars who viewed the Habsburgs as oppressors, and continued a guerrilla conflict, harassing and disrupting the Austrian rear areas.¹⁰ Being both supported locally and successful militarily, there was no need for the revolutionaries to rush into any decisive engagement with the regular forces of Prince Windischgrätz. If a decisive engagement occurred the Magyars, not the Austrians, would dictate the tempo and determine the parameters of the fight.¹¹ Over the course of the next year, while writing almost exclusively about operations in Hungary, Engels devoted much space to the actions of the rebels that expanded on his conceptions of fighting against a larger regular army, exemplified in the quote at the beginning of the section. To Engels, the possibilities for irregular action were endless. For example, in April, 1849, the Hungarians possessed a tremendous advantage by their method of light cavalry employment near Hatvan and by dictating the tempo of the battle through the use of engineering detachments to destroy bridges and artillery units to harass the Austrians.¹² Engels, inspired by the events of the day, at this point in late April 1849, quit his journalistic activities with the closure of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* offices and went to southern Germany to take part in the insurrections of Baden and the Palatinate. He did not, therefore, continue his observations of the actions in Hungary through the summer, at which point Russian forces intervened and in August assisted in the final defeat of the Hungarian rebellion.

Shortly thereafter, in his exposition on the failed Palatinate insurgency of 1849, Engels consistently reiterated the necessities for a successful revolution, and how these conditions were possible, but not undertaken, in that summer's campaign. First, Engels insisted on the nature of the insurgency operating from an area that possessed a strong popular base, and not within the fortress towns, such as Cologne. Only by occupying and containing the smaller factory towns and rural areas around these fortresses, thereby isolating them (and the Prussian troops which

resided inside) could favorable conditions be set for a successful revolution.¹³ In the end, the possibilities were not that encouraging, but did at least allow for success if the insurgents took fast, vigorous action that shocked the authorities into compromise or capitulation. Such action did not happen in the Palatinate. Engels' final commentaries on the actions of the midcentury revolutions, published under the title of "Insurrection" for his series "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany" in August, 1852, summed up his thoughts on military actions accurately and deserve to be quoted in full:

Now, insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other, and subject to certain rules of proceeding, which, when neglected, will produce the ruin of the party neglecting them. Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play. The forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organization, discipline and habitual authority; unless you bring strong odds against them, you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, the insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination, and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising; it is lost before it measures itself with its enemies. Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small but daily; keep up the moral ascendant which the first successful rising has given to you; rally thus those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse, and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of [French Jacobin Georges J.] Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: *de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!*¹⁴

In the first half of the 1850s, Engels wrote relatively little about the tactical considerations for revolutionary warfare. During these years, he took particular care to remain as unbiased as possible in order to present a realistic portrayal of the attributes of the failed revolutions of the previous years. With his disheartening assessment of the opportunities for revolutionary activity in the near future, his emphasis became the dissemination of those methods that would be most appropriate, effective and possible for contemporary insurgent movements.¹⁵ Those few samples he contributed mostly reaffirmed his earlier postulations and reinforced his views. He continued to stress the role of favorable terrain, whether it was in a sparsely populated country such as Scotland or in the densely populated cities of England.¹⁶ He did add one element to his discussion of the progression of insurgency movements--the importance of tying the

insurrectionary movement to the operations of a regular army. Although this aspect had been present in his writings on the midcentury revolutions, previously he never fully elaborated his thoughts regarding the relationship between the two, although he previously had examined historical examples such as the Duke of Wellington in Iberia and General Mikhail G. Kutuzov in Russia during Napoleon's 1812 campaign. The two forces had existed in either in a state of total separation, or in a state of evolution, similar to the position Mao would espouse nearly a century later when laying out the guerrilla platform for his forces fighting both the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists.¹⁷ In October 1853, Engels saw these considerations in the actions of the Turks and the Russians, particularly with the necessity of the Turks to be able to successfully engage the Russians on a sustained basis.¹⁸ To counter this, and later to counter the combined Allied forces, Engels asserted the Russians needed to use their advantage in light cavalry--the Cossacks--to interdict the Allied rear areas and to cause havoc along the British and French lines of communication, although Engels did admit to numerous shortcomings the Cossacks possessed for application in a conventional scenario.¹⁹

During the Indian rebellions in 1858, the Sepoy insurrectionaries demonstrated both positive and negative attributes of guerrilla tactics. The successes of their operations lay for the most part in the realm of rear area fighting and the successful disruption of the British lines of communications.²⁰ The main faults of the Sepoys, and the causes for the significant defeat at Lucknow, in particular, were their total lack of any military skill or knowledge. According to Engels' prerequisites of guerrilla warfare, there was no reason for such poor performance against Campbell's advancing English column. Engels was extremely critical of the Indian leaders' abilities in the realm of conducting warfare, stating that in Lucknow "there appears to have been neither pluck, nor concert, nor even a shadow of sense. We do not hear of any artillery used in the defense."²¹ Engels was also critical of the Indians' lack of common direction or focus during the later stages of the war. While their slow, methodical campaign against the British later in the

year was boring and lacking in military spectacle, it was also effective. But, unfortunately for the rebels and to Engels' disgust, the Sepoys did nothing to take advantage or follow up their successes.²² And Engels' did mention their successes. Engels held a firm belief that guerrilla movements could overcome a regular European force if well-led and patient enough. By preventing any regular force from taking a holding anything else that the ground they stood upon, an insurgent army could defeat regular foes, even without engaging in a decisive battle.²³ Unlike the revolutions of a decade before, the Indian mutineers possessed a great number of advantages, such as popular support and a relative equality in quantity, if not quality, of troops. Even after the dislodgment from Lucknow, the Sepoys still retained the ability to reenter and reoccupy formerly subdued areas, forcing the British to devote nearly their entire period of operations to retaking previously captured territory. If followed through, thought Engels, this had the potential to guarantee the ultimate success of Sepoy operations.²⁴ In the end, however, the Indian revolutionaries were unsuccessful because they were not nearly fanatical, robust, or united enough to endure the necessary hardships to see final victory.²⁵

The decade of the 1860s was a period of supremacy for the regular armies of Europe against insurrectionary and rebellious forces. Engels saw the regular armies of Europe spending considerable time drilling and working on those elements that would allow them to gain another dimension of supremacy against any future guerrilla movement.²⁶ In addition to the generalities of drilling there was, Engels saw, an added emphasis on the concept of skirmishing among the regular armies, teaching forces to fight not individually, but with unit discipline as part of a combined team, that could work effectively together to defeat irregular forces. The French, in particular, helped to develop the contemporary system through their operations in Algeria, where elements of their army achieved some success against irregular forces.²⁷ Engels also lamented the disparity between abilities of irregular and regular cavalry. Although irregular cavalry possessed advantages when operating against regular forces, as time progressed these advantages shrunk as

regular forces adapted to the undisciplined style of warfare and seldom engaged irregular forces on ground of the latter's choosing.²⁸ Added to this was the factor of weapons with much greater effectiveness than regular rifled muskets. The breech-loading rifles that came into widespread use in the 1860s further assisted these trends.

Until the Paris Commune of 1870-1871, Engels had very little to become excited about concerning the actions of the proletariat, or of any oppressed people, or any other positive examples of guerrilla warfare upon which to remark. In 1857, Engels set down an example of an excellent leader of petty warfare operations when he wrote his entry on Bem for *The New American Cyclopaedia*. Bem conducted "bold surprises, audacious maneuvers, [and] forced marches" and inspired great confidence in his subordinates by leading them to victory in the early stages of the Hungarian uprising.²⁹ In the early 1860s, Engels noted the one leader who was able to emulate Bem, mostly through the application of the same attributes. Garibaldi's use of rebel forces to conduct successful operations up and down the Italian peninsula was the one exception to the bleak period of revolutionary operations in the 1860s.³⁰

Guerrilla Warfare in a Mountain Environment

There is still another form of defensive mountain warfare which has become celebrated in modern times; it is that of national insurrection and the war of partisans, for which a mountainous country, at least in Europe is absolutely required.³¹

Friedrich Engels, "Mountain Warfare in the Past and Present"

Engels dedicated a considerable amount of time to the study of petty warfare in specific environments that were conducive to particular situations or locales. One of these specific areas of interest was warfare in mountainous regions and the use of specialized troops who were particularly suited for such warfare. During the first half of his journalistic career he commented infrequently, but regularly, on the impact of such operations on regular campaigns. In this regard, he used both historical examples and contemporary evaluations to further explore his conceptions about the use of mountain irregular troops to augment conventional operations. In January 1857,

he wrote two articles for the *New York Daily Tribune* that summarized his ideas on the goals, objectives, and tenets of irregular mountain warfare.

Due to the mountainous nature of much of the terrain in Hungary, such warfare contributed a significant amount to the fighting during the midcentury revolutions in that country. Within this environment, Engels noted the adaptability of other nationalist groups within the Austrian Empire to influence the fighting by their occupation of mountain passes that the Austrians relied upon for logistical support. Particularly important in this regard was the Slovak people of the Carpathian Mountains, who occupied important locations in the mountain passes. Although they were not successful in the long run, Engels noted the particular topographical considerations, as well as the national dispositions, that facilitated partisan movements in such areas.³² Another factor that Engels did not comment extensively on, but mentioned in a few of his commentaries, was the hesitancy that the Austrians exhibited in actively engaging such regions. This was indicative of the problems that regular forces faced when confronted with an enemy that operated in such environments.

During the early 1850s, Engels made occasional comments on the effectiveness of mountain troops in both the Balkans and the Caucasus during operations associated with the Crimean conflict. Engels saw the potential use of mountain troops by the Turks as a great opportunity to draw off Russian strength from the front of Turkish positions. There existed, in late 1853, an excellent opportunity for the Turkish commander Abdi Pasha to augment his 30,000 regular troops with Bedouin and Kurdish horsemen who could interdict the Russian supply lines in the Caucasus, significantly deteriorating the Russian effectiveness against his force.³³ When such a situation did occur soon afterwards, the Russians were forced to retreat across the Dariel Pass as they were attacked by a detachment of Abdi Pasha's mountain forces.³⁴ Finally, Engels evaluated the impact of the mountain passes and trails for the resupply of troops garrisoning Sevastopol and other sites on the Crimean. While Engels saw the tremendous opportunities for

the Russians in this regard, he also noted that the Allies had a comparable force available that was suited for countering this threat. With the introduction of the French into the fighting came French specialty troops like the Zouaves and Chasseurs who had experienced such warfare in Algeria.³⁵ In any event, neither the Russians nor the Allies ever fully capitalized on this opportunity and mountain operations made relatively little on the progress of the war.

In January 1857, Engels wrote two articles entitled "Mountain Warfare in the Past and Present" for the *New York Daily Tribune* detailing the use of mountain forces in warfare. For the majority of these articles, the focus remained on petty warfare in a mountain environment, as testimony to the difficulty of regular forces operating in such circumstances. The focus within these articles provided an historical window through which one can view the best methodology for application of military doctrine in a mountainous environment. The nature of such warfare required forces to be light and mobile, far more so than the regular forces which these mountain troops often engaged. This was the case with the Caucasian tribes against the Russians, allowing them to conduct "continued sallies from their hills into the plains," surprising Russian detachments, and "rapid excursions far to the rear of the Russian advanced line, in ambushes laid for Russian columns on the march."³⁶ These activities, which dragged on in Chechnya and Dagestan over the course of several decades, is eerily reminiscent of the current Russian quagmire in the same region.

Engels did not limit his examples to the Crimean theater of operations. Other insurgency movements successfully conducted such operations, too. Engels discussed the actions of the Swiss throughout history, and their ability to stop invading forces to such a distinct degree that opposing armies, notably those of the Habsburg crown, a favorite target of Engels, never achieved success there. It was in the narrow mountain passes of Switzerland where superior technology and numbers were of little use to an invading regular army, and "as soon as these slow-moving armies were once entangled in difficult ground, they stuck fast, while the lightly-

armed Swiss peasants were enabled to act on the offensive, to outmaneuver, to surround, and finally to defeat their opponents.”³⁷ In other cases, Engels used the examples of the peasants in the Tyrol in 1809, the Basques against Spain, and of course the Spanish guerrilla operations against Napoleon to augment his point.³⁸

Guerrilla Warfare and Rear Operations

The strength of a national insurrection does not lie in pitched battles, but in petty warfare, in the defense of towns, and in the interruption of the enemy’s communications.³⁹

Friedrich Engels, “The Relief of Lucknow”

Of all the aspects of guerrilla warfare, Engels did not devote a considerable amount of time or space to the questions of guerrilla detachments operating in a regular force’s rear area. What attention he did pay, however, was very insightful and focused. It is clear that Engels thought such operations were very important in any insurgency, and cited a number of examples of badly outnumbered and outmanned forces successfully degrading a regular army’s operations for an extended period of time. Most of his observations cover two distinct conflicts. The first struggle was the Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849, where insurgencies and counter-insurgencies were common aspects of the military situation. The second conflict was the Indian mutinies of 1858. In this clash, although ably led British regulars frequently defeated the revolutionaries, the Indian tactic of retreat and petty warfare achieved as much as could be expected from such a force.

In Hungary, Engels went to considerable trouble to establish the importance of guerrilla operations in the rear of advancing Austrian armies, and the roles of these operations in distracting the Austrians from their main effort. Engels noted this trend early in the campaign, particularly in his article “The War in Hungary,” written in February, 1849.⁴⁰ From this point forward, Engels did an admirable job of demonstrating not only the success of Hungarian and Hungarian-led forces operating in the rear of the Austrians, but also of the failure of the Austrians to successfully counter such operations. Engels proved especially adept at demonstrating the

repeatedly failures of the Austrians. In early 1849, after repeatedly claiming that a particular geographic area was clear of rebel forces, Engels proved that this was not the case, and that a substantial guerrilla force was operating to the rear of Count Franz H. Schlick's Austrian formation, both strengthening the Hungarian regular forces of Görgey operating to Schlick's front and weakening the corresponding Austrian position.⁴¹

Soon afterwards, in late March 1849, Engels commented on the spread of guerrilla actions in the Austrians' rear areas. These events were no longer limited to Hungarian forces, but had spread to include other Slav, Serb and Slavonian regions, most particularly in the Tolna and Baranya regions of Hungary.⁴² To demonstrate this fact, Engels cited the work of other newspapers reporting from the theater and the official Austrian Army Bulletins to substantiate his position. Although a young reporter and not fully comfortable with the role of subject matter expert in military affairs, Engels did follow this sequence with a number of predictions concerning the next periods of unrest, and included proposals for the necessities to successfully conclude guerrilla operations. Based on his observations that an armed uprising tended to occur whenever the Austria forces left a locale, he predicted that the insurgencies in the Tolna and Baranya would soon cut off Austrian logistical lines and spread into the Triventine Alps and the Bakony Forest.⁴³ While this would not come to pass in the fullest sense of Engels' vision, his discernment of the key tasks and decisive points of this guerrilla movement is striking.

As the successes of the Hungarians became more frequent, Engels' commentaries on rear areas diminished. By the time he concluded writing about the situation in Hungary, his remarks were limited to designating the locations of new insurgencies, both Magyar-led and Imperial, and condemning those nationality-based movements which he saw as economically supported directly from Vienna, such as the Serbian uprising in the Banat and Bacska in May 1849.⁴⁴ In the years following the midcentury revolutions, Engels remarked relatively infrequently on such rear area guerrilla operations. In January 1850, he commented in an article for the *Democratic Review* on

the Palatinate revolutions and the role of the Mulheim workmen who attempted to disrupt the flow of regular troops to his sphere of influence at Elberfeld.⁴⁵ During the Crimean War, he commented a few times on the plight of the Russians in the Caucasus against native tribes operating in their rear and the Turkish use of irregular forces in their attempts to relieve besieged towns in the Balkans.⁴⁶ These few commentaries remain unsophisticated and lack any in-depth analysis of the role and purpose of such operations in a military scheme.

Finally, in 1858, Engels embarked on a very perceptive series covering the operations of the British in India to relieve the garrison at Lucknow. Although Engels certainly was no friend of the British in this sphere, he did give the British commander, Campbell, a great deal of credit for his rapid and active relief of the capital.⁴⁷ On the other hand, he was extremely critical of the conduct of the Indian mutineers. While recognizing the inability of the insurgents to defeat the English on the battlefield, he repeated the mantra that the Sepoys did retain the ability to outmaneuver the English through the application of a doctrine of indiscriminate warfare, forcing the British to march and counter-march in order to protect their lines of communication and resupply.⁴⁸ While early in the conflict, this tactic achieved a degree of success, particularly through the repeated Sepoy tactic of retreating and scattering before decisive engagement with the English, as time passed the insurgents lost their focus.⁴⁹ This loss of focus vexed Engels tremendously, and he chastised the Sepoys roundly: "But instead of organizing an active guerrilla warfare, intercepting the communications between the towns held by the enemy, of waylaying small parties, harassing the foragers, or rendering impassable the supply of victuals, without which no large town held by the British could live--instead of this, the natives have been satisfied with levying revenue and enjoying the leisure left to them by their opponents."⁵⁰

These writings, though relatively few in number, contain a great deal of insight into Engels' conception of the role of guerrilla operations in the rear area of an opposing armed force. One can comprehend many specific goals and objectives of such operations, and see where they

fit into nineteenth-century warfare, and how these goals carried forward into the twentieth century. But it was not solely through his role as a military theorist that these writings should be valued. While Engels did not engage in a large amount of analysis and expert prediction at this early stage of his journalistic career, it was through these writings that he best exemplified those traits that made him an invaluable military correspondent and commentator to the youthful socialist movement in Europe. The series of articles he wrote on the Hungarian revolution and the Sepoy rebellion, and the succinct attention to detail he demonstrated when commenting on these concepts of rear operations that remained relatively obscure for the period, highlight some of the most important concepts of his early theoretical career.

Speed and Irregular Warfare

In war, and particularly in revolutionary warfare, rapidity of action until some decided advantage is gained is the first rule.⁵¹

Friedrich Engels, "The Storming of Vienna. The Betrayal of Vienna"

Engels dedicated a significant amount of time to the discussion of the nature of speed on the battlefield, and the critical importance of alacrity in the combat zone. His analysis of these elements as a part of irregular warfare contained many similarities to comparable operations in the evolution of regular operations. Regardless of these similarities, Engels specifically dedicated a fair amount of writing to the importance of rapidity for those forces fighting petty war.

The first and most prominent incidence of such types of warfare occurred during the midcentury revolutions. Particularly, Engels saw actions in his native Germany as excellent examples of how one combatant's dictation of operational tempo proved to be critically important for ultimate victory in the campaign. Engels evaluated his own experiences in the Palatinate insurgency of 1849 in demonstrating the criticality of such concepts for revolutionary forces. Unfortunately, in this instance, as in many that Engels commented on in his future writings, the problems of the 1849 insurgency proved too great to permit any significant accomplishments. For Engels, it was vitally important for revolutionary forces to take "swift, energetic measures"

not only during the conduct of operations, but also during the organization and administration of forces prior to combat in order to infuse units with the necessary spirit and momentum. In keeping with his conceptions of the nature of class warfare, the first step in this (theoretical) juggernaut was the arming of the workers.⁵²

Demonstrating his theoretical versatility, Engels also established what needed to be accomplished by regular forces to support the insurgency effectively. Using the 1849 campaign in Germany as a paradigm, as soon as revolution broke out, Prussia should have dispatched “immediately and without a moment’s hesitation” the available regular forces to defend the Frankfurt Assembly; this action alone might have sustained the liberal movement. Given the political realities of the time, it is not surprising that such Prussian action did not take place in any manner, although Engels’ writing tone seems to indicate that he half anticipated that it would.⁵³

Engels made numerous allusions to the importance of swift action not only in battle, but also for the sake of the entire revolution. The importance of swift action was a theme to which he frequently returned when discussing the progress of revolutionary movements across Europe and around the world. As already discussed, Engels saw speed of action as a pre-requisite for the revolutions in Germany in 1848-1849. Similarly, following the defeat of these European movements, Engels attempted to give some larger evaluation of the causes for the revolutionary failure. In his articles “The Storming of Vienna” and “The Prussian Constituent Assembly” published in March 1852, for the *New York Daily Tribune* Engels expounded on a number of military truisms that were critical for revolutionary success. Among these axioms were the concepts of speed, demonstrating strength through the attack, and setting the stage for a decisive engagement through bold action.⁵⁴ In years to come he returned to these axioms, citing the examples of other insurgencies that achieved success, often by displaying many of these revolutionary virtues. In 1858, Engels commended the Sepoys in India for the ability to move rapidly, indicating that this aptitude made them essential for warfare in India.⁵⁵ A few years later,

one of the key attributes that Engels found so worthy of praise in Garibaldi's operations was his demonstrated talent for out-maneuvering his enemies on the battlefields of Sicily. These actions on Garibaldi's part showed that the Italian revolutionary was "fit not for petty partisan warfare only, but also for more important operations."⁵⁶

Administration of Insurgent Forces

Order and Discipline Within Guerrilla Formations

For a war of defense? For that there is no need of a standing army, as it will be easy to train every fit member of society, in addition to his other occupations, in real, not barrack-square handling of arms to the degree necessary for the defense of the country.⁵⁷

Friedrich Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld"

If a Marxist revolution was to be successful, Engels foresaw many of the military challenges insurgents needed to overcome in order to make that happen. One of the key aspects Engels saw very early was the problem of organization and discipline. In Berger's commentary on the Theory of the Vanishing Army, the author makes that point that: "Arming the people would help to redress the technical imbalance between army and people; but until every worker had a repeating rifle and a hundred cartridges in his home, any attempt at insurrection would be madness."⁵⁸ The implications of such arming of the people are tremendous; Engels found it critical to address the need for order with such an armed populace. For centuries, the bourgeois, upper classes of society owned the available means to conduct war, and now the workers needed to enact, relatively suddenly in most cases, some form of order to balance out that shortfall. As he remarked on the Frankfurt uprising in September, 1848, "The people, who are unorganized and poorly armed, are confronted by all the other social classes, who are well organized and fully armed."⁵⁹ Sixty years later, Bolshevik military leaders hearkened to these words as critically important for the success of their revolutions of 1917.⁶⁰ As early as his commentary in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, Engels critiqued some of the early worker uprisings, and noted specific failures in their discipline, which resulted in final defeat. For instance, in

1843, when the Manchester brickmakers rioted, one of the reasons for their ultimate failure was “horrible” marksmanship. Another fault, and one that provides an early example of Engels’ attention to detail in military matters, was the insurgents’ lack of awareness of their battlefield, exemplified by their standing with their backs to a fire during the evening, silhouetting themselves to their foes.⁶¹

During the revolutions at the end of the 1840s, Engels saw many specific instances of the proletariat rising up and at least attempting to engage in disciplined conduct against better-trained foes. Although they met with ultimate failure, the way in which the workers in Paris met many of the challenges of the royalist forces with “unity, discipline and military skill” was to be admired, considering the odds.⁶² Even after their defeat, such admiration was deserved: “The people, mostly unarmed, have to fight . . . the organized power of the bureaucratic and military state.”⁶³ In Hungary, Engels commented on the ability of Magyar “improvised soldiers” to hold their own against trained Austrian and Russian armies. Although he seemed somewhat mesmerized and biased regarding the degree of success that could be attributed directly to this insurgent army, his writings elucidated the importance of transforming the proletariat into soldiers.⁶⁴ A decade later, writing about General Jozef Bem for *The New American Cyclopaedia*, Engels toned down these comments, offering some criticism of the Hungarian for not instilling the necessary organization within his army to withstand the trauma of battlefield defeat.⁶⁵ When the Hungarian forces attempted their less-than-successful demonstration toward Pest in early 1849, Engels concluded that this was done solely to maintain morale while the bulk of the Magyar forces continued their military training. At the time of the demonstration, the level of military proficiency for the insurrectionary forces was not sufficient to risk a decisive engagement.⁶⁶

The cases where problems with organization and discipline most affected the revolutionary movements were seen most clearly in the German situations, according to Engels. When the first rumbles of revolution swept through the German states, various groups began to

organize themselves, and Engels commented on the prospects of their success or failure. He was skeptical about the German Legion from Switzerland and its ability to conduct any sort of effective operations based on the lack of weaponry, drilling, and generally poor nature of its inception, as formulated by a volunteer commander, Johann Philipp Becker from Switzerland.⁶⁷ The situation was not always so dour. In 1849, the Badenese insurgent army was well prepared for fighting, in terms of organization and structure, although Engels did criticize both the level of arming the troops had attained and the financial administration of the force.⁶⁸

During actual campaigning, the situation was not clear-cut in determining success or failure based on the level of discipline. Engels' sarcasm was evident when he commented on the people's militia in the Palatinate: "The Kaiserslautern civic militia, over three hundred philistines strong, paraded at the Fruchthalle every day in uniform, shouldering their arms, and the Prussians, when they marched in, had the pleasure of disarming these gentlemen."⁶⁹ The presence of some trained forces, particularly within the Badenese army, did little to alleviate the problems of discipline within the force as a whole; when the untrained volunteers interspersed with the trained troops, the undisciplined proved to be the greater influence, and problems spread throughout the entire expedition.⁷⁰ When the campaign concluded, and Engels wrote his review of the situation, he returned to the problems of organization and discipline that plagued the insurrection repeatedly throughout the course of the conflict. Such lapses in discipline allowed for missed opportunities and allowed any vague chance of victory to slip away.⁷¹

Perhaps no other situation during the revolution demonstrated the insurgent problems of organization and discipline that the subjugation of Vienna by imperial forces in November 1848. In this case the forces for reform consisted mostly of "a proletarian mass, powerful by numbers, but without leaders, without any political education, subject to panic as well as to fits of fury almost without cause, a prey to every false rumor spread about, quite ready to fight, but . . . incompletely armed and barely organized when at last they were led to the battle."⁷² Even after

an official proletariat guard was created for the defense of the liberal government, it proved “too little inured to the use of arms and to the very first rudiments of discipline” and was overwhelmed by better prepared imperial forces.⁷³

In the decade to follow, Engels repeatedly saw these same conditions for success and failure, and in certain circumstances saw the same lessons of the midcentury revolutions replayed. Particularly in the British Indian operations, Engels viewed the actions of the rebels as faulty in many cases, often culminating in direct combat between the well-organized and disciplined forces of the British and the poorly organized and (Engels might say) unled armies of the insurgency.⁷⁴ Later in the rebellion, in February 1858, Engels saw the one instance of “drilled troops (disciplined they cannot be called)” taking on the British in some sort of organized attack, allowing for some Sepoy control on the battlefield.⁷⁵ Even after stretched lines of communications and problems in their rear areas, sometimes as a direct result of Sepoy success, nullified British gains to a degree the Indians did nothing to follow up this success. Engels saw this failure as a direct consequence of organizational and discipline failure. Not only did the Indians fail to take advantage of the situation, but instead fell deeper into lawlessness as opposed to insurrection.⁷⁶ Engels perceived one particular success in these years for revolutionary military activity. That occurred in Italy, under the direction of Garibaldi. Despite the problems and challenges that the Italian insurrectionary faced during his campaigns in the late 1850s and early 1860s, he held his army together and achieved a string of successes. Engels attributed this ability to Garibaldi’s knack of disciplining a force and holding it together against superior odds.⁷⁷

The achievements of Garibaldi cannot be overlooked. Maintenance of discipline and organization in a revolutionary army proved problematic on many occasions. During the Paris Commune the degree of discipline, regardless of inspiration, in the combatant forces played a crucial role in the destruction of the Communards.⁷⁸ Even in the late twentieth century, Marxist

military thought emphasized the need to instill organization, as well as doctrinal fervor, within proletariat massive during the course of an insurgency.⁷⁹

Guerrilla Training

In the act of raising and developing revolutionary forces, one key element that Engels specifically noted was the amount and quality of drill, instruction and training that those forces received. In his writings, Engels did not postulate any groundbreaking or particularly insightful theories concerning the nature or degree of such training. He did, however, demonstrate sound judgment by detailing both specialized training that was critical to insurgency success and by noting examples where the presence of or lack of training figured prominently in the outcome of the conflict.

Engels found many examples from which he could choose during the revolutions of 1848. Not only in France and Hungary, but also elsewhere in Germany were examples of poorly trained insurrectionaries failing when fighting against drilled, regular troops. For example, in his article "Measures Against German Refugees" in December 1848, commenting on the German Legion of Switzerland, he criticized the Legion's activities for their *ad hoc* foundations. The reason for the impetuous nature of its operations was simply the lack of proper drill the unit possessed, which exacerbated other qualitative and quantitative problems within the unit. The ultimate result of their "over-hasty and unplanned" campaigns, those actions at Lucerne, Baden and Val d'Intelvi, failed.⁸⁰ In Dresden, as well, the total lack of any concrete preparation on the part of the insurgent forces, mostly working-class poor, exacerbated their desperate situation leading to defeat in less than six days. Engels cited the well-trained and equipped forces of the regular armies as the foil in this setting, demonstrating the necessity of finding a way to successfully balance such disproportionate conditions in the future.⁸¹

It was possible to overcome these challenges in certain situations. Engels specifically noted the capabilities within the English working-class community and discussed the suitability

of machinists and engineers for armament development, and artillery or engineer service. Similarly, in rural areas, partially trained sharpshooters and marksmen could be found in abundance.⁸² The significance for Engels was that, given the disparity that was almost certain to exist between regular forces and irregular revolutionaries, responsibility lay with the insurgent forces to balance conventional strengths. The leadership of these actions had to ensure that any proclivities of the local population be taken into consideration and employed when establishing, organizing and training their forces. An insurgent movement could not afford to wait, and waste time training recruits in unfamiliar procedures in the limited amount of time these operations always entailed.

Even in cases where there were attempts at drilling workers and future insurgents, these forces seldom met with any substantial success. For instance, in revolutionary Mannheim Engels noted that tactical instruction proceeded “in a very clumsy fashion and with bad instructors.”⁸³ Not that the hopeless case of such instruction was an excuse not to accomplish it. Conversely, it only meant that future insurgencies must plan accordingly to spend time accomplishing necessary training. In Engels’ article “To Die for the Republic!” when he was commenting on the German revolutions, he noted that although considerable time needed to be spent on logistical preparation for the battle, in one particular instance the insurgents spent at least two days on “tactical instruction,” including a scenario undertaking a mock assault on the Karlsruhe castle by the training insurrectionaries.⁸⁴

In his evaluation of regular forces and their adaptation to combating such movements, Engels paid particular attention to the English and the French. The French, in particular, had succeeded admirably in his opinion in training their forces for irregular and petty warfare. The French had been involved in two specific operations where irregular warfare was the norm and their opponents were not accustomed to conducting “traditional” combat operations--the Crimean and Algeria. The potential within this experience was invaluable, and the French did not

squander these opportunities. Indeed, in both cases, the French learned lessons and applied them later when fighting against irregular troops of other nations, and carried these concepts into their regular army for application in both conventional and unconventional environments. Such lessons that the French gleaned from their experience included: troop appraisal, leadership experience, soldier confidence, and terrain evaluation for cover and concealment.⁸⁵ Additionally, Engels discussed the manner in which combat with irregular troops in special conditions demonstrated the importance of physical fitness in any armed force. The French used the term *pas gymnastique* to define this familiarity and exposure to training that developed physical stamina and played such a critical role in long, drawn out operations, of which many anti-guerrilla operations entailed.⁸⁶ Engels found this same exposure to conditions of irregular warfare valuable to the forces fighting in the American Civil War, as well, particularly in the border and western regions of the conflict.⁸⁷

¹Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #261 (2nd edition), 1 April 1849, 9:171.

²Engels, "Insurrection," 11:85.

³Berger, 60.

⁴Hammen, 36.

⁵Engels, "The 23rd of June," 7:132.

⁶Engels, "The June Revolution," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #31, 1 July 1849, 7:157-8.

⁷Engels, "The June Revolution," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #32, 2 July 1849, 7:161. Engels uses the figures 100,000 against 40-50,000.

⁸Engels, "The 23rd of June," 7:132.

⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Uprising in Frankfurt," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #107 (supplement), 20 September 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:443.

¹⁰Preface to *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 8 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), xxiii; Engels, "The Struggle in Hungary," 8:294.

¹¹Friedrich Engels, "The 19th Army Bulletin and Commentaries on it," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #214, 6 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:301.

¹²Engels, "An Austrian Defeat," 9:272.

¹³Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:163, 170.

¹⁴Engels, "Insurrection," 11:85-6.

¹⁵Berger, 83-5.

¹⁶Engels, "England," 11:204.

¹⁷U.S. Marine Corps, FMFRP 12-18, *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), 62.

¹⁸Friedrich Engels, "The Holy War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3925, 15 November 1853, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 12:432.

¹⁹Engels, "The Armies of Europe," *Putnam's Monthly* #33, September 1855, 14:445-7.

²⁰See Chapter 2, Section I.C.

²¹Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:436.

²²Friedrich Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5443, 1 October 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:607-8.

²³Semmel, 20.

²⁴Engels, "Details of the Attack on Lucknow," 15:532; Friedrich Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5351, 15 June 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:553-4.

²⁵Engels, "The Indian Army," 15:583.

²⁶Friedrich Engels, "Progress of the Moorish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #5846, 19 January 1860, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 16:550.

²⁷Engels, "The French Light Infantry," 18:427-8.

²⁸Friedrich Engels, "Cavalry," *The New American Cyclopaedia*, vol. 4, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 18:311.

²⁹Engels, "Bem," 18:132.

³⁰Engels, "The Moorish War," 16:555.

³¹Engels, "Mountain Warfare," 15:171.

³²Engels, "The Magyar Struggle," 8:236; Engels, "The War in Italy and Hungary," 9:150-1.

³³Engels, "The Holy War," 12:432.

³⁴Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, "State of the Russian War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4125, 8 July 1854, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 13:251. Engels did not, however, discuss the eventual Russian success in the region in 1855.

³⁵Friedrich Engels, "The Crimean War," *New York Daily Tribune* #4411, 8 June 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:202-4.

³⁶Engels, "Mountain Warfare," 15:171.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 15:167.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 15:171.

³⁹Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:441.

⁴⁰Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #219 (2nd edition), 10 February 1849, 8:351.

⁴¹Friedrich Engels, "Bulletin No. 22," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #225 (supplement), 18 February 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:405.

⁴²Friedrich Engels, "From the Theater of War," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #252, 22 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:124; Engels, "The War in Italy and Hungary," 9:151.

⁴³Engels, "The War in Italy and Hungary," 9:151; Engels, "From the Theater of War [Italy]," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #258 (supplement), 29 March 1849, 9:157.

⁴⁴Engels, "Hungary," 9:456.

⁴⁵Friedrich Engels, "Curious Revelations Concerning the Despots of Germany--Intended War Against France--The Coming Revolution," *The Democratic Review*, February 1850, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 10:13.

⁴⁶Friedrich Engels, "Progress of the Turkish War," *New York Daily Tribune* #3944, 7 December 1853, 12:476; Friedrich Engels, "Position of the Armies in Turkey," *New York Daily Tribune* #4065, 28 April 1854, 13:152; Engels, "The War on the Danube," 13:278; Friedrich Engels, "Napoleon's Last Dodge," *New York Daily Tribune* #4358, 7 April 1855, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 14:111-2.

⁴⁷See Chapter 2, Section I.A. and Chapter 3, Section II.C. Campbell had been on the other end of a similar operation a few years earlier. As the British advisor to the Turks at Kars, he was present when that fortress fell to the Russians in 1855.

⁴⁸Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5351, 15 June 1858, 15:554; Engels, "The British Army in India," 15:558.

⁴⁹Engels, "The Indian Army," 15:580.

⁵⁰Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5443, 1 October 1858, 15:607.

⁵¹Engels, "The Storming of Vienna," 11:61.

⁵²Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:168.

⁵³Engels, "Karlsruhe," 10:173-4.

⁵⁴Engels, "The Storming of Vienna," 11:61; Friedrich Engels, "The Prussian Constituent Assembly. The National Assembly," *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, *New York Daily Tribune* #3432, 17 April 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:68.

⁵⁵Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5351, 15 June 1848, 15:554.

⁵⁶Engels, "Garibaldi in Sicily," 17:388.

⁵⁷Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld," 4:249.

⁵⁸Berger, 156.

⁵⁹Friedrich Engels, "The Uprising in Frankfurt," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #108, 21 September 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 7:444.

⁶⁰Von Hagen, 65.

⁶¹Engels, *Condition*, 234.

⁶²Engels, "The June Revolution," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #32, 2 July 1848, 7:164.

⁶³Engels, "The Uprising in Frankfurt," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #108, 20 September 1848, 7:444.

⁶⁴Engels, "From the Theater of War," 9:182.

⁶⁵Engels, "Bem," 18:132.

⁶⁶Friedrich Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #237, 4 March 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:467.

⁶⁷Friedrich Engels, "Measures Against German Refugees--Return of Troops from Tessin-The Patricians'," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #180 (supplement), 28 December 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:204; Friedrich Engels, "Letter of the Central Commission of the Workers' Associations in Switzerland to the Association in Vivis," 25 December 1848, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 8:208.

⁶⁸Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:165; Engels, "Karlsruhe," 10:172-3.

⁶⁹Engels, "The Palatinate," 10:194.

⁷⁰Engels, "To Die For a Republic!" 10:206.

⁷¹Engels, "Petty Traders," 11:91.

⁷²Friedrich Engels, "The Vienna Insurrection," *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, March 1852, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 11:58.

⁷³Engels, "The Storming of Vienna," 11:59.

⁷⁴Engels, "The Siege and Storming of Lucknow," 15:423; Engels, "The Relief of Lucknow," 15:436.

⁷⁵Friedrich Engels, "Windham's Defeat," *New York Daily Tribune* #5253, 20 February 1858, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 15:448.

⁷⁶Engels, "The Revolt in India," *New York Daily Tribune* #5443, 1 October 1858, 15:607-8.

⁷⁷Engels, "Garibaldi in Sicily," 17:388.

⁷⁸Robert Tombs, *The War Against Paris* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7, 23, 194-6, 200; Cole, vol. 2, 134 ff.

⁷⁹*Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 83.

⁸⁰Engels, "Measures Against German Refugees," 8:204.

⁸¹Engels, "Rhenish Prussia," 10:154.

⁸²Engels, "England," 11:203-4.

⁸³Engels, "Karlsruhe," 10:181.

⁸⁴Engels, "To Die for the Republic!" 10:215.

⁸⁵Engels, "Military Reform in Germany," 17:345-6; "The French Light Infantry," 18:426.

⁸⁶Engels, "The French Light Infantry," 18:426.

⁸⁷Engels, "The American Civil War," *Die Presse* #84, 26 March 1862, 19:187.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

When Prussian armies invaded France in the late summer of 1870, Engels, true to form, wrote furiously about the unfolding battlefield campaigns and events. Indeed, for the last half of 1870, practically the entirety of his writings dealt with the subject of the war. Following the war, however, his military writings nearly ceased for almost a decade, when he again dedicated some time and effort to martial subjects. But his later writings contained a more somber tone. Whether age or preoccupation with the activities of the International, Engels' most prolific days of military correspondence were nearly concluded.

From his earliest writings discussing the events of the midcentury revolutions that earned his attention in the working class world as a writer and observer of note, through his writings leading up to the events of the Franco-Prussian War, Engels consistently built his observations and theories of revolutionary war, and how best it could be achieved in the world of the nineteenth century. He skillfully incorporated the events of the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon with the unwieldy suddenness of the industrialization and the development of the working class poor that came in its wake. Early Marxists of many different parties read and understood his commentaries on socialist revolutionary theory concerning both the military and the insurrectionist concepts. On the military side, his offerings included missives on the impact of speed, technology, lines of communication, and the incorporation of combined arms in times of strife. From the revolutionary perspective, his contributions consist of formulating guerrilla operations in different types of combat environments, and organizing the proletariat population for such a struggle. Encompassing these two themes were his writings on military science and leadership for any socialist military movement.

His evaluations of warfare not only in Europe but also across the world, and the implications of military operations for the socialist revolution, had earned Engels great

appreciation as a leading military expert of the period. Very few nonmilitary people in the nineteenth-century paid more attention to developments within the military profession than he.¹ In this sense, Engels can be regarded as one of the early pioneers of military journalism. He contributed the same elements to the socialist cause as his more famous successor, Hans Delbrück, contributed to his audience in the decades following Engels' death. Historian Gordon A. Craig wrote about Delbrück that he was "at once military historian, interpreter of military affairs to the German people, and civilian critic of the general staff. In each of these roles his contribution to modern military thought was noteworthy."² Certainly, these same attributes apply to Friedrich Engels as well, except that his target audience went far beyond the German population to include the entire working class population of the world. While not always an innovator or initiator of new ideas, Engels' conceptions of war fused together contemporary ideas, for the first time, to the proletariat revolutionary movements of his lifetime. His journalistic contributions appeared in publication in many different countries and languages, both during and after his lifetime. In that sense, then, his sphere of influence was at least as large, if not larger, than Delbrück's.

Areas for Further Examination

Obviously, there are certain challenges and limitations with which this project contended. One particular challenge was the problem of changing definitions over time. For instance, the terms "unconventional," "guerrilla," "irregular," "partisan," and "*kleinekrieg*" each entailed different aspects of the type of conflict being waged. These definitions varied somewhat through time and did not always mean the same thing to different people. Such a discussion, while valuable in a larger scheme, will be too peripheral for this study.

There are a number of issues related to the concept of adding an evaluation of Engels' tactical knowledge to his overall theory of war. Perhaps the most obvious one is how his tactical analyses changed following the Franco-Prussian War. Engels eventually reversed his view on the

necessity of war, concluding after the events of 1870 and 1871 that war was no longer desirable for the progress of the revolution, a view that some later revolutionaries, particularly Guevara, would find galling. Wette describes the three factors that contributed to this change of heart as the increase in European mass armies, the “revolutionary innovations in military technology” (*umwälzenden Neuerungen im Kriegswesen*), and the foreseeable horrors of any future world war.³ It is here that Wette comes closest to discussing the relevant tactical and technological issues that go into Engels’ theory of war. These changes fostered a necessity in Engels’ thought to call for the avoidance of war. Despite the promising and challenging concepts this issue provokes, more research than appears possible is needed to properly place this matter within the scope this project.

Likewise, many of the tangential arenas that figure into the progression of the major themes of this project deserve further analysis that was not possible given the constraints of this thesis. The most prominent of these is the debate (or at least potential debate) between Vladimir I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky during the shaping of the Bolshevik Revolution. The relationship between and the actions of these two men shaped Soviet, and international, Communist military doctrine for decades after their deaths. Similarities between Engels’ conceptions and Communist doctrine of the twentieth century are certainly apparent. For example, Engels looked at the basic instruments of success and failure on the battlefield, particularly in the realm of new technology. Even in the late twentieth century, Soviet military doctrine remained heavily focused on two elements, the political and the military-technical.⁴ Similarly, it is Engels, not Marx, whom Soviet thinkers regarded as the founder of late twentieth-century communist military doctrine and science.⁵

Engels was one of the earliest contributors to the theories of unconventional warfare during the nineteenth century. During the Hungarian national revolution of 1848-1849, Engels did not concentrate on conventional warfare, but emphasized the unconventional aspects. He

endorsed the actions of Görgey in his program of holding towns for as long as possible and then resorting to guerrilla warfare in the countryside.⁶ Similarly, Engels emphasized the guerrilla warfare that erupted in the rear of Austrian forces during their campaigns in the spring of 1849. He saved his most significant formulations of military doctrine for the closing stages of the Hungarian war. Specifically, in a series of articles written in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* during the first week of April 1849, he wrote that “A nation that wants to conquer its independence cannot restrict itself to the ordinary methods of warfare. Mass uprising, revolutionary war, guerrilla detachments everywhere--that is the only means by which a small nation can overcome a large one, by which a less strong army can be put in a position to resist a stronger and better organized one.”⁷

Engels also emphasized the importance of light operations as opposed to conventional ones. The guerrilla tactics of the revolutionary forces were much more appropriate for this style of fighting, and able to take advantage of all the benefits of quick strikes and fast movements without the heavy equipment, heavy cavalry and artillery, that bogs down on long campaigns. The Hungarian rebels of 1848-1849, even though not as well armed or trained as the Austrians, could gain significant successes with few artillery pieces and small detachments of cavalry in the conduct of guerrilla warfare against the “indolent and mindless” Austrian soldiery.⁸

Twentieth-century parallels to these ideas in the world of the Left are common. General V. K. Triandafillov, an important interwar innovator of Soviet operational warfare, echoed Engels’ sentiments concerning the nature of oppressive forces in an unjustified attack. Where Engels called the Austrians “indolent and mindless,” Triandafillov paid particular attention to the mentality of the mass armies that would conduct future operations. Not so much calling the manpower of the capitalist world substandard, but instead viewing them as a force waiting to break the bounds of the oppressive regimes themselves.⁹

Conversely, certain communist movements in the twentieth century appeared quite contrary to the ideals that Engels espoused. Why, then, did communist movements veer away from his viewpoints along different trajectories while still adhering to his general principle first advocated in the mid-eighteen hundreds? The case of Che Guevara provides a provocative illustration. Not only does Guevara concentrate his Marxist activities on fighting a guerrilla style war, but does so in a manner that both hearkens back to Engels, while also demonstrating some very significant breaks with the forerunner's ideology. At one level, Guevara emphasizes the importance of a long, intense guerrilla war, conducted primarily in the countryside, where the proletariat forces have the greater advantages. Guevara also recognizes the importance of the "people's" readiness for and ability to conduct such a war.¹⁰ This line of thinking solidly mirrors Engels. But Guevara also takes an apparently different view of the individual in the revolution. Whereas Engels places a great deal of importance on the role and ability of the individual in executing and enhancing a revolutionary movement, and is much more enterprising at incorporating the social aspect into Leftist revolutions, Guevara apparently ascribes nothing in his "Marxist humanism" to Engels himself. Guevara's disdain and derision of standing armies is also somewhat, though not totally, incompatible with Engels' position on the role and mission of standing armies a century earlier.¹¹

These, then, mark the important sub-elements that need to be addressed in the progression of this further research. What were the specific influences of Engels on the major Marxist movements of the twentieth century? Beyond this, how did Engels' vision of tactical military incorporation into revolutionary activities carry from one movement to the next, and why did it differ? As a corollary to this question, how did his vision of socio-military incorporation into revolutionary activities evolve over time and distance. Once these questions have been examined fully, one can synthesize the conclusions into an overall appraisal of Engels' lasting impact.

Significance

There is no simple and individual concept that can summarize the attitudes of Engels toward similar activities during his life. A few trends and ideas can be ascertained, however, that provide a solid foundation for evaluation of his military thought and analysis during this time. Engels spent a considerable amount of time developing the strategic level of Communist military doctrine, a fact that many historians admit without argument. But he also, alone among the early Marxist theorists, considered the tactical development of military doctrine as well, and how it integrated into this strategic outlook. He demonstrated great ability in handling the intricacies of campaign analysis and doctrinal development. These contributions to the field of communist thought were important and frequently studied by later generations of Marxist leaders. This is an aspect to which scholars have paid lip service, simply rolling these contributions into the largest catchall of strategic revolutionary thought.

With the vast number of insurrections that have taken place in the world over the last few decades and the large number of current Marxist movements in the world today, from Africa to the Philippines, the importance of doctrinal foundations is critically important. In the late twentieth century people have become so accustomed to the mantra that policy and strategy must drive operations and tactics that it has become too easy to overlook the perspectives of an earlier period. Understanding Engels' place in this pattern, the accuracy of his evaluations, and their potential impact will be a major asset to other scholars in the field, as well as to military observers.

¹Chaloner, xvii-xviii.

²Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 326.

³Wette, 91.

⁴Jacob Kipp, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control," *Military Review* (December 1988), 8.

⁵Vigor, 9.

⁶Engels, "The 19th Army Bulletin," 8:300-1.

⁷Friedrich Engels, "The Defeat of the Piedmontese," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #261 (2nd edition), 1 April 1849, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 9:171-3.

⁸Engels, "The War in Hungary," *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* #265, 6 April 1849, 9:232.

⁹V.K. Triandafillov, *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*, trans. William A. Burhans (Bath: Frank Cass, 1994), 45-6.

¹⁰Michael Lowy, *The Marxism of Che Guevara: Philosophy, Economics, and Revolutionary Warfare*, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 90-1.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 87.

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